The Political Scene | The New Yorker · · Transcript & summary by WhipScribe
A historian who reported on the fall of the Iron Curtain explains why liberal democracy is under strain and what Europe can still do about it.
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“Seen from South America or Africa, China looks in many ways more attractive.” Timothy Garton Ash · at 6:27 — ▶ hear it from here
“Stupidity is a much underrated factor in history.” Timothy Garton Ash · at 23:34 — ▶ hear it from here
Historian Timothy Garton Ash, speaking with David Remnick, traces how liberal internationalism lost its footing after the Cold War. He blames early-2000s overconfidence, the 2008 financial crisis and extreme inequality for weakening the liberal order, while Vladimir Putin pushed back and China rose as a rival model. Ash argues that developmental authoritarianism looks attractive to many countries in Africa and South America, and that American democratic norms have been battered. He does not expect a return to the 1930s, but thinks Western democratic capitalism is failing to deliver for many people.
On Ukraine, Ash says a just peace, with full territorial recovery and Putin on trial, is out of reach. The most realistic outcome is an independent Ukraine that gives up roughly a fifth of its land and moves toward the European Union. He warns that Russia's hybrid attacks in Europe could test NATO's resolve, and he doubts Putin will settle until his generals tell him he is losing. Across Western Europe, he sees aging populations, heavy welfare debts and immigration anxiety feeding nationalist parties, with the balance between liberals and nationalists finely poised.
Ash applies the same lens to Britain, where he calls Brexit a damaging mistake and says rejoining the EU would be a five-to-ten-year project. He credits Andy Burnham with speaking emotionally about the nation, and argues liberals ceded patriotism to the right. On America, he says trust in the US security guarantee has been badly damaged, which gives Europe a chance to spend more on defense. He closes by warning that money in politics and unaffordable housing keep the conditions for Trumpism alive without Trump.
Timothy Garton Ash is a historian at Oxford University and a fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution. He has written about Eastern Europe and Germany since the early 1980s, and his most recent book is Europe in Seven and a Half Chapters.
Timothy Garton Ash describes China's model, kindly, as developmental authoritarianism. He says that seen from South America or Africa, China looks more attractive than the West, especially since 2008.
“Seen from South America or Africa, China looks in many ways more attractive.”Timothy Garton Ash · 6:27
Timothy Garton Ash calls Brexit an incredibly stupid move and one of the most long-lasting pieces of damage from the Trump era. He says most British people would now be happy to rejoin the EU, though a return would come on worse terms than before.
“Stupidity is a much underrated factor in history.”Timothy Garton Ash · 23:34
Timothy Garton Ash says Putin does not yet believe he is losing in Ukraine, so he will not negotiate seriously until his generals tell him otherwise. He describes Putin's approach to the war as putting in enormous numbers of troops regardless of cost.
“He does not yet believe that he is losing.”Timothy Garton Ash · 12:47
Timothy Garton Ash says he no longer believes the United States would come to Europe's aid under NATO's Article 5 guarantee if Russia sent troops into Estonia or Narva. He calls that trust blown, and says Europe should have been doing more for its own defense for years.
“But I don't think the trust in the NATO Article 5 guarantee that if push came to shove”Timothy Garton Ash · 28:26
Timothy Garton Ash says Marine Le Pen looks likely to win the French presidential election, which he sees as part of a wave of far-right consolidation across Europe. He argues that one far-right leader who moderates, like Italy's prime minister, is different from several of them shifting the EU's centre of gravity.
“Five Maloney's is very different from one Maloney.”Timothy Garton Ash · 32:10
Timothy Garton Ash argues that liberal democracy has lost ground since the 2000s through overconfidence, the 2008 financial crisis and inequality, and that Europe must now build its own defense and resilience because America can no longer be relied on. He sees the next few years, including a run of European elections, as a close contest between liberal internationalists and nationalists.
Timothy Garton Ash says Europe has to keep building its own resilience, independence and connections because America can no longer be counted on for security. He calls Europe the biggest concentration of democratic middle powers in the world and hopes a better American president arrives in January 2029. He blames liberal hubris, the 2008 financial crisis and inequality for weakening the liberal order over the past two decades.
Timothy Garton Ash describes the Chinese model kindly as developmental authoritarianism. He says that seen from South America or Africa, China looks more attractive than the West, especially since 2008. He points to the flouting of democratic norms in the United States and to Europe's reaction to Donald Trump as reasons. He does not think Xi Jinping's China is the future for most people, but says Western democratic capitalism is failing to deliver.
Timothy Garton Ash says a just peace, with Ukraine regaining all its territory and Vladimir Putin on trial in The Hague, is not possible. The most he thinks can be achieved is Ukraine accepting the loss of about one-fifth of its territory, including Crimea and eastern areas Russia already controls, and becoming a strong sovereign state on its way into the European Union. He calls that a victory for Ukraine and a huge defeat for Putin.
Timothy Garton Ash calls Brexit an incredibly stupid move and one of the most long-lasting pieces of damage from the Trump era. He says opinion polls show most British people would be happy to rejoin the EU, though a return would be a difficult process on worse terms than before. He expects a clear political majority for rejoining to take five to ten years to build. He credits Andy Burnham with making an emotional case for a liberal patriotism.
Timothy Garton Ash says he does not think the United States would come to Europe's aid if Putin sent small green men across the frontier into Estonia or Narva. He describes escalating Russian hybrid attacks, including explosive-laden drones at Leipzig Airport, and warns Putin might test a corner of NATO territory to show the alliance is a paper tiger. He says the answer is to redouble support for Ukraine.
Timothy Garton Ash says he cannot recall a period when pro-liberal internationalists and anti-liberal nationalists were more finely balanced. He points to two big wins for the Alternative for Germany, the French presidential election where Marine Le Pen looks likely to win, and coming votes in Italy and Poland. He says by the end of 2027 Europe may look very different, but stresses that the outcome is by no means inevitable if younger Europeans mobilize.
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2:54Head to Wayfair.com to shop all things home. That's W-A-Y-F-A-I-R dot com. Wayfair, every style, every home. You're listening to The Political Scene. I'm David Remnick. Early each week, we bring you a conversation from our episode of The New Yorker Radio Hour. The New Yorker Radio Hour is a co-production of WNYC and The New Yorker. Welcome to The New Yorker Radio Hour. I'm David Remnick. Tens of millions of Americans in many places are still giddy from delivering a verdict on Trump's second term. Voters have turned away from the Iran war, from mass deportation, from the rampant corruption in the administration. But for responsible, reality-based leaders, the challenges ahead are truly daunting.
3:55Under Donald Trump, America has largely given up its place in the world. We've been weakened by a quagmire in Iran. Our allies are looking at China as perhaps a more stable, mature economic partner. They're concerned that Russian aggression will spread even beyond Ukraine, and nobody counts on Donald Trump to stand up for NATO. Meanwhile, far-right parties are seeking power across Europe. So how much could a future administration in Washington regain of what's been lost? The person I most wanted to sit down with to think through this precarious moment is Timothy Gardinash. He's a historian and, I should say, a real hero of mine. Tim started writing about Eastern Europe and Germany when he was very young, in the early 80s.
4:39He documented the fall of the Iron Curtain with unbelievable on-the-ground reporting coupled with his immense scholarship. I have learned a lot from Timothy Garton Nash. Tim, you and I were lucky enough in the 1980s and early 90s to cover the collapse of communism, the fall of the Berlin Wall. And liberal internationalism was on the march. It didn't turn out quite the way we had thought. What is your sketch, and we'll get to the specifics, of how things went wrong for so long? I think that in the early 2000s, we fell prey to hubris. We really believed it was mission accomplished and that history would go on going our way and Europe and freedom would march forward arm in arm. And hubris is always a mistake because
5:33then the problems come. And I think the problems come from outside, starting with the fact that Vladimir Putin clearly didn't like what had happened and the empire started striking back, but also the global financial crisis, which segues into the Eurozone crisis. And a lot of that had to do with neoliberalism, extreme economic inequality. So I think there's a bunch of things that have to do with what went wrong with liberalism, but then there's a bunch of things that have to do with what was happening in the rest of the world, not just Russia, but also, of course, the quite spectacular rise of China as a competitor superpower. I heard you say elsewhere that the true alternative ideology to liberalism is the Chinese alternative.
6:27How would you describe the Chinese ideology in contemporary terms? If you wanted to describe it very kindly, you would say developmental authoritarianism. But honestly, look at the West, particularly the United States, since 2008, and then look at China. Seen from South America or Africa, China looks in many ways more attractive. Until the midterm elections, we have experienced in the United States, and you've seen this elsewhere in Europe, a complete flouting of democratic norms. You saw all these European states looking at the Trump presidency as something that was absolutely repugnant. You even saw the spectacle of Canada, thinking that maybe it was time to make a much closer alliance with China, much less Europe. The sense of growing repugnance and
7:18disgust, not just of the Trump administration, obviously, but of what's happened to American society is honestly very painful. Now, I don't think that means that we're back in the 1930s, because remember, in the 1930s, people thought communism was the future. I've seen the future, and it works. And then there was another big group of people who thought fascism was the future. Now, I don't think many people in Europe, not even in Africa or South America, think Putin's Russia is the future. Maybe not so much even Xi Jinping's China. But what they think is that Western democratic capitalism is just failing to deliver. And in many respects, they're not wrong. There's a lot of glee in the United States in a lot of quarters about the midterm elections.
8:12I don't know how you interpret it and what its meaning will be. I mean, as decisive as all that in the European mind about a reversal of the American temper. So this was one of the best evenings of recent times for me too, no question. But David, for us in Europe, we have to keep our heads on, because actually, it doesn't make such a big difference for us. I mean, okay, Congress has the power of the purse. Maybe it'll constrain the Trump presidency a bit, but he is still in charge of foreign policy. He's going to be the largest and angriest lame duck in the history of the world. He's still clearly intent on trying to impose a capitulation peace on Ukraine in his farcical attempt to win the Nobel Peace Prize. Next week, he's proposing
9:07to have a trilateral summit with Putin and Xi Jinping in Shenzhen, China, which is a sort of parody of the February 1945 Yalta meeting. So ironically, I think the lesson for us is we have to just keep doing the same, only more so. I mean, build up our own resilience, our own independence, our own connections. So you mentioned Mark Carney. So Europe is the biggest concentration of democratic middle powers in the world and the most integrated with Canada and with Australia and with Japan. Build all that up in the hope that, pray God, come January 2029, we have a charismatic internationalist Democrat president, you know, Pete Buttigieg, John Ossoff, you know, that would be wonderful. But we clearly can't count on it.
10:01What is possible in Ukraine? Territory has been lost in the east and in the south. The casualty count everywhere on both sides is horrendous. What is possible there? The first part of the answer is what might have been possible if we'd given more decisive support, the Biden administration and Europe, in the early months of the war. People talk smoothly of a just peace. I'll tell you what's not possible. That's a just peace, because a just peace would be Ukraine regaining all its sovereign territory and Vladimir Putin being on trial in The Hague. What is possible is that Ukraine, accepting the de facto loss of about one-fifth of its territory, so Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, the territory Russia
10:54already controls, becomes a strong, sovereign, independent state on its way into the European Union. And that, I don't need to tell you, is a victory for Ukraine. And it's a huge defeat for Putin because Putin clearly believes that Russia without Ukraine cannot be Russia in his imperial understanding. So that, I think, is the maximum that is now possible. My sense of things, if I were to go to Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, places that you go, I would hear a lot of anxiety about all kinds of operations being carried out by the Russians. Am I right? Totally. There is constantly escalating Russian hybrid attacks on us. I mean, explosive laden drones at Leipzig Airport is a spectacular example of that. And it's not impossible that Putin will think it
11:55worth having a go at some corner of European NATO territory, Svalbard right up in the north, Narva, the majority ethnic Russian city in Estonia or somewhere else. Not to grab a vast chunk of NATO territory, but to demonstrate that with Trump in the White House, NATO is a paper tiger. So the threat is very real. And the answer to it is very clear. Redouble our support for Ukraine. Do you have any sense at all that there's any motivation on Putin's side to finally come to a settlement? The calculation on his side seems to be, I have a gigantic meat grinder and I don't care how much meat I have to put into it. I am going to prevail. What would motivate him to come to a settlement? So a friend of mine spoke to a Central Asian leader who knows
12:47Putin very well some time ago and asked a precise question. He answered, it's very simple. When his generals tell him he's losing, then he will negotiate seriously. He does not yet believe that he is losing. And I mean, you would know this better than me. Yes, his economic situation is getting worse, but it's not so dire that people are going on the streets or great parts of his elite are rebelling, which is why we in Europe have to redouble our support for Ukraine and hope that maybe a Democrat-controlled Congress does vote another Ukraine aid package. Tim, let's turn to what's going on in Western Europe. A lot of people in the United States look at the social democracies throughout Western Europe
13:36with a great measure of envy, whether it has to do with health care or retirement benefits, education and the rest. And yet it's very easy now for conservatives to point to places like France and say, look, is that what you want? You're seeing all kinds of indebtedness and collapse and street protests and all the rest. So how do you answer that anxiety about social democracy in Europe today and the problems it faces? In Donald Trump's definition of communism, we are enjoying all the delights of communism in Europe, and I can strongly recommend it. Our problem is that we have aging populations, very large welfare states, high levels of national debt, and populations that are getting increasingly allergic to
14:27the immigration that we need to pay our pensions and anti-liberal nationalist populist parties that are exploiting those fears and concerns. And, you know, we have this mega cycle of elections now. We have Spain coming up at the end of this month. It started in Germany with two very worrying big wins for the alternative for Germany. The far-right AFD party. Then we have the French presidential election, which Marine Le Pen at the moment looks likely to win. And then we have Italy and Poland. So by the end of 2027, we may be getting a very different and anti-liberal nationalist populist Europe, which is a source of huge concern. If I look back over the whole period we've been talking about, I cannot see a period when the forces of, broadly speaking,
15:22pro-liberal internationalism and anti-liberal nationalism have been more finely balanced. And I think by the end of next year, we'll see which has the upper hand. It seems the outcome in France, for example, is likely either far left or far right. What Macron did was put all the liberal forces together in the center. But if you don't deliver, and he's spectacularly failed to deliver, then all you're left with is the far left or the far right. So yes, indeed. As I say in the book, analytically, I think the nationalists are more likely to prevail. And in a way, we shouldn't be surprised by that, because we've had this more or less liberal Europe for quite a long time. So as a historian, one would expect at some point some big challenge to that order.
16:15But it is by no means inevitable. If people mobilize, and particularly if younger Europeans mobilize, it's entirely possible to swing those elections the other way. Most of the results are very close. I'm speaking with the historian Timothy Gart Nash. His new book is called Europe in Seven and a Half Chapters. We'll continue our conversation in just a moment. This is the New Yorker Radio Hour. into the great indoors with VELUX Skylights. Create spaces full of natural light and fresh air so you can better connect with nature, your home, and those around you. Because home isn't just how a space looks. It's how it feels. VELUX Skylights. Discover more at veluxUSA.com. Clothes shopping really isn't my thing.
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18:16of $45 for three months, $90 for six months, or $180 for 12-month plan required. $15 per month equivalent. Taxes and fees extra. New customer offer for initial plan term only. Greater than 50 gigabytes may slow when network is busy. See terms. This is the New Yorker Radio Hour. I'm David Remnick, and I've been speaking today with Timothy Garton Ash, the historian at Oxford. Ash wrote with great penetration about Eastern Europe during the late days of communism, describing what happens in the absence of democracy with corrupt, unaccountable officials in charge. Looking at recent history has made Tim one of the great defenders of the liberal democratic project. Timothy Gartnash teaches at Oxford University
18:58and he's a fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution. We'll continue our conversation now. Your fellow historian Simon Shama just wrote a long essay in the Jewish Quarterly about anti-Semitism in the UK and as well as in France and elsewhere in Europe. And his level of anxiety, I would say, is through the roof, through the roof. And to him, it indicates the canary in the coal mine about nationalism in its most extreme form throughout Europe, particularly in UK and France. That's what he was concentrating on. Do you share that anxiety? I do. The other aspect of this is as well as, if you like, old-fashioned European antisemitism, particularly on the right, we have passions running very high, particularly on the
19:48left, about Israel, Gaza, and the issue of Palestine. So I think one needs to keep those two elements apart. In other words, I think that, you know, old-fashioned European nationalism and xenophobia and indeed anti-Semitism is very much extremely worrying in Poland. But there is also a part of this story for whom the person most responsible is probably Benjamin Netanyahu. And you find on the left that it's purely focused on fury about Gaza, not about anti-Semitism as such. No, no, no. I won't want to say that. I think there's a continuum there. But what I would say is this. If, unlikely as it seems, there was a really significant change in the Israel-Palestine relationship, I think a good deal of the anger, for example, among my own students here at Oxford, would fade away.
20:49And then you would see what is actually a kind of hardcore, very worrying actual anti-Semitism and xenophobia. We lived in a time when the Czech Revolution was being led by a playwright moralist named Václav Havel, and there were similar figures in Hungary, in Poland, in Russia, if not in the government, then at least in the dissident class. I don't know that I see that anymore anywhere, whether it's in Europe or the United States, but I keep looking for it in all the wrong places as the song goes. You'll remember that Bertolt Brecht in his play Galileo, Galileo's disappointed disciple says, unhappy the land that has no heroes. And Galileo replies, unhappy the land that has need of heroes. Countries with quote-unquote normal politics
21:47don't generate but don't actually need the Churchills or Adenaus or de Gaulle's or Havers or Wences or Michniks or, you know, Gorbachev. But God, we seem to need them now. You write in your book that the French, for example, are the architects of modern revolutions. And we've seen these widespread protests in France this year, huge student demonstrations on the street, farmers dumping manure, liberal clarity, so that France doesn't end up with an extremist on the left, an extremist on the right. And I would ask the same question of other European nations. I'd ask the same question of us. In places which have had a bit more oppression, a bit more adversity, and remember one of my earliest books was called
22:43The Uses of Adversity. In Hungary, with that amazing election victory for Peter Magyar, a leaderless student movement toppling a strongman in Serbia, I would say someone like Kaja Kallas from Estonia is not half bad. Now the high representative of the European Union for Foreign Policy, Meta Fredriksson, the Danish prime minister actually, Andy Burnham, our new prime minister, is not half bad. You know, I think there's a real danger of putting it all on the leaders. But of course, I agree with you. Where are the great ideas about how to reform and reshape and revive a liberal society, a free society, liberal international order. That, I think, is what we're still looking for. You mentioned Burnham in the UK.
23:34We're having trouble keeping up with your prime ministers. They come and go, it seems, every six months, every year or so. Help us understand Burnham. You seem to have some confidence in him, some hope in him. It's a mess, Britain, because, how shall I put this? Stupidity is a much underrated factor in history. And the most dangerous form of stupidity is the stupidity of extremely well-educated and intelligent people like Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, who gave us Brexit. And this country still has not recovered from that incredibly stupid move, you know, potentially one of the most long-lasting pieces of damage done by what one might call the Trump era. Now, Andy Burnham at least understands that you've got to do things that immediately reach people, that we've got to emotion and we can't leave talk of the nation to the right. Because that was
24:48another big mistake liberals made, right? We left all talk of the nation to the right, and we left emotion to the right. And so he's able to make an emotional connection and to communicate a kind of liberal patriotism. When you speak of the nation, you're talking about immigration, essentially. You know, as I say in the book, our societies have changed out of recognition in the last 60 years. I don't know when was the first time you came to Europe, but, you know, in the early 1970s, our societies, a West European country, would typically have sort of one in 20 people with a migration background. Now it's typically one in five or one in four, one in three in a younger generation, and one in two in big cities. then things look very dark for Europe. What we did for the last 20, 30 years was arguably to let in possibly too many immigrants,
25:52somewhat uncontrolled immigration, but not do enough about integration. And what we need is the precise opposite. Take back control, the great Brexit slogan. It was a brilliant slogan because that's what people all over Europe feel, that it's no longer under control. People have got to feel it's managed. Actually, one of the most successful places in Europe doing this is Britain because Britishness is already such a baggy identity. On Saturday, I can cheer for Scotland in the rugby match, and then when they lose on Sunday, I can cheer for England. It's already a multinational nation which has been quite good at integration. Do people in Britain think that, looking back, that Brexit was a good decision?
26:38No. All the opinion polls tell you very clearly. If you could say abracadabra, Britain is back as a full member state of the EU, most people would be very happy. Also, by the way, in the EU. It was a very close vote. I think it was 52% or 51%, I forget what it was. And now a majority thinks it was a bad mistake. How do you reverse it if you could? So first of all, on the EU side, you know, trying to get into the EU, which is what this would be, is an absolutely bloody process. Ask any Central and East European country. So we would get a much worse deal than we had before. As we come up to the next election, probably 2029, you're going to have a left block, which is kind of competing in pro-Europeanism, Labour, Lib Dems, Scottish nationalists,
27:30Welsh nationalists, and so on. But you're going to have a right block with the Conservatives competing with Nigel Farage's Reform UK in anti-Europeanism. So you've got to get beyond that to a point where there is a clear majority politically for rejoining. And I think that's a matter of five to ten years. When you speak to European leaders, diplomats, academics, and the rest, and watch this election in the United States, is one of the results you think that the NATO alliance has been vouchsafed again? I wish I could say that. The one thing all Europeans have in common is America. You go to a small town in eastern Slovakia, and they will know the name of John Ossoff, and they will be comparing possible presidential
28:26candidates from different US states. They know nothing at all about politics in Portugal or Spain. So it's an absolute dominant in our political conversation. But I don't think the trust in the NATO Article 5 guarantee that if push came to shove and Putin sent some little green men across the frontier into Estonia and Nava, for example, the US actually would come to our aid. I think that's gone. And in a way, it's incredible we had it for so long. Because, you know, this whole wonderful Europe, the best Europe we've ever had, was being built under this American security umbrella. All the way from 1945, I would say, to 2025. But I think that trust is blown. And there's an opportunity there. Because, of course, to be honest with you, we should have been doing much more for our own defense years ago.
29:26Donald Trump was a little bit right in terms of percentage of GDP being spent in Europe on defense, wasn't he? Clearly so. But every other American president, basically, since George W. Bush had been saying that, no one had paid any attention. But when you say trust is blown, speaking of abracadabra, do you think that that trust in the United States has been blown permanently? Do you remember we used to talk about the West, David? I do. Do you remember that time? It existed as a geopolitical actor. And I think what's happened in the United States between 2016 and now has destroyed that. But as I said, there's an opportunity there. If we actually spend more on our defense, build up our own hard power,
30:11build up our own connections, then we could imagine a kind of, if we're very optimistic, a kind of reshaped and restructured liberal international order waiting there for President Buttigieg or President Ossoff or whatever the name is, he or she, coming to power in January 2029. I wonder, if this extends now to Taiwan as well, if you're the Chinese and you look at the state of things in the United States, do you think that if you're Xi Jinping, you figure you can take Taiwan if it's worth the trouble? So I think if I'm Xi Jinping, I look at Ukraine and I think, God, I'm not so sure if I want to risk a military invasion. But I also think I can go on just gently squeezing by economic and political means,
31:08and eventually I'll probably get there without triggering a U.S. reaction. So I think, yes, absolutely. U.S. allies in Asia Pacific, whether you're Japan, South Korea, or Australia, are in the same position as we are, but they don't have the scale that Europe has, because, you know, they're all middle powers. But Europe, when it acts together, is a great power. How much do you buy into the notion that if you look at Italy, for example, where we thought we were getting a kind of soft fascist leadership, and she turns out to be maybe not so far right as one had thought, that the possibility that Marine Le Pen is not so bad as her father. I'm trying to put a smiley face on this, Tim, but maybe I'm failing miserably. Listen, Georgia Maloney is correctly described as as a post-post-fascist. What does that mean? It means she was, when she was younger,
32:10a member of a genuinely post-fascist party, a party that had real continuity from Italian fascism. But I would credit her now with being a post-post-fascist because the way she's in significant ways moved on from that. But this is how we try to reassure ourselves by saying, oh, maybe Marine Le Pen will be like Maloney and maybe the PP, the popular party and Vox in Spain will be like Maloney. But here's the thing. Five Maloney's is very different from one Maloney. If you've got one Maloney, she has to adapt to still the mainstream, the center of gravity in the EU, particularly because she needs EU money. Five Maloney's and the whole center of gravity of the EU has shifted. And once again, as a historian, one shouldn't be surprised by this.
33:00What is the concrete result if you have five Maloney's, if you have that kind of far-right consolidation in the EU? We are under attack militarily from Russia, economically from China, and politically from the United States. Unprecedented triple challenge, right? In the 19th century, European colonialists talked about the scramble for Africa. And what we're now beginning to see is the scramble for Europe, right? So outside powers, you can see it very clearly in the Balkans. You saw it also in Hungary, but also elsewhere in Greece, you know, buying up bits of Europe, the Chinese, the Russians, Turkey, and others. So that rather than being what it's been for centuries, one of the great actors, a subject of history, the roles are reversed and suddenly we become
33:56the object of the ambitions of, you know, non-Western or mainly non-Western great powers. And if you like, we get a taste of our own medicine. A final question about the midterms. The more I think about Donald Trump, the more I worry that we're still vulnerable to Trumpism. All across the West, if we can still use that term, the democratic capitalist world, the reservoirs, the aquifers of anger are still overflowing, right? So you see again and again in election after election that people are just so angry about, in many ways, the world we liberals built. And, you know, I think the United States is quite far down the road to oligarchy okay Elon Musk's what was it 500 million dollars didn't swing it this time but many many times
34:53money has spoken and that's the classic you know that all the way back to Aristotle that's the definition of oligarchy in Europe huge issue is affordable housing you know if you're a young person in any big city in Europe, you simply can't afford a rental apartment. Unless and until we address these big structural problems that result from what has passed for liberalism over the last 30 years, there's always going to be the potential of Trumpism coming back without Trump. I agree. And I think the moral political problem we have is one that Putin so acutely pointed out in Munich in 2008, I think it was, at the Munich Security Conference when he gets up and he gives a speech and he basically says,
35:39okay, I've had it. I'm no longer trying to make my accommodation with the West. I look at the United States and its hypocritical and its behavior in Iraq, Afghanistan, and stop scolding me about this, that, and the other thing. I will do what I—you want to act in this way, then I will act as I will. And that's precisely what he went ahead and did. He pointed out, exaggerated, had his own version of history, but he used hypocrisy as the lever against us in terms of world politics. And in some measure, he was not wrong. Yeah, no, that's spot on. What I think is historically new about this moment is that we're already in a post-Western world. We basically threw the kitchen sink at Russia in terms of sanctions, and the Russian
36:33economy did better than many of ours for two or three years. I mean, partly because Putin had prepared for it and had good economic managers, but mainly because he had China to give him the trade and technology. He had India to take the oil that we were no longer buying. He had Turkey. He had Brazil. He had South Africa. And for the first time in at least 200 years, if the major non-Western powers act together or in the same direction, they have sufficient wealth and power to counterbalance the West. And this is why, you know, we need both Europe to do more and the other democratic middle powers. And then, my goodness, we need a better American president in 2029. Timothy Gartnash, thank you so much. Great pleasure, David.
37:22Timothy Gartnash teaches at Oxford University. His books include The Uses of Adversity, The Magic Lantern, and most recently, Europe in Seven and a Half Chapters. I'm David Remnick. That's our program for today. Thanks for joining us, and we'll see you next time. Venture into the great indoors with Velux Skylights and let natural light and fresh air transform every room. Because home isn't just how a space looks, it's how it feels. Discover more at VeluxUSA.com Shaq here. What's it like to buy a car from Carvana 100% online and get it delivered to your door? Let me tell you. Your car is here, Mr. Shaq. Thank you, Mr. Carvana guy. Can't wait to take it for a spin. Only the best for you, Mr. Shaq.
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