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0:00The Telegraph. At Walden University, we give you the support and flexibility to get the W. Walden's online programs are designed for working professionals like you. You'll gain hands-on skills to take on real-world challenges and succeed. Your future is waiting, and Walden is here to help you achieve it. Take the first step to make your impact. Visit waldenu.edu. Walden University. Set a course for change. Certified to operate by Chev. Every restaurant wants to be busy. Most restaurants aren't ready for it. I'm Chef Mike from Detroit 75 and Toast helps us stay ready when the lunch rush hits. We prepare for lunch like we're preparing for battle. Orders are flying, tickets are stacking, and the guests should never feel
0:59the chaos. Toast keeps our team organized so we can serve more people, stay consistent, and keep growing. Visit ToastTab.com to learn more. Pay testimonial from an actual Toast keeps our team organized so we can serve more people, stay consistent and keep growing. Visit ToastTab.com to learn more. Pay testimonial from an actual Toast customer. I'm Venetia Rainey and this is Iran The Latest. It's Monday, 16th of November, 2026, the ninth month of the war between the U.S. and Iran. On today's episode, Iran has targeted an American base in Bahrain again over the weekend, and the Houthis have retaken the Bab al-Mandab Strait after Saudi-backed forces withdrew to fortify their capital city, Aden. Plus, as this is our last week, we'll be taking stock of this
1:41moment in the war and asking what next for America and Europe in an increasingly dangerous and turbulent Middle East. A short time ago, the United States military began major combat operations in Iran. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the attacks. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei! For the first time ever, the U.S. Navy used a surface sea drone in combat to strike Iranian targets. Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do? Come on. To discuss all of this, I'm thrilled to be joined by David Blair, our Chief Foreign Affairs Commentator. David, welcome back on to Around the Latest. Thank you. Should we just start with a little bit of news? So as I mentioned just then, Bahrain
2:34was targeted again over the weekend. And we mentioned this in our podcast on Friday. We weren't able to update our listeners and viewers completely because we don't think the Iranian attack actually hit anything. They were targeting a radar in the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. It doesn't sound like they actually hit anything. CENTCOM came back very strongly and said, we intercepted two drones, no damage on the ground. Looks like that attack happened again on Sunday. The Iranians trying to target this US radar system in Bahrain. The Bahraini military said that their air defence systems intercepted and destroyed Iranian air attacks, six drones, according to the Iranians. CENTCOM have not come
3:10back on this attack. Of course, we don't know for sure what's happening on the ground. Very hard to say. But clearly, Iran is targeting American bases in Bahrain. Again, that hasn't happened for a couple of months. Plus, on Friday, and this was after the podcast came out, we had drone sightings over RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk. This has been used as an onward operating location by the US Air Force for decades, but it's currently home to the 48th Fighter Wing. And apparently there were sirens blaring. One person who lived nearby said it sounded like World War II era sirens. Big announcement comes out on the tannoys telling people to remain indoors, take shelter. The American European Command later said no personnel, aircraft or infrastructure were affected in the incident.
3:48But obviously this follows the withdrawal of refuelling tanks from RAF Mildenhall, also in Suffolk, and US heavy bombers being pulled out of RAF Fairford back in September, both linked to Iranian plots or threats there. I think there's two things to pull out of that. One is that it doesn't look great for us Brits. In fact, I'd say it looks like we're increasingly riddled with IRGC assets who are able to do stuff, even if not actually hit anything, put the threat out there. But the other side, and I'd be keen to get your thoughts on both, but the other side is that American forces, their force posture in both the Middle East and here in Europe, looking increasingly vulnerable. And they look quite jittery over it. I mean, we don't exactly know what happened in RAF Lake and
4:29Heath, but how sustainable is this force posture in the face of these ongoing Iranian threats, where they don't even have to do that much to really give them the wibblies, should we say? Well, we don't know who was behind whatever happened at RAF Lake and Heath, so we shouldn't speculate. I think more broadly in the Middle East, there is a question mark over the utility of American bases that are within drone and missile range of Iran. The US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and El Udeid base in Qatar have respectively been the hubs of US and other allied naval and air operations across the whole region, not just the Middle East, incidentally, but the Indian Ocean as well. But they've both been shown to be vulnerable to Iranian attack.
5:20Now, what does that mean? Does that mean the Americans are going to somehow abandon those bases or, you know, move them elsewhere? I very much doubt it. I mean, these are colossal assets. The enormous amounts of time and money have been invested in them. It will be a huge undertaking to try and move them or anything like that. And it will be a signal of retreat. But nonetheless, the fact that they have come under Iranian attack time and again shows their vulnerability. I would imagine that the American response, the first response to that, will be to try and strengthen their defences, make them much harder targets, work out how it is the Iranians have been carrying out these attacks and how to interdict them.
6:04And we'll find out soon enough whether those efforts are actually worthwhile or not. What do you make of specifically what's been going on here in the UK? You're right to say that we don't know any kind of Iran linked to RAF Lakenheath, but we do RAF Mildenhall and RAF Fairford. What's going on? Well, we have to separate what we know for certain and what we speculate. With RAF Fairford, certain individuals have been charged, and they've been charged with conducting activities at the behest of Iran's intelligence service. But they've not been convicted. So we should be cautious about what we say. We do have the prime minister saying that Iran was involved in the threat to A.F. Fairford. And I think some Iranian involvement, never mind these individuals, but some Iranian
6:45involvement is pretty clear. Is that a surprise? No, it isn't exactly. The Iranians have quite openly delivered threats against all bases that have been involved in the war. Is Britain vulnerable? Clearly, yes. Exactly why did those American bombers leave? They clearly judged that there was an imminent threat to the base, which they weren't entirely confident of the ability of everybody to handle. And so they left. But I wouldn't over egg it. It's never a good sign, of course, when your ally withdraws their prize assets from your territory. But these planes, you know, they're made to be moved, redeploying them for safety reasons, redeploying them for security reasons is all part of military routine and planning. So we shouldn't blow the whistle and declare we've been asking a lot of people in recent weeks. What do you think is going to happen with this war going forward? We've just heard that the USS
7:49Theodore Roosevelt has arrived in the Middle East and sent comms area of operations, so third aircraft carrier joining USS George Washington and the USS George H.W. Bush. How do you rate the chances of things kicking off again? Well, we now have a very tense situation of no peace, no war. And the American military buildup in the region has been sustained. As you say, a third carrier battle group has arrived. I wonder whether that means one of the two battle groups currently there might now be withdrawing. It might rotate, yeah. It might well be a rotation. But even assuming it is, retaining two carrier battle groups facing Iran is a huge commitment by the US Navy. And remember, they're blockading all of Iran's ports.
8:31And that's a tremendously powerful weapon because what they've effectively done is drive Iran's seaborne oil exports down to zero. And that's never happened before. Iran has always been able to export at least some oil by sea. The fact that they can't do that anymore is a huge problem for the regime. Now, we talked about this before. How long can they sustain the loss of all their seaborne oil exports? The answer is probably measured in months. It's impossible for us to know exactly how many months. But one vital question now is how long can the Americans sustain the blockade for? Because it's a massive commitment by the US Navy. And it's extraordinarily demanding on both ships and personnel.
9:18The ships that come away from enforcing a blockade for month after month after month in the Gulf are going to come home as rust buckets. I mean, I over-dramatize, but they are going to need an awful lot of repair and maintenance work, and the crews are going to need a long time to recover. So the more you do that, the longer it would take the US Navy to get back to its full fighting strength once this crisis is over. So what the Iranians will be hoping is that they can outlast the blockade, that they can put up with losing their oil exports for longer than the US Navy can enforce this measure against them. Now, who's right about that? We can't know. Neither side can know for now. But it's going to be a test for Trump's political will.
10:06Does he really have the will to tell the US Navy, you are going to have to maintain this blockade for as long as it takes to force Iran to give way? Bearing in mind that if America is concentrating its forces in the Middle East, that will make it weaker everywhere else in the world, particularly the Pacific facing China and the North Atlantic facing Russia. Now, Trump may not be particularly concerned about Russia, but he is or should be concerned about China. So the opportunity cost for America when it comes to enforcing this blockade is very significant. And how do you interpret that key element, that political will to maintain the blockade? Obviously, quite a few significant things have happened in America over the last few months.
10:49We had the midterms and absolute bloodbath for Republicans. Really, really significant blue nami, as they're calling it, apparently. We've had Trump appoint Stephen Miller as his White House chief of staff, replacing Susie Wiles, who was a longtime ally of his. Don't know how significant that is for foreign policy, but it's been interpreted as a right-wing push to the America First agenda, domestically at least. We've had Hegseth escaping impeachment, for now at least. That will probably change in January once the makeup of Congress shifts. And we also had Joe Rogan, and I think this is significant, so I will mention it, World's Most Listened To podcast. He has been critical of this war, and last weekend he came
11:25out again to talk about how trump pretty much has himself to blame for the midterms blood path he mainly focused on how ice immigration enforcement has gone overboard and arrested and killed innocent people but he also blames the iran war this is what he said but like they didn't just lose the podcast bros they lost most of the country. When you get into a war that no one wants to be in, when you've got militarized police in the streets wearing masks and no ID. I think you could interpret this as a sign of the shift starting to occur in Trump's support base, potentially, further fracturing of MAGA. He's launched into this war. His key promise at the beginning was no more forever wars. But putting all of that into play, where do you think that political will is at for Trump to
12:10continue with the blockade, I suppose, as the medium option, just noping out completely and washing his hands of it, the lowest option and resuming strikes, the highest option? If he's going to conclude this war on anything like the sort of terms that he could present as something approaching a success, he's got to do one of two things. Press on with the blockade, no matter what the logistical or other cost to the US Navy, until the Iranians give way, or go all out and resume the airstrikes and hope that this time somehow it will work, even though months of previous airstrikes clearly didn't have the desired effect. He's got to do one or other of those two things. And bear in mind that the Iranians will be mightily encouraged by the outcome of the midterm elections
12:58and by all of Donald Trump's domestic political problems, such as the ones you've just described. And that will make them even more intransigent. So the amount of pressure that you'll have to apply to get them to agree to anything like acceptable terms for Donald Trump will be all the greater. And that pressure will have to come either through the blockade or through direct strikes. And Donald Trump will have to decide and I don't envy him his choice. We do think that some kind of deal is on the table from the Iranians. We heard about it before the midterms, it was sort of a seven day deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz if America lifted sanctions and started to unfreeze some money. It's now been crunched down to a two day deal.
13:38And the Iranians are still talking about it. We heard the Foreign Minister, I'm talking about on Monday, that this plan is on the table and they are ready to reopen the strait within two days if Washington agrees to its conditions. Trump really doesn't seem interested in this deal. Clearly been knocking around for a couple of weeks. He wants some kind of nuclear concession. We believe nuclear inspectors being allowed in or something like this, which Iran does not appear to be in the mood to bend on. We're at a real impasse, aren't we? Yes. The key nuclear concession that Trump wants is to get Iran to export, hand over its stockpile of 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. That's the uranium enriched to the 60% threshold. Under the Memorandum of Understanding, which
14:21briefly halted the war back in June, as you'll remember, the Iranians had agreed to down blend or liquidate that stockpile, but to do it in their own country, to do it in situ where it is now. Now, Trump will probably want them to hand it over, which is a hell of a demand. And it's something that the Iranians would only agree to under pressure. Can I just note two ironies? Please. The first is that, of course, the objective of reopening the Strait of Hormuz has to be set against the reality that it was open before Trump started the war. Yes. the fact that the only reason why they have this stockpile is because Trump destroyed the original nuclear deal back in 2015, signed back in 2015, which banned them from having uranium enriched
15:11to that level at all. So he's now having to go to these extraordinary lengths to clear up, solve two problems that he himself created. Thank you for allowing me to... Absolutely. No, I know whenever I come over and speak to you about this war, your frustrations with those particular elements comes out very quickly. Does that leave you with much hope that he can dig his way out of his mess? There's no point attempting to speculate. But the key variables are, how long can the Iranians sustain the blockade? How long can the US... Which you've pegged at months. That's right. How long can the US Navy enforce the blockade? And the third variable is, how willing is Trump really to go back to military action? Something else to consider there,
15:55his partner in this offensive, Benjamin Netanyahu, his only ally in this offensive, Benjamin Netanyahu, might be about to lose power in Israel. I'm no expert on Israeli domestic politics. And of course, Netanyahu is the ultimate master and all the rest of it. But as of today, it's more likely than not that he will go. And that, I would imagine, might make it a bit less likely that Donald Trump would resort to simply resuming the war. I'd put Netanyahu's chances at 50-50. You're right that his rival, Gadi Eisenkot, has been given 28 days to try and form some kind of government, but there are significant obstacles to him forming a government that can rule for more than a couple of months without collapsing.
16:37It would probably have to be a minority government at this point. And as you say, Netanyahu, the ultimate survivor. We do also believe that Netanyahu has been increasingly pushing for strikes. There were reports last week of a very angry phone call between Trump and Netanyahu the ultimate survivor. We do also believe that Netanyahu has been increasingly pushing for strikes. There were reports last week of a very angry phone call between Trump and Netanyahu but Trump doesn't seem to be biting. He seems to have, it might just be temporary, but he does seem to have really lost interest in the sort of bellicose rhetoric around the Iran war. Vance, J.D. Vance obviously came out after the midterms and said this was all down to the Iran war.
17:04Trump has sort of put him back in his place and said, you focus on domestic politics, Privet Vance. But he does seem to be humbled slightly by the results of the midterms. And remember, if you're a member of the Iranian regime looking at this, it will make you more intransigent. Yeah. Because you will think Trump is feeling the pressure more than we are. So it will encourage them to dig in. We're going to take a short pause. Coming up after the break, could the UK and European countries get change in your life, career, and community. At Walden University, we give you the support and flexibility to get the W. Walden's online programs are designed for working professionals like you. You'll gain hands-on
17:56skills to take on real-world challenges and succeed. Your future is waiting and Walden is here to help you achieve it. Take the first step to make your impact. Visit waldenu.edu. Walden University. Set a course for change. Certified to operate by Chev. Every restaurant wants to be busy. Most restaurants aren't ready for it. I'm Chef Mike from Detroit 75 and Toast helps us stay ready when the lunch rush hits. We prepare for lunch like we're preparing for battle. Orders are flying, tickets are stacking, and the guests should never feel the chaos. Toast keeps our team organized so we can serve more people, stay consistent, and keep growing. Visit ToastTab.com to learn more. Pay testimonial from an actual Toast customer. Day or night, VerboCare is here 24-7 to help make
18:42every part of your stay seamless. If anything comes up or you simply need a little guidance, support is ready whenever you reach out. From the moment you book to the moment you head home, we're here to help things run smoothly. Because a great trip starts with the right support. And hey, a good playlist doesn't hurt either. Welcome back. You're listening to Iran The Latest with me, Venetia Rainey and David Blair. Can I get your thoughts on the other war? I know this is not your area of speciality, but I'm interested to see whether this might be the conflict that will bring the UK or Europe in. It seems very unlikely that UK or Europe, European countries are going to help with the blockade or help with the straightforward moves.
19:29They certainly haven't shown any inclination to do so so far. But there is another war that's heating up in Yemen. So we've heard today that Yemen's pro-government forces, these are the ones that are backed by Saudi Arabia, the internationally recognised government forces, they've withdrawn from the Bab al-Mandab Strait coastal area. And they've said it's so that they can urgently fortify Aden which is their capital city. So as I said it's being framed as a strategic redeployment. So we had a statement from the Southern Armed Forces Group which is fighting on behalf of the internationally recognised government. They said they were withdrawing from the Dubab airport and Bab al-Mandab area. They said this step is driven by
20:02the priority of securing the capital Aden and the neighbouring governorates, reinforcing the front lines and addressing existing threats. So quite a significant shift there. The Houthis have retaken that territory now. Heavily suggests that Aden is at risk of falling or is at least under pressure, under significant pressure. Meanwhile, we've got the siege of Taz continuing. Quite a bleak humanitarian situation there. No food, drinking water, medicine or fuel has been going in for months. Human Rights Watch said over the weekend that it may amount to a war crime of using starvation as a method of warfare. That's directed at the Houthis, obviously. So far, the Saudis are still leading the charge in this conflict. UK and France helping a bit with defensive stuff. They've been very keen to say it's just defensive. But how long can
20:45European countries and the UK specifically, because we have a history of getting involved in helping Saudi Arabia out, how long can they stay out of the Yemen war if the Houthis, for example, take over a major city such as Taz or even the government capital of Aden? Well, I don't know how likely it is that they would really take over two huge population centres of that kind. They've certainly never captured Aden before. I mean, I don't know how likely that really is. It's very difficult to imagine any circumstances in which Britain or France or America, for that matter, will get deeply involved in the Yemen war. I can't really see how that would happen. I ask because, of course, we were previously, right?
21:25We supply arms to Saudi Arabia. We provided support during the Yemen war. We joined the Americans bombing the Houthis in early 2024. We didn't join last year. Well, Europe and America have one interest, which is free navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb. Now, the Houthis have been in a position for very many years to disrupt shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb. I'm not sure whether their recent capture of certain territory adjoining the strait hugely adds to their capability to do that or not. I imagine it probably does add to that capability, but that capability has been there for years. Yes, that's true. Their decision is over whether to use it or not. As things stand, the Saudis are managing to export oil via the Red Sea.
22:11In the past, there have been interdictions by the Houthis of shipping going through those lanes. As you say, that has led in the past America and also Britain in 2024 to respond with airstrikes. Whether that might recur, I don't know. And we can't speculate. We love to speculate on this podcast. I know, I know. But that's the one interest that the outside world really has. It's free navigation. It's not really over whether the Houthis control this town or that town. So if the Houthis did start firing again on Saudi ships or even non-Saudi ships, that could be a trigger, you think, for some kind of further involvement? I doubt it. I mean, in the first instance, it will be up to Saudi Arabia.
22:58In the first instance, it will be up to Saudi Arabia. As you say, Britain and France have deployed quite limited forces to help Saudi Arabia defend itself against drone attacks, particularly launched by the Houthis, which are happening quite regularly over the border into Saudi Arabia. I think they will be enormously reluctant to take their involvement any further than that. I guess that's part of this moment that we're at right now. UK and Europe are highly focused on the threat from Russia and what's going on in our continent. And they seem really very wary to get involved in the Middle East at all beyond what they are at pains to point out is purely defensive measures, very small scale stuff. Is that something that you
23:42see holding for the coming years, a legacy of, you know, the debacles in Iraq, Afghanistan, Taliban coming back, and this growing distance between America under the Trump administration and what could well be a continuing isolationist thread if J.D. Vance, for example, gets in in 2028, between America and Europe, and this cleave over Ukraine, Russia, how to approach it all? Well, first of all, everything that's happening now happens against the background of the war that Trump and Netanyahu launched against Iran on February the 28th this year. And America in particular began that war without any consultation with its European allies, without any serious expectation that they would join in. All that they wanted from Britain,
24:27for example, was use of bases, which eventually they got, although with severe limitations, that they could only use those bases for strikes designed to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and to prevent Iranian missile attacks. So the consequence is that for European countries with historic links to the Middle East, particularly Britain, any involvement now is limited purely to the defence of absolutely vital interests. There's going to be nothing that goes beyond that. And even the defence of vital interests, they may not deploy as much force as you might expect. So everything is going to be as limited as it as it possibly can be. And one of the reasons for that, one of the reasons for why Britain and France in particular will be very risk averse, even more than usual when it comes to the Middle East, is because they can't be absolutely sure that they'd have American backing. You know, in the past, any military operations in the Middle East had a
25:30sort of American umbrella, which comes with all kinds of defensive strengths and all kinds of technical assistance and everything else. If you can't be absolutely sure that you're going to have that, then you have to be even more careful than you would otherwise have been about deploying hard power in the Middle East. Do you think that umbrella is permanently broken? We were speaking to some people last week who are talking about the sort of American relationship with the Gulf and how it has undergone what feels like a permanent shift. Or do you think some of what's happened in this war can be walked back and realigned and changed under a different president? Well, America's interests in the Middle East
26:09haven't changed. And those interests broadly defined are, one, ensuring free navigation, not just for oil, but for trade more broadly. Two, preventing a single power from dominating the Middle East, like Iran, for example. Three, preventing the region from being a base for terrorist attacks upon the mainland, the United States. And four, although it's a rather forlorn hope these days, trying to resolve some of the conflicts in the region, like the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, although one may wonder whether that even makes the list anymore. But those interests, and the first three are very important, don't go away. And when it comes to if you are a global superpower, you can't start withdrawing from
26:55whole regions of the world unless you're prepared to just lay down your status as a global superpower, which I can't imagine not even Donald Trump would at least wish to declare that he's going to do that. And his successors probably wouldn't want to do it. So I can't see the prospect of a wholesale American retreat from the region. Okay. Let's talk about something big that's happening this week that you've written a very interesting piece on. So we've got APEC, Asia Pacific Summit, happening on Wednesday and Thursday. And we think we're going to get some kind of trilateral between Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Trump said on Monday that one of the meetings he expects will be with those two presidents.
27:36What do you make of this? Well, what I find extraordinary is no other American president would have agreed to be present at such an occasion. Now, the leader who will gain most from this, for whom this would be an extraordinary triumph in a diplomatic sense, is, of course, Putin. Because there he would be apparently on equal terms meeting with the leaders of the two most powerful countries in the world. Of course, it's largely illusory. Russia, by comparison with China and the United States, is an economic minnow. Putin would be by far the weakest of the three leaders in every sense. But nonetheless, the symbolism would be extraordinarily important. And the photograph, the photo opportunity of the big three, the obvious irresistible parallel with
28:24Yalta, although very misleading, but nonetheless, the obvious irresistible parallel with Yalta, although very misleading, but nonetheless, the parallel will be made. All of that is gold dust for Putin. Now, I can't imagine any other American president allowing that to happen. Or if another American president might have considered it, you know, that president would have demanded a price from Putin in return for doing this extraordinary favor. But of course, Trump isn't getting anything in return for it. It's very hard to imagine why Trump is allowing this, but for the fact that he has a well-known personal admiration for Vladimir Putin. And then we know that him and his family have a great interest in certain Russian economic assets and Russian natural resources. And the head of the Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund, Kirill Dmitriev,
29:11has spent most of the last year trying to tempt them with business opportunities of one kind or the other. And we hear that the assets of Lukoil might somehow be on the table. And all of this might perhaps explain why Trump is prepared to do this extraordinary favour for Putin. But none of that really has much to do with strategy or the American national interest. Do you think they'll talk about the Iran war at all? Do you think Trump might use it as an opportunity to ask Putin and Xi to help pressure Iran in some way? They are both connected heavily to the Iranian regime. He might well ask, but it's hard to see how China and Russia, even acting in concert, could bend the Iranian regime to their will. The Iranian regime is almost as stubborn and intransigent with its friends as it is with its enemies. It's almost as difficult
29:55for them to deal with the Iranian regime as it is for the ardent foes of the Iranian regime to deal with them. So even if China and Russia somehow agreed to try and put pressure on Iran to cut a deal with America and bring this crisis to an end, I struggle to see how those efforts are likely to yield very much. You mentioned Yalta. And as you say, this irresistible comparison, that was obviously Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt. We're not there at the table, of course, anymore. We've been replaced by China. But I wonder what you make of America as a superpower today. They clearly are still a superpower. Has this Iran war dented that or has it shown up flaws in its ability to be the superpower that it has been over the last
30:47century or so? I don't think it's shown flaws in American capability. On the contrary, I mean, the United States military has displayed extraordinary, an extraordinary ability to deal precision destruction to Iran. And in some cases, alas, very tragically imprecise destruction to Iran, such as the destruction of that school in Manab and the terrible civilian casualties that resulted from that. You know, all of this shows that when it comes to straightforward military firepower, the United States probably still has no peer in the world. What it does show is that all of that power can achieve very little if there isn't a coherent strategy guiding it. And when you have a president who goes to war without setting a clear, consistent
31:39and attainable political objective, you get into all kinds of difficulties. But that's not really a lesson about whether or not America is a superpower. It's the eternal lesson, you know, dating back, you know, at least to Clausewitz, that, you know, war is a continuation of politics by other means, unless you set a clear, attainable political objective, then your use of force is likely to fail. Do you think it dents perceptions of America as a superpower or superpower on the right side on the on the good side, if I can be that crude? It certainly doesn't help America's reputation. But we knew that about Trump anyway. You know, we knew that that Trump in large areas of the world diminishes America's reputation.
32:22There was a survey earlier this year that really struck me that suggested a growing number of people in the West see America as a threat. And very anecdotally, I remember when I was preparing for a war game scenario earlier this year, and I sent some questions around on WhatsApp groups that I meant to my friends, asking them who they saw as the biggest threat, you know, all of this kind of stuff. And America, Trump specifically, just came up a lot. And it spoke, I think, to these shifting attitudes that America is no longer the sort of world policeman, the good guy, but something a bit more nuanced, something a bit more in the grey zone. I wonder what you make of that. It's the Trump effect. And we've always known this. And we knew it even from his first term.
33:07Whether it's justified or not is another question. Whether it's changed perceptions in areas of the world where America was always perceived in the way that you've just described is also another question. I suspect that in some parts of the world, Trump has just reinforced what people always believed to be true. Final question. What's on your bingo card for 2027? We're nearly the end of 2026. You're in the foreign affairs analysis business. Let's have some analysis from you about what might happen in 2027. Let me think about this. Well, I always try and avoid predictions, but let me just mention one thing. I'm trying to pull them out of you. Come on, David. Yes, yes. But let me just mention one thing. I'm trying to pull them out of you. Come on, David. Yes, but let me just mention one thing.
33:56The Iranian regime, as it stands today, is even more hardline than it was before Trump and Netanyahu launched this war in February. The people who now take the decisions in Iran, particularly Mohsen Rezaei, the head of the Supreme National Security Council, and so far as we can tell the new Supreme Leader, Mujtaba Khamenei. These are people who are very dangerous indeed. And they are now, or the regime itself, is now quite openly debating whether to go all out and get a nuclear weapon. Yes. As you know, the official position of the regime under the previous Supreme Leader Khamenei was that it was not interested in that pursuit. Now, we can all question whether that was credible or not, but that was their stated position.
34:35Now they're quite openly debating whether to get rid of all that and just withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and go all out for a bomb. So one thing to look out for in 2027 is whether Iran's extremely hardline regime does something like that and declares quite openly that it's going to withdraw, as North Korea did, from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and go for a bomb. It's another painful irony of this war, I think that one of the stated aims was to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. We were told that they were going to be able to do it within two weeks, which always sounded like nonsense to me. But as you say, they do have a lot of enriched uranium knocking around. As you've always pointed out, most of the damage to their
35:17nuclear program was done last year in the 12-day war, not really in this war. But anyway, the fact that they have assassinated the former supreme leader Ali Khamenei and left his son who we know very little about in charge albeit incapacitated in some respect we don't really know how it adds fuel to the debate in Iran that maybe we need a nuclear weapon to protect ourself the debate that we've seen unfold in Ukraine who gave up their nuclear weapons in the 90s would they have been invaded by Russia if they still had a nuclear weapon? The debate that we've seen play out in North Korea, we've got a nuclear weapon and look, nobody's touching us. It follows through, didn't anyone think if we bomb the hell out of Iran and kill the person who had a sort of
35:57ideological, we think, opposition to nuclear weapons, but like to sort of flirt around the edges with it, aren't we opening Pandora's box as to what comes next, and giving them a reason to develop a nuclear weapon? Yes, two points in response to that one to strengthen it, but one big caveat, please, to strengthen it. You know, all Iran's means of deterrence, its missile arsenal, its threat to the Strait of Hormuz, its sponsorship of terrorist movements, have demonstrably failed to deter America and Israel from attacking the regime all out this year. So from an Iranian point of view, getting the ultimate means of deterrence, like a bomb, suddenly becomes a lot more appealing. Second point, and this is the caveat,
36:41but you need the capability first. And their two enrichment plants, the Tance and Fordow, were badly damaged, if not destroyed, not in this war, but in the previous one in 2025. So their capabilities have been set back very significantly. And even the stockpile of high enriched uranium, which they appear still to possess, the 440 kilograms, they would need to have an enrichment capacity in order to bring that up to weapons grade uranium. And so far as we can tell, at the moment, they don't have such a capacity because it was destroyed. And if they set about trying to rebuild it or reconstitute it anywhere, the great danger for them is that America and Israel would spot that and come in and bomb them again. And as we've seen, America and Israel don't necessarily
37:31have any restraints about doing that. So even if the intent to develop a bomb may be there, developing the capability would be a huge challenge. And it's not just getting the uranium up to that final level of enrichment, they then need to develop the missile and warhead to put it in. So there's several stages to them being able to have a nuclear armed warhead. Yes, and the ideal scenario from their point of view would be to develop a bomb in secret without anyone finding out and then announce their capability at a time and by a method of their own choosing, perhaps by conducting a test, for instance, or by withdrawing from the NPT or whatever it might be. Their problem is that their record of conducting secret nuclear activities is extremely poor.
38:20I put it no more strongly than that. All their nuclear facilities or all their key ones were originally built in secret and all of them were discovered. Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, Arak back in the day, those of us who can recite Iranian nuclear plants, you know,, but they were all found out. So the chances of them being able to conduct a secret covert effort to develop a bomb, well, experience suggests that they would be very unlikely to pull that off successfully. We'll leave it there. David Blair, our Chief Foreign Affairs Commentator, thanks very much for joining us on Around the Latest. Thank you. That's all for today's episode. We'll be back again tomorrow. And a reminder that we're doing a Q&A episode this week.
39:02If you have questions for me, Roland and Sophia, please send them in. And bonus points if you can send us a video note or a voice note. Thanks very much. Goodbye. Iran The Latest is an original podcast from The Telegraph. It was previously Battlelines, which was created by David Knowles. It's hosted by me, Roland Oliphant and Sophia Yan. Every episode featuring us in the studio plus maps, battlefield footage and pictures of the events we discuss is now on YouTube. Head over to our channel and subscribe to our playlist. You can find a link in the show notes. If you appreciate this podcast, please consider following Around the Latest on your preferred podcast app and leave us a review. For more from our foreign correspondents on the ground, sign up for our new daily newsletter, Cables, via our website, or listen to our sister podcast, Ukraine
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