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📅 2026-11-13 ⏱ 58 min episode · ~2 min read 📝 Transcript · 13,114 words 🎙 Tarek Mansour

Tarek Mansour: Bulwark Takes transcript and summary

Bulwark Takes · · Transcript & summary by WhipScribe

A prediction market CEO answers pointed questions about insider trading, state lawsuits and an adviser who was Donald Trump Jr., one week before the election.

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In this episodeKalshiPolymarketDonald Trump Jr.Catherine RampellEconomic Club of New YorkWall Street JournalNBARobinhoodCitadelSpencer PrattGeorge SantosTaylor Swift

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▸Notable quotes

“It was never a political decision because at the time there was still a 50%, 55% chance that Harris would have won that election.” Tarek Mansour · at 41:39 — ▶ hear it from here
“They're bad markets that shouldn't exist because they present moral hazards.” Tarek Mansour · at 19:09 — ▶ hear it from here

▸What this episode covers

Donald Trump Jr. has parted ways with Kalshi, where he had been a paid adviser for about a year and a half. Kalshi ties the split to his investment firm's $300 million stake in rival Polymarket, though he had already advised and invested in Polymarket for more than a year. Host Catherine Rampell links the timing to Democrats regaining power in Congress and to scrutiny of companies with Trump family ties.

In an interview recorded a week before the election, Kalshi CEO Tarek Mansour argues that prediction markets show what people expect to happen, while polls show what respondents want. He says most volume comes from research-driven traders rather than young men gambling their savings, and that markets differ from gambling because informed traders hedge risk and are rewarded for accuracy. He also says Trump Jr. was hired for his online following, not as a political move.

The harder questions concern integrity and regulation. Mansour says Kalshi bans likely insiders using NBA data-sharing and lists of politically exposed people, and that public trade logs expose manipulation, citing a $1.5 million bet on the Los Angeles mayor race that reverted within nine seconds. He wants federal rules so liquidity is not split across states, says Kalshi sues states first, and says sports, which the host cited at about 95 percent of revenue a year earlier, is no longer its fastest-growing line.

▸Tarek Mansour on Bulwark Takes: the answers

Who is Tarek Mansour?

Tarek Mansour

Tarek Mansour is the CEO of Kalshi, a federally regulated prediction market exchange. Catherine Rampell interviews him at a public event at the Economic Club of New York, a week before the election.

What did Tarek Mansour say about Donald Trump Jr.?

Tarek Mansour said Kalshi hired Donald Trump Jr. as an adviser in January 2025 because of his large online following, and that the decision was never a political one. He said the hire was made before the 2024 election, when Kamala Harris still had a 50 to 55 percent chance of winning.

“It was never a political decision because at the time there was still a 50%, 55% chance that Harris would have won that election.”Tarek Mansour · 41:39

What did Tarek Mansour say about Polymarket?

Tarek Mansour said Kalshi and rival Polymarket have principles differences, mainly because Polymarket went offshore and unregulated and listed missile-strike markets. He called those markets bad and said they should not exist because they create moral hazards.

“They're bad markets that shouldn't exist because they present moral hazards.”Tarek Mansour · 19:09

What did Tarek Mansour say about weather markets?

Tarek Mansour cited a recent paper finding that weather markets on Kalshi are 10 percent more accurate than the national average of weather stations. He said the traders driving this are ordinary people with the skill to get good at forecasting, not Wall Street institutions.

“There was a recent piece of paper that said that weather markets are 10% more accurate than the national average of weather stations.”Tarek Mansour · 53:36

What did Tarek Mansour say about perpetual futures?

Tarek Mansour said perpetual futures are the same as ordinary futures except they do not expire, so traders avoid the rollover fees charged each time a contract closes. He said rollover fees make up about 20 to 25 percent of CME revenue, which is why the CME is pushing back.

“Perpetual futures are basically futures. They're the same thing as the future.”Tarek Mansour · 46:13

What is Tarek Mansour's main argument on Bulwark Takes?

Tarek Mansour argues that prediction markets reveal what people think will happen, using real money and public trade logs, which makes them more transparent than polls or stock trading. He says the sector needs sensible federal regulation, strict insider trading enforcement, and protection for vulnerable users, and that the Don Jr. advisory role was not a political decision.

Mentioned in this episode

Episode facts

Released
November 13, 2026
Length
58 minutes

▸Key takeaways

01Donald Trump Jr. left his paid Kalshi adviser role after his investment firm put $300 million into rival Polymarket, Kalshi said.
02Tarek Mansour argues prediction market prices reflect what traders think will happen, not what voters want, unlike polls.
03Tarek Mansour says 70 to 80 percent of Kalshi's volume comes from research-driven traders, not young men gambling their savings.
04Kalshi's NBA partnership shares league data on likely insiders so Kalshi can ban them, a self-regulation Tarek Mansour wants written into law.
05Tarek Mansour calls Polymarket's missile-strike markets bad markets that should not exist, and says Kalshi will stay conservative on moral hazard.

▸Questions this episode answers

Q1What did Tarek Mansour say about Don Jr. and his Kalshi advisor role?

Tarek Mansour, Kalshi's CEO, said Kalshi hired Donald Trump Jr. because he has a massive following online, and that the decision was not a political one. He said the hire was made before the 2024 election, when there was still a 50 to 55 percent chance Kamala Harris would win. Kalshi says Trump Jr.'s exit was tied to his firm's $300 million investment in rival Polymarket.

Q2Why does Tarek Mansour say prediction markets are better than polls?

Tarek Mansour argues polls ask people what they want to happen, while prediction markets ask what people think will happen, with real money at stake. He says a poll can be shaped by who commissions it and how the sample is drawn, while a market price is set by millions of traders. He gave the example of a candidate polling at 51 percent but trading at 65 to 67 percent on a prediction market, which he says reflects a probability of winning.

Q3How does Tarek Mansour say Kalshi detects and prevents insider trading?

Tarek Mansour says Kalshi verifies customers with name and Social Security number checks, screens them against lists such as FEC reports and politically exposed persons, and uses data from its NBA partnership to ban likely insiders from related markets. He says Kalshi also investigates trades after the fact, with fines up to criminal prosecution. He wants the proactive bans written into law, since they are currently self-regulation.

Q4What did Tarek Mansour say about the Los Angeles mayor race market?

Tarek Mansour said someone put $1.5 million on the Los Angeles mayor race, moving the price on Spencer Pratt's odds from about 25 percent to 40 percent. He said the price stayed at 40 percent for only nine seconds before traders pushed it back to 25 percent, so the bettor lost the money. He used the episode to argue that public trade logs make manipulation visible and that traders correct it quickly.

Q5What is Tarek Mansour's argument on state lawsuits against Kalshi?

Tarek Mansour says Kalshi faces lawsuits in about 20 states and usually sues them first, and that appeals courts have issued conflicting rulings. He argues prediction markets need federal regulation because state-by-state rules would split liquidity, the way splitting the New York Stock Exchange into 50 state exchanges would. He says Kalshi is pro-regulation and wants sensible guardrails, and that the real question is whether the market stays onshore or moves offshore.

Q6What did Tarek Mansour say about sports and Kalshi's revenue mix?

Catherine Rampell said sports bets made up about 95 percent of Kalshi's revenue a year earlier and roughly 60 to 65 percent now. Tarek Mansour did not dispute the figures but said Kalshi's fast-growing businesses are crypto, commodities and single stocks, not sports. He said Kalshi now has 30 million customers and is one of the largest fintech brokerages in America.

Q7Why does Tarek Mansour defend perpetual futures against the CME?

Tarek Mansour defends perpetual futures, which do not expire, saying they carry the same leverage, risk and regulation as traditional futures but avoid the rollover fees traders pay each time a contract expires. He said rollover fees make up roughly 20 to 25 percent of CME's revenue, which explains why the CME sued over them. He said the concept was not invented by Kalshi and that economist Robert Shiller discussed perpetual futures in the 1990s.

▸Transcript

Our own transcript of the public episode, with a timestamp about every 90 seconds. Tap a timestamp to play the episode from there in the show's own player; the link button on a paragraph copies a link that opens this page there.

0:00Hi, I'm Catherine Rampell, economics editor here at The Bulwark. Donald Trump Jr. just got the boot from Kalshi, which is a controversial prediction market platform that had hired Don Jr. as a paid advisor. Or at least he and Kalshi have agreed to part ways. Don Jr. had been working as a paid advisor for Kalshi for about the past year and a half. In fact, he was announced as a new hire a few days before his father, Donald Trump, was sworn in for his second term as president. Kalshi says the decision to part ways with Don Jr. was related to the fact that Don Jr.'s investment firm decided to make a $300 million investment in Kalshi's chief rival, Polymarket. But Don Jr. had already been an advisor and investor in Polymarket for a while,

0:47going back to over a year ago. So this is not an entirely new relationship. What is new, what did change is that we just had a major election in which there was a blue tsunami and Democrats are coming back into the majority in the House and the Senate and seem pretty keen on investigating any companies that have relationships with the Trump family, particularly those that might be looking for regulatory favors. Just coincidentally, two weeks ago, a week before the election, I happened to interview Tarek Mansour, the CEO of Kalshi, at a public event at the Economic Club of New York. We talked about a lot of things, including many of the lawsuits and even criminal charges that Kalshi and Mansoor personally are facing

1:31in states around the country. I also asked him about whether the decision to hire Don Jr. as a paid advisor might be seen as favor trading. Mansoor said at the time that he hired Don Jr. simply because Don has a massive following online and the decision was not, quote, a political decision. Again, this was one week before the election. It seems like at least the relationship between Don Jr. and Kelshi has evolved since then. Take a look at our whole exchange. Tarek, thank you so much for being here. If it's okay if I start by embarrassing you a little bit. Okay. The reason you were late, may I share? Well, I usually have a good excuse for being late, but this time, yeah. So the reason why Tarek was late is that there's a dress code here.

2:23And Tarek, I gather, did not show up wearing a college shirt. I had to buy a shirt. I was buying a shirt. I only mention this because it feels like an elaborate metaphor somewhat for some of the regulatory questions facing your industry. Tarek, they could have snuck you in through a side door, but you went out roaming the streets of New York and found a new shirt. I had to follow the rules. Exactly. Had to follow the rules. So anyway, so thank you again for coming and for the for abiding by the dress code. I wanted to start by talking about the midterms that are coming up. You have said that these midterms are truly the first prediction market election. What concretely does the public get from prediction markets that polls and forecasters do not provide?

3:07I mean, a better forecast, really. I mean, it's also sort of answering a little bit of a separate question. I mean, polls are really asking people what they want to happen, like who they're voting for. Prediction markets are asking people what they think will happen, which are two different questions. They're also kind of pricing something different. A poll is essentially, you know, okay, if I poll this room, it will give me, okay, this is the percentage of people in this room that are voting for one candidate or the other. And, you know, often see a poll that says, okay, you know, like in Texas, Tallarico is polling. I didn't look at recent polls. I usually look at the prediction marks. But let's say Tallarico is polling at 51%, but the prediction markets are at 65%, 67%, because it's a probability.

3:48It's not the same thing. You know, a poll that's at 67% would usually translate to, like, a 99% probability of the candidate winning. And that's, I think, one of the things that the general public mistakes often. But maybe to really answer the question, I think the thing that's unique, and I really think about this election as being the first prediction market election, even though 24 is when we went mainstream, it's the first time that we have a piece of information that is really flowing bottom up from people. That's really what's exciting me about this. It's like historically, okay, how do we know which candidates are worthy to look at or interesting or about to win? I mean, it really is a few publications with a few people in those

4:32publications telling us, okay, here are the different candidates and here's how well they're doing. And there's polls, which in my view, I mean, polls are mostly an elite top-down messaging or information medium because, you know, polls are commissioned by a few people that decide, they have all sorts of decisions they make when they run the poll, who they're going to ask, what's the sort of sampling bias in it. There's all sorts of things that can lead the poll to go one way or the other. And the best proof you have of that is actually, we're in the last street to the election and I'm not a wizard, but I'm going to make a prediction, is each of the Senate races are pretty contentious. You're going to see two polls that are released for each race, one from the Democrat, one

5:10from the Republican. And the polls are going to be saying opposite things. Why? Because you can make them say whatever you want. That is just not true for markets. You can't. People oftentimes come and tell me, why is Kashi predicting something? We're not predicting anything. This is millions of people going one way or the other and with real skin in the game. And that, I think, is what's interesting. In some ways, you're sort of reshifting the power of information to people, millions of people that nobody can really control. This is, you know, if you look at 2028 for Kashi right now, it's, you know, you have John Alsop, you have Gavin, you have AOC, and that's information that's coming from millions of people, not, you, not an ad board or two opinion

5:46writers at Politico. And that's what's so different about prediction markets. You have said that prediction markets are different from gambling. They're not gambling. It's about price discovery, at least in my recent conversation with you. And I'm sure that the viewers online and the participants in this room will agree there is great value in price discovery. It helps markets function more efficiently. But why is it important for markets to price who wins the Cardinals-Cowboys football game? Or who gets eliminated on Dancing with the Stars this week? Two actual bets, by the way, on Cal State. I don't have the odds. I'd be surprised by the number of people that care about Dancing with the Stars this week. Two actual bets, by the way, on Kelsey.

6:25I don't have the odds. I don't know, you'd be surprised about the number of people that care about Dancing with the Stars. Yeah. I mean, who am I to say whether Dancing with the Stars matters or not? I mean, really, it's always interesting. The interesting thing to me about this is like, certainly we have markets that are more societally useful to some people than others. And there's markets that are more, some people would find them frivolous. And this is where the rule of a federal regulator can come and put some lines and decide, okay, these are them frivolous. And this is where the rule of a federal regulator can come and put some lines and decide, okay, these are too frivolous. These are like in the public interest

6:48and have enough economic consequence. But I'm sure you can find some markets that are funny on CalSheet because some set of people really care about them. And one example I've always quoted, it's so interesting. I've gotten so much inbound about our Taylor Swift markets. And it's always been interesting to me because the general public, when you think about Taylor Swift,. And it's always been interesting to me because the general public, when you think about Taylor Swift, you think it's a gimmick. You think it's like some sort of funny side show. Oh, okay, Taylor Swift is doing one thing or the other. I can tell you, I have a partnership with MSG. I'm not going to say exactly how much we paid

7:16for it per year, but let's assume we paid for it a million dollars a year. That's my deal value with MSG. After this woman decided to get married there, I can resell that thing for $3 million now. It went up by 3x. That is the economic impact of Taylor Swift just deciding to do her wedding at MSG. And this is true for the weather, it's true for economics, it's certainly true for sports. I mean, the notion that sports is a sort of sideshow or a game, it's a bit outdated now. Like it's big business. $70 billion of private equity have gone into sports. Whether the World Cup was going to be played in certain cities, I mean, that has invigorated the city in many different ways. Go to Kansas and ask them, what did the World Cup do to the city?

7:53I mean, there's a real inflection point that happened. A lot of people that were hedging on Calchi, I mean, some people bet on Calchi. They trade, and a lot of people do it the way they bet on the stock market or the way they bet on traditional grain futures as a way to make money. But there are some people that are actually using it to offset risk, to essentially hedge themselves against an adverse consequence. And sports, one of the typical examples is like, we had a bunch of media rights buyers that know that, okay, if Team America loses early, that investment they made in the advertisement is going to get marked down by 50%, 60%, 70%. Why? Because Americans stopped watching the World Cup.

8:27And so to me, what's interesting is the difference in markets and gambling has never been about behavior. Gambling is a behavior. There are people that bet and gamble and trade, whatever you want to call it, any name, on Calci, the same way they do it on Robinhood, the same way they do it on Coinbase, the same way they do it on the stock market and on NASDAQ. That is true. That doesn't make a market not a market. You know, the structure is, is it a market that promotes open price discovery? That actually if somebody is smart and doing research in the world, they come to the market and get rewarded for it. And the reason they're getting rewarded, because a lot of you are actually looking at the prediction market forecasts

9:00when it comes to politics and so on and so forth. There's a public good that comes out of it, which is this prediction. It's making us smarter of the world. And then some people are hedging their risk. And for every hedger, you need a speculator. And that's true for prediction markets. It's true for sports, weather, economic. It's true for grain futures. It's true for oil futures. The topic can change. The market doesn't. Or is it gambling, where the sole purpose of the model, it's a business model. You're going to a house. And if you're doing anything that's smart, if you're showing any indicative behavior of doing research and getting sophisticated and calibrating the odds or being smart about what you're doing, you get banned because that's not what the purpose of

9:32this thing is. It's not price discovery or promoting getting smarter about something. The purpose of it is for you to lose money to the house. That's really what it's structured. You're betting against the house. The house revenue is equal to the customer's losses. And over time, you root out the winners and you figure out how to get the losers coming back and so on and so forth. And so oftentimes people, you know, they have this conception, which the casinos have done a very good job at like seeing this narrative that prediction markets, these young men that are, you know, gambling this life savings. I mean, if you look at like the percentage of the volume that comes from these young men, it's tiny on Cal State. It's pretty much irrelevant.

10:03Really the 70 to 80% of our volume comes from these, the people, maybe the best way to imagine it, a lot of you probably here have watched The Big Short. You know the two kids that were living in their mom's garage, but did all the research. They were going crazy doing the research on the mortgages and read every single one of them and all of that. That's what we're doing. You're adding that level of rigor to politics, to sports, to economics. And 70, 80% of that is those people. They're setting up teams and they're doing copious amount of research, the same way that Morgan Stanley, I don't know, does research on Apple stock and then trading it on the open market. And if they have a good piece of information, they make money.

10:38And if they don't, they get punished. And that's, I think, what's so exciting about this next generation of markets is anyone can participate. This episode is sponsored by Cometeer. So my day cannot begin without a good cup of coffee. I had a couple this morning, maybe three, and there's nothing worse than sitting down for your first cup of the day and it's just bitter. Burnt grounds or, you know, watery, weak brew. Now, I never have to worry about that. I have a great cup of coffee every morning, thanks to Cometeer. Cometeer sources coffee from the best roasters in the world. It brews it to perfection, and then it flash freezes it to lock in peak flavor and freshness. Comes on dry ice right

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12:02takes for $20 off. You mentioned that there are a few participants who have outsized participation in these markets, outsized volume. The Journal actually found that there's a small number of accounts on Polymarket and CalSheet, often pros using sort of a more data-driven algorithmic trading model, who take home most of the winnings, not just participation, but most of the winnings. And they phrased it as there are a few sharks and a lot of losers potentially losing their shirts. What duty do marketplaces like yours have to ensure participants are informed about the risks they take and ensure that they are not gambling away their life savings? Let me ask, I want to answer the risk question.

12:45It's been interesting. I did see that Wall Street Journal article. Most of the data was from Polymarket, but CalciZiza is a bit different. And I also don't know how they sampled that data. But it's always been interesting to me. How many hedge funds outperform the S&P every year? What percentage of hedge funds outperform the S&P? It's pretty much an 80-20 thing. 20% of hedge funds win and 80% lose. It's always been interesting to me. It's as if there's some sort of standard that an open competition, a market should be 50-50. It's like, you know, you're like 50% of people win and 50% of people lose. Imagine like, but then there wouldn't be skill. Then what are we even doing? Like, and there's been this sort

13:18of supposition that like, it should be like a competition should be uniform. Imagine like, you know, we run the NBA finals and every year we pick one team and uniformly at random. And that's the one that wins. I mean, what's the point of a competition? A competition is a game of skill. The same way in the stock market and prediction markets, you will reward people that will be better. You know, some athletes put more effort, energy, resources into their research than others. And they will be rewarded disproportionately than others. And that's what you see. Some people put way more money, effort, resources to get better at this than other people. And that's what an open competition, open market does. The thing that's unique about

13:53prediction markets, though, is that when you put out some trader, some of you may have seen this, we put out some studies, and it's all public, about who are the top traders, who are the people that are performing the best in prediction markets. And it's amazing. You see it, 80% of them went to public school. They're 2x more likely to have worked in retail than have worked in Wall Street or banking. I mean, think about that. They're 2x more likely to have worked in retail than Wall Street or banking. The Federal Reserve put out a paper about the forecast from Cal State, which I think is Main Street, it's people, millions of people, laymen, average people, against Wall Street on economics, on like inflation, GDP, interest,

14:26a bunch of economic indicators. And they found that Main Street, Cal State was actually more accurate than Wall Street. And that's a paper that's public. It may be in the pack, but it's called Cal State and the Rise of Macro Markets. And after that paper was put out, it's like, how is Cal State so predictive on inflation? Like who are these traders? Are they like Wall Street, et cetera? And you look at the top traders, like our top trader on inflation is a random dude in Kansas, never traded financial markets, likes reading about the economy for 25 years, and he's now a way to monetize it. I certainly think, though, that CalShe, like Robinhood, like the NASDAQ, we do have a very, and I believe, you know, we are regulated as a federally regulated exchange.

14:57We spend the first four years getting regulated. And we are doing a lot of things that are beyond the regulation. My personal beliefs, and I've been a very big advocate of this, I'm pro-regulation. I'm pro-free markets, but also pro-regulation. I don't think they're counter to each other. I actually think that if you do it right, and if you solve the hard problems that are not usually sexy headlines, you can actually get to a better outcome where free markets grow even faster and better, but you have sensible guardrails around it. I believe it's totally the platform's responsibility to make sure that we're policing irresponsible use. And irresponsible use is not people losing money. People losing in a competition or losing anything in life, that's what you do.

15:31You got outcompeted by somebody else and that's okay. It's losing money that you cannot afford. It's doing things that can harm you and harm your life. And that's true for Couchy. It's true for traditional gaming, like whatever, sports books and draft things. It's true for Robinhood. It's true for NASDAQ. And I think that the rules need to be updated to reflect the reality that financial markets now have millions of people, not just institutions that are participating in them, whether it's in options and so on and so forth. But the key thing about prediction markets is when somebody is doing things that are harmful to them and keep losing money and they're clearly vulnerable and have addiction issues, they're not losing that money to CalSheet. They're losing it to somebody else in the open market. So we don't

16:07have an incentive to keep promoting it. In fact, we use the same tools that the sportsbooks do to send predatory marketing to these customers to actually ban these customers or add more friction to their accounts. Because again, the sportsbooks, their business model is reliant on these most vulnerable customers that keep losing money to the sports book. They send them a drink or get them a sweet or whatever. But on cash, I am reliant on these informed traders that make the markets more efficient and more accurate over time. And sure, some people are going to lose. That's a competition. But those people that are really doing it irresponsibly, in some ways, we want to kind of put them out of the system.

16:40I think of it as a long probability. It's like there's all the use. And on both extremes, there's all the smart, informed trader, and then on that very extreme of those is the insider traders, the people that are actually cheating on the one side, those you want to ban. And then there's people that are going to be losing because they got out-competed by somebody else, and then on the other end of that spectrum, you have the people that are doing it irresponsibly, and you also want to basically put those out of the system. And that's what the regulation needs to basically target. You mentioned insider trading. I believe that just in the elections-related markets, you've already suspended six 2026 candidates for improperly betting on their own races.

17:15There have been some other very high-profile cases of insider trading. The teleprompter guy, the Trump teleprompter guy, just as an example. George Santos. George Santos as well. That guy's a moron. It's unbelievable. He loves committing fraud. It's like, you know, his thing. How do you go about detecting insider trading? Because I imagine that in the George Santos case, maybe it was relatively easy if he was doing it under his own name. But maybe somebody has a cousin, maybe the cousin of the teleprompter guy. It seems very difficult, unlike in some of these other competitions that you were talking about with sports and things like that. For politics and yeah. Well, for politics or any of these other markets where

17:59it really would be an unfair playing field. That's right. If there is somebody who has insider information at the heart of what the bet is, or even worse, you might have some moral hazard problems, right? Yes. Where they can effectuate the outcome that they are betting on. They can set the wildfire or what have you. So can you talk a little bit about how you try to prevent it or how you detect it, insider trading ex post? Yeah. I mean, a few things. Let me address the moral hazard because I think it's a bit easier and then I you detect it insider trading ex post yeah i mean a few things let me address the moral hazard because i think it's a bit easier and then i'll get to inside trade so um we there's a bunch of regs that ban essentially markets that prevent like present moral hazards

18:38like violence war terrorism assassinations etc like those have never been listed including wildfires we've never listed wildfires. Those have been listed offshore. So on prediction markets that are unregulated that run offshore. And that's one of the challenges that we've had. And I always say this, and I say this pretty publicly at this point. I like competition. I love competing with Robinhood and Coinbase. Now Goldman is entering the space. There's so many, competition is good. An industry doesn't really become an industry without competition. I mean, the things that I've always struggled with a little bit with one of our big competitors, Polymarket, is I think we have principles differences.

19:09I think they went offshore, did it unregulated, and then the results show, like they listed some of these missile strike markets, et cetera, that really infuriated people for good reason. They infuriated me too. They're bad markets that shouldn't exist because they present moral hazards. So really the line there is like there are regs that ban them, and we shouldn't allow any operators to do these types of things. And if there are certain markets. So really the line there is like, you know, there are regs that ban them, like, and, you know, we shouldn't allow any operators to do these types of things. And if there are certain markets that are on the line, my view is we should be conservative

19:29and not let them happen. Now, insider trading is a more interesting issue. And I always go back to, you know, initially when, the beginning of the year, when the first insider trading case, which is the famous Maduro trade happened, you know, there was a bit of a debate in the industry. Like we came out very strongly and said, we spent the first four years building systems to ban insider trading, and we're very against insider. And some of the industry players who have now come around, initially were saying, well, actually, no, we should let insider trading happen because it makes market prices more efficient. If you let insiders trade on the information that they have, it should, in theory, make the market price more efficient.

20:01And it was a completely moronic take, basically, because there's sure theoretically that would happen, but what would happen if you let corruption go rampant in a supposedly free and fair competition? People stop believing it's fair. And what happens if people stop believing it's fair? They stop participating. The thing breaks. People stop using it. And that's why it's been in the stock market, it's been in traditional markets, it's been in prediction markets, it's been in prediction markets. There's a few layers. I mean, one is we verify all customers. So when you're on board to Kalshi, we take your name, social security. Number two is we send it to a bunch of vendors that usually the banks use.

20:37So after the Banking Secrecy Act was enacted, banks have a duty, the same way as a regulated exchange like us, we have a duty to figure out who we're transacting for, who we're moving money for, so who the customers are. And then you can cross-vote it against a bunch of lists. So FEC reports, politically exposed people, their families, their close families. And there's all sorts of lists now also with sports leagues. Now we just announced a partnership with the NBA. The core tenet of that partnership is they share data with us about who may be an insider in the leak so we can ban them from trading. And then we ban all these people from trading on things that they proactively, we proactively

21:09ban them on things that they might have an insider information or influence over. That ban is actually a self-regulation. That's not currently law. We're pushing for this to be law. I'm strongly advocating for this to become law. But what's law is also after the trade, like post the fact, which we had discussed last time. After a trade happens, the thing that's interesting with fraud is like there's always something suspicious, like somebody, you know, all of a sudden is buying in larger size, something that's an asymmetric long shot or other things. And then that can go and that goes to our investigation team that like can impose fines all the way to criminal prosecution. And the way they really combat crime or bad actors is you catch them.

21:43And when you catch them, you have to enforce heavy consequences. That's true for any financial crime or any crime, really, on the street. The next person that considers doing it is going to reconsider it because of how bad it would be for them to get caught. Now, here's the thing I'll say about prediction markets. I'm sure a lot of you have seen, especially the young people in the room, you know the meme about the plane from World War II around survivorship bias where the plane was shot in certain places and we make the completely wrong conclusion about where we should shoot the plane or not shoot the plane. I think that's a bit what's happening in prediction markets. The thing is prediction markets are incredibly transparent. All the trading activity is public. You see

22:21it. Everybody sees it. You can go to cashflow.com right now, click on Texas Senate race or any race or whatever you want to click on. And you see all the trading activity publicly available as a log for anyone, which is not really true for traditional markets. You cannot easily, the reporters and press and general public and our customers cannot see it so publicly. And so it's interesting because there's basically the tailgate is there's way more trading happening in the stock market. We're just catching way less of it. Whereas in prediction markets, we're just actually catching much more of it because it's so blatant. It's right there for everybody to see. When somebody is moving the price from 10% to 25%, well, everybody starts freaking out about what happened.

22:58And that's a good thing because then we can go and police it. And I think that's a bit of that dynamic happening. But over time, society will adjust. I mean, the candidates now know. It's like, well, if I'm going to do something on my campaign and I get caught, it's pretty much going to ruin my campaign, so I'm not going to do it. Well, I was going to ask you about a study, actually, from Bloomberg that looked at how much it takes to move one of these prediction markets in a midterms race, because these are generally relatively thinly traded races. So Bellwether, an online tool built by a Stanford grad school of business, rather, research lab monitors how much money it would take to meaningfully move political markets

23:32on prediction market platforms. A single bet of less than $100,000 could move 99% of the 15,000 U.S. midterm election markets. How much? $100,000 could move 99%. That's not true. There's no way that's true. That they tried. I didn't even look at the research. I can tell you right now it's not true. By at least 5% of choice. People can put out all sorts of shit. I'm sorry for the... It's like the polls from Wedgwood. Oh, I think this candidate is up 17% and the two dudes were just fabricating fake data. I mean, tell them they should move the market. They should put money on it then. We should ask them. Do they have enough conviction to put money on it? I mean, I don't know. I don't know what to tell you.

24:14I mean, it's not true. If somebody put $1.5 million on the L.A. mayor race, you can all go publicly see it. I don't know if it's in the pack, but we can, you know, if anyone, targetcashier.com, ask me about that. I'll send you all the information. They put $1.5 million on the L.A. mayor race, and they moved the price from, I think it was something like 25% to 40%. They were trying to artificially manipulate public perception on what people perceive Spencer Pratt's odds of winning are. Guess how much, how long the price stayed at 40% for? Nine seconds. It went to 40, and then the smart people, the traders, that have incentive to make money on this thing. This incentive is so clean, transparent.

24:53They're like, well, something is off here. Certainly it's not 40%. They traded it back all the way to 25%. So what happened to the $1.5 million? They just lost their money. It's completely stupid. They should have actually commissioned a bunch of polls, which, by the way, they probably did, to say that Spencer Murad is crushing it in that election or bought a bunch of AI videos to promote a bunch of misinformation on TikTok and Instagram. So which they also probably did. Like, you know, if you're a campaign candidate right now, you're not doing that. You're what are you doing? Like, this is what everybody is doing. You do attack ads. I mean, you know, campaign one on one. You set up a campaign, put a million dollars into, like, creating a bunch of fake, you know, cool AI videos that makes your opponent look very, very bad.

25:30Say a bunch of inflammatory things and you start ripping them. I mean, that's left and right. That's politics, pretty much. And so my point is, like, sure, could people move prediction markets? Certainly. That's certainly true. But we have to put them in context of everything else that we're dealing with. I mean, how much money did it take for these two dudes to fake the Wedgwood poll? Zero. They're just coming up with numbers. They literally wrote a number on a spreadsheet and they sent it to a bunch of mainstream media and they were being reported left and right. And then people were like, why do people not trust the polls? I mean, why would they? I mean, maybe I should do that experiment, like fake a bunch of polls and then also release it.

26:10But my point is markets are not going to be perfect always. Now, if you look at a bunch of studies that have shown how calibrated they are, it's like they do work. When we say something has a 20% chance of happening, it does happen 2 in 10 times. Some markets are going to be more public, have more volume than others, the same way that Tesla stock has much more volume, is more efficient than a Russell 2000 biotech stock. And that's all publicly available on CalSheet. Maybe this is the most important takeaway here, is everything is public. The methodology is public. The incentive is public. And once something is low volume, it's also public. And I tell customers, if something is like $5,000 a volume versus $5 million a volume, you should treat it differently.

26:45One of them is more efficient market than the other one. None of that is true for polls. None of that is true for how the black box algorithms on social media are feeding information or not feeding us information. It's certainly not true. None of it is true for all these other sources of information that somehow are held to a much lower standard. If a poll is basically a sample of like, a completely missampled versus not missampled, do we even know? much lower standard, right? Like if a poll is basically a sample of like, it completely missampled versus not missampled, do we even know? Is there some, any public audits about how the poll was done and so on and so forth? There isn't. And I think that the fact that we can be asked

27:13that question, I think is a good thing. I actually think this is why these markets are so important is because all, it's bringing more transparency to the entire process. Have you thought about how you will adjudicate some of the election outcomes, given that there is likely to be a lot of contesting of election outcomes? I mean, who wins in Alaska if the Department of Justice decides to try to overturn the results of the election? That's a great question. So this is a question that markets have always had an issue with. So I'll give an example and I'll get to the election. Because elections are actually surprisingly interesting. Like you would think it's just like a, you know, yes, no. And so back in the day when CME, the Chicago Border Trade, listed butter futures, you know, they said, okay, we're going to list the futures on the price of butter.

27:59They would get to settlement. And then all the, you know, the butter farmers and the traders and speculators, it was civil war. They would all start fighting. They were like, no, no, no. This type of milk should count as butter and then this cheese is actually kind of buttery, so it should be in the butter definition. And so how they actually handle it, what these markets are, the reason we call them event contracts is they're a legal contract. They were like, okay, we're going to set it. What you're buying is a contract. There's a swap that pays based on these specific legal, like legally defined characteristics. So if you look at any of our markets and you're like, you know, control F view rules, you'll see the full rules.

28:34It's a long PDF. It's like three pages of legalese that explains exactly up front to the marketplace. What exactly does it mean for us to say the straight of our moves is going to open? Like what does that actually mean? And it's usually a very specific definition of like, okay, the seven day average of amount of cargo is X, Y, and Z reported by these different agencies. Elections are interesting. So in the 24 election, what we've done, so for the elections, we're very careful. We've got, we basically get election lawyers, like election integrity lawyers that essentially help us with the definition of, okay, what is the, where you know the election is done in a way that essentially is nonpartisan and is defined up front to the entire public, that all the

29:14public can see and agree to up front. So at 24, what we've realized is the only way to really determine, like fully determine and settle an election is January 20th. So it's basically whoever gets sworn in as an ex-president of the United States. Because actually, I didn't know this, but actually even after a Congress cert, there could be a bunch of different things that could happen, including a SCOTUS overruling a Congress certification and so on and so forth. And that's basically, I think, the standard we do. I don't know how we're doing every single one of our midterm markets, but there's a team up front that defines these rules and a team of external counsel that essentially vets them to make sure that once the settlement is done, that's basically who won the election.

29:52And I mean, we don't want to be in the business of calling an election or deciding what the outcome is. We want to be in the business of once the outcome is decided, however it gets decided, and that's a whole different issue that society has to deal with, we are there to settle it, basically. The same way as the butter. We don't have strong views about what butter is or isn't. We'll just be there to settle it as long as we agree on what the final definition of butter is. I should go and look up how many calci markets relate to butter. We don't have that yet. No? It's a touchy subject. Touchy subject. Okay, fair enough. We also don't have onions. You can explain why. Because, you know, this goes back to the market manipulation question, which is how, you know,

30:32this is the prime example of how we really kind of get to unsound policy sometimes when there's a time of crisis. Which, unfortunately, we often do policy as a reaction to a crisis instead of just being thoughtful and proactive about enacting policy that makes sense it's down the middle but in 55 1955 there's two two guys that manipulated the onion markets by basically buying up pretty much most of the onion supply in short and doing what we call a short squeeze so they put a big short and then they tanked they sold all the onions at the same time to tank the prices down and make a lot of money on their short on the futures um a bunch of people went bankrupt. It was really bad. So Congress at the time was like,

31:11well, obviously the issue is onions, not humans. And so we will ban onion futures, the Onion Act of 55. And, you know, it's just such an interesting use case of like, you know, yeah, obviously, I mean, manipulation is only endemic to onions. You cannot possibly manipulate tomato futures or corn futures. I mean, that's impossible. But it's one of those interesting things. And you see there's a real practical impact now because onions are one of the most volatile commodities. They're a very volatile vegetable because there is no future market to dampen that volatility, to help farmers reduce their risk and predict how much they're going to sell for. So supply ends up being kind of volatile. And the market is actually more volatile than oil,

31:46which is one of the most volatile commodities out there. And so, you know, after we deal with the prediction market issue, my next thing will be to repeal the Onion Act, which must be done. Also, movie box office returns, right? You also can't offer prediction markets in those. You can't do futures on box office returns. Can I talk about that one? It's pretty fun. Brief Frankly, sure, sure. Okay, I'll do it fast. But it's just these interesting use cases in the law. At the time, there was an exchange that wanted to do box office futures. And the reason why those futures were great is because right now, you know, like movie production is basically a few big, it's a monopolistic, you know, it's a few big studio companies

32:20that like have all the resources, all the investment, and they can basically produce movies. What's hard for basically a bunch of the smaller studios is to get lines of credit to basically get going. And so the reason to build a futures market for it is basically if you can predict ahead of time that a market was going to be kind of successful, it can help you basically get more predictability in the future so you can get higher credit worthiness and raise loans, raise money, and basically let the smaller players basically get more competitive and more dynamic. It was actually going to, they started to go around. And last minute in Dodd-Frank, a small line got introduced out of nowhere, which was like ban box office futures.

32:55Guess who was introduced by? The lobbying coalition for the three big box office companies. And really the two reasons was like they didn't want to prop up more competition because if there's open price discoveries, there's more transparency on who's going to do well, which movies are going to do well or not, it might be an equalizer of where capital goes. And the second hidden reason, which after a while it came around, they didn't want to have a good forecast of whether a movie going to do well or not ahead of time, because usually they get three or four weeks of back box office sales before people realize that a movie was pretty bad. And so if you have more transparency in that system, it would kind of hurt their bottom

33:29line. And so sometimes a lot of people don't also like these markets. And we think we've seen this a little bit with the casinos now, like they don't like the idea that there's an open market that is pricing these sports events so transparently because it kind of hurts their ability to screw their customers. And so there's a little bit of that going on. So maybe that one is- So let's a little bit of that going on. So maybe that one is... So let's talk about some of that litigation. You have faced lawsuits in, I think, about 20 states trying to restrict or ban... But we're the ones suing in most of them. You're suing in most of them. Yeah. Because they're trying to regulate you. No, it's not exactly right because they're trying to, like, sue us.

34:05So we sue them first. Okay, okay, fair enough. As I understand it, so far appeals courts have issued conflicting rulings. It's not a regulatory, yeah. Well, they've issued conflicting rulings. Do you think that there is any legitimate state interest in regulating products that look and feel like sports betting? Not exactly, not framed the right way. So I don't have my phone now. It's just turned off the battery. But recently I've been really obsessed with this court opinion. There's a court opinion that goes, you know, we believe, I don't have the exact language, the thing I read to you last time. So we believe that dealing in these types of markets is void by the common law because it is contrary to public policy.

34:43It is not only contrary to public policy, it is a crime against the state, a crime against the country, a crime against humanity. And they go on and on about how the species of gambling is a preeminent sin and it's emphatically the worst thing that's happening to society. That's an opinion about, from 1888, about grain futures. It's like amazing. Like it's the states were suing the Chicago Board of Trade because some farmers are betting on the price of grain. They're gambling on the price of grain. Some of them were losing their house, which is bad. And states were like, well, this is gambling. It's the same thing as people, you know, betting on the bucket shops, which is the original version of the casinos and the sports books at the time. And, you know, that whole

35:22thing played out. A bunch of states, there were like 20, 30 states that sued the Chicago Borough Trade, and it went up to the Supreme Court. And then, you know, we handled it with the Comanches Exchange Act, which came in 74, which was like, okay, yes, there is gambling, speculating, trading, whatever you want to call it, in all financial markets. If the line is, if anyone is going to use a certain market to gamble, then, you know, the NASDAQ should be state-by-state regulated. Like, and there's an argument to be made for that because there are people that lose their shirts gambling on options markets. It's true. And so how do we draw a line? The line goes back to, is it a market or are you betting against

35:56the house? Because the house incentives are to basically ban out the winners and screw the losers. The market's incentive is to promote price discovery in an open market that can produce the public goods of the price forecast, which gives farmers predictability about the future, the same way the prediction markets give us predictability about a bunch of different things, and risk management. There are some speculators on one side and hedgers on the other side. And the reason why a market needs to be regulated, there's a reason why it needs to be regulated at a federal level, is because of liquidity. Like when you want to buy something, you mentioned the piece of some state races have low volume or low liquidity.

36:26Why? Because I'm not taking the other side. Every time, if you're on one side of the market, you have to be on the other side of that market. And so at the time, it's a little bit like they were thinking about, well, we have two options. Either let New York Stock Exchange be a nationwide market with nationwide rules, where the rules of who is an insider in California are the same as New York, so that when I match the two of you, you're abiding by the same rules in the competition, and then we enable liquidity so you can trade against someone in Texas, someone in Texas can trade against someone in California, against Hawaii. Like that global liquidity, that diversity of trades is critical for an open market.

36:55Or the alternative is imagine we bifurcated the New York Stock Exchange to 50 state New York stock exchanges, like 50 national stock exchanges, where you can only buy Apple stock in Oregon from someone who's in Oregon. What would happen? where you can only buy Apple stock in Oregon from someone who's in Oregon. What would happen? You can't buy the Apple stock. It wouldn't work. It would bifurcate liquidity, make markets inefficient. It's a very anti-free markets way to approach things. It would just not work. And so the message is always like, it's not about cash not wanting to be regulated. We spent the first four years proactively getting regulated when our main competitor became the Uber of the space, Polymarket. Two years ago, you didn't even

37:22know who we were. I've always been very pro-regulation. I want regulation. And if there's a delta with the states, I always tell them how the marketing is being done, et cetera. Let's have that conversation when we're open to it. If you want to tax it, certainly you can tax it. It's more about whether we want this market to live as a market onshore, or we want to drive it offshore to give yet another monopoly to the casinos. That's really the fundamental question that's going on here. And I like to choose the free open market competition, which is what America has chosen historically. So these lawsuits are over the sports betting in particular? Some of them. No, a lot of them are actually about the whole thing.

37:55Okay. Well, the reason I... New York is about the whole thing. Utah is, like, I think a whole swath of events. I don't, I mean, some people think... The point is, I mean, again, where's the line? Where's the limiting principle that you're drawing? The topics can change, but the structure is exactly the same, right? The elections, economics, interest rates, like the whole thing is the same. So no, I think there's a bunch of these lawsuits that are a bunch more, like a much broader set of things, basically. Well, the reason I ask about sports is that it does seem like that is at least one common denominator among the different lawsuits. about sports is that it does seem like that is at least one common denominator among the different lawsuits.

38:26And as I understand it, sports bets made up something like 95 percent of your revenue like a year ago. And now it's closer to 60, 65 percent, somewhere around there. So what happens to Calchi if these cases ultimately get adjudicated by the Supreme Court and you are no longer allowed to participate? People love to ask me that question. I mean, look, I think there's a few things. I mean, on the one hand, we would need to figure out some sort of patchwork which would really destroy the market. And it's just bad for the customer at the end of the day like it's not like like it's really it's a little bit the way i think about it it's like the way to respond to that question is like what happened if we just like gave a monopoly to a sportsbook model i mean just worse for the

39:11customers like the winners that are getting banned from sportsbooks are basically using prediction markets right now should have a place place to go and they cannot do it on sportsbooks it's just like terrible um but like you know we have i mean our fast growing actually businesses are not sports that's you know the commonly thing that what people believe to be fast growing is actually not also crypto it's actually commodities and like we're just entering single stocks like we're a very diversified company now and we we have 30 million customers which is really large like we're basically one of the largest fintech if not I mean top two fintech sort of brokerages in America today so we're very excited about the direction of travel we're entering into compute futures we I mean, top two fintech sort of brokerages in America today.

39:47So we're very excited about the direction of travel. We're entering into compute futures. We have a few announcements coming. We just announced our S&P partnership this morning or last morning. Everything is hazy these days. But, like, which we're very excited about because we're going to be developing a bunch of indices. Like, imagine the S&P for politics, the S&P for sports, the S&P for economics, for all these different areas of the economy that are essentially becoming increasing larger industries. But to summarize all of that, the law is on our side. The law is very clear. And the pro-social utilities of prediction markets are very clear. And we feel pretty good about our court standing.

40:18Speaking also about the regulatory risk and how states are approaching all of this. Kalshi announced on January 13th of 2025, shortly before Trump's inauguration, that Trump's son, Don Jr., was going to be joining as a strategic advisor. Reports at the time indicated that he was being given something like $300,000 worth of equity in the company. And the press release at the time cited his, quote, extensive business experience and influence. Don Jr. brings a fresh perspective to CalSheet as we continue to push prediction markets into the mainstream, unquote. Since then, Don Jr. has been reported to have told Republican state attorneys, attorneys general to back off investigations in prediction markets at a

41:06closed door event in March. Do you understand why, at the very least, the perception of this relationship with the president's son and his relationship with his own father, with other states, suggests favor trading on the part of CalSheep? Yeah, I mean, we totally understand the optics issue. I mean, we totally understand the optics issue. I mean, there's no question about it. And we keep getting asked that question over and over. The press loves that question, you know, and I always think, like, why are we not talking about the pro-prediction markets? What is interesting about prediction markets over... I've answered this question a million times. You can find a million clips of me online with a bunch of hate comments about it.

41:39Like, I'll tell you the same thing right now. But it's interesting. I didn't even know about this Republican... Then why are we being sued by Republican attorney generals? If that worked, then what's happening? I mean, so look, we've never done anything on the regulatory front, and we've never done anything on the policy front. It was made up front very clear at the beginning, and it's still very clear. We've never done anything. And whatever happens, happens. It's going to surface that basically nothing in that regard has ever been done. The interesting thing about it is actually it was announced January, but we had actually done it before the election. It was not a political decision. It was never a political decision because at the time there was still a 50%, 55% chance that Harris would have won that election.

42:12So we were a company that was 20 people. And then people, you know, now we're very big. So people look at us as some sort of big industrial, you know, like establishment company, big company, be scared of it. But like, you know, random guy that grew up in Lebanon, single mom, volatility, crazy life. I go to MIT, love math, love markets. I went through four, five, six years slug. Anyone who's built a company or started a company at some point, those three, four years of early building, they're the most excruciating, painful experience anyone can go through. And I'm telling you, building a high, like what should hopefully become a high growth tech company is one of the hardest things you can ever do. And I'm telling you, building what should hopefully

42:45become a high growth tech company is one of the hardest things you can ever do. And I really believe in prediction markets. I believe in this so much that I staked my entire career and took all the risks, even though I'm a risk averse guy, like Luana is a risk loving one. I'm a paranoid person. I think about risk all day. And we got to a place in 24 where literally it's been six years of building things and no one cared about prediction markets. It was like a niche corner of the internet, which is a bunch of weirdos. Like, maybe if I probe this room, there'll be like two dudes in this room that had heard of prediction markets in 23, like, and no one else. And those two dudes, sorry, you're probably internet weirdos,

43:17like, and, you know, like, I mean, I mean, that's the people that like prediction markets at the time. And so you get a place, how do you get the word out? And you had Don, who was a public figure that loved them. He did. And it was amazing. And like he has 10 million followers on Twitter. And the deal was like, you help us promote the message and help us get it out there. And we did this with Republicans. We did this with Democrats. If you look at our Twitter affiliates, people love to cover. We have hundreds of Republican affiliates and hundreds of Democratic affiliates. And yet that announcement happened and people flew with it. And like that was a narrative that was basically set. And it was never a political decision. It still isn't. And we also have a lot of advisors on a democratic front. People just don't like to, to, to talk about

43:51them. I'm guessing next year they will talk about them because like, you know, Cal, she hired a democratic advisor because Congress flipped, et cetera, even though we had them for two years and oh my God, you know, evil corporation, big, bad, everybody freak out. I don't think it's unusual for companies to hedge their risk by developing relationships with Republicans and Democrats. It's still a political relationship. Certainly, but it's interesting to me. It's like, that one specific, frankly, we do hire lobbyists. We have infinite number of lobbyists at this point, right? That is just not one of them. It's not one of people that, and you will, I mean, when all the things surface, you will

44:23see that it was not one of them. But what's interesting to me is like, I see all all these reports about, like, cash he gave to whatever. I wouldn't even know about it. $7,000 to candidate in X, Y, and Z. And there's a big article about it. And it's a little interesting to me because it's like, how much have the casinos given in the last 20 years? Like, what game am I supposed to be playing? I didn't set the rules of the game. Like, if it were up to me, like, you know, I would just just say like, I don't know, all this political giving should not be allowed. I don't know. This is not my game. I think, you know, what you, I walked into the thing, the politicians were freaking out early this year about things that we didn't even do.

44:54Like it was cash in the polymarket and the polymarket would do every, every single one of these things where they shat the bed, it was them. And I basically, you know, came to clean up the shit and like, I mean, it's true. I'm so sorry, I know we're the New York Economic Club, and I didn't come with a t-shirt. But my point is, the casinos have been playing this game forever, and I realize, oh God, this is a thing that we have to get better at. You have to build a public affairs function, and a comms function, explain who you are, and be able to walk in the door and explain who you are. And once I walk into a door like I am right now and explain who I am, people understand that actually there is a lot of benefits to this market.

45:29This person is actually pro-sensible regulations, and that's basically what lobbying is about. But I don't see any articles about the casino giving, which I'll tell you right now. It's way bigger than anything that Kalshi has ever done. Those guys are very good at the political lobbying game, and they'll always be very good at it. We're just getting a little bit better. I think we have time for a few questions, and we have some mics floating around as well. Back there. Hey, Tarek. I'm curious, like, what's your take on perpetual futures? I think that's like another business line that you guys expanding and just want to another one. We're getting sued over so You know, but it tells you what it is. I mean, this is interesting, right?

46:13like so the CME sued over perpetual futures right and and and some They want to label them as future or swaps some small technical thing that doesn't really matter but like And it's interesting because, so what are perpetual futures? Perpetual futures are basically futures. They're the same thing as the future. But unlike futures, they don't expire. You know, they don't have a set calendar when you have to close, naturally close your position by. Now, futures expire because historically, like let's say, you know, you wanted to like set up pork belly futures or cattle futures. There's an actual point where you're going to deliver the physical good. There was a natural place where, you know, it made sense to deliver the thing.

46:52And so that's how the market structure evolved. And it evolved to things that don't have a natural expiry, like crypto or I would say oil or stocks, single stocks or others. And the concept of perpetual is actually, we didn't invent it. It was from the 90s. Shiller used to talk a lot about perpetuals, about the idea that you should have futures market that don't expire on a variety of different things. And I think it's just more elegant because right now, if you want to take a position that's six months long on oil or crypto, let's say Bitcoin, you have to use like, let's say CME or other futures where you have to open it and close it every month. So you open and then you do close and then open again, which you call a rollover.

47:33And then you pay fees at every rollover. So it's a very inefficient mechanism. With a PERP, same amount of leverage, same amount of risk, same regulation, same methodology, everything is the same. You can just open it and then close it in six months and you just pay fees at open and close instead of paying fees six times. Why does CME and some of the big monopolistic exchanges dislike it is because, well, guess what? Rollover fees is like 20%, 25% of their revenue. And now that there's an alternative where you don't have to pay rollover fees, what happens to that revenue? It's going to get squeezed. That's usually the constant talk, push and pull. It's like the innovator and the people that are pushing the

48:01boundary are going to have to push, and then the incumbents are going to figure out ways to protect their turf. And I feel pretty good about Perp still. That's my, maybe, if you ask me how I felt about them, I felt pretty good about them. I think there's a microphone over here. Yeah. Hi, thank you so much for joining us today. I just had a question about what do you think makes a good target prediction market, and what makes a market just linger around the five-figure level compared to the ones that are multi-million dollar ones? what have you seen drive that see this is the fun stuff let's get into it i mean like the the the here's okay prediction markets what they do is they aggregate information that doesn't sit in a committee right like when hayek was talking

48:38about information markets back in the in the 40s he was the idea was really like okay you know we have a table you're're the board, and you make some big decision that's going to impact millions of people. You need information that is actually coming from the millions of people that you're impacting. How do we do it? Market price is a very good aggregator of information. They do a very good job at essentially incentivizing people to have a good piece of information to come out in the open. And so prediction markets, like any financial markets, do a very good job when there's a lot of disaggregated, dispersed information that's sitting with the corners. With some person in Hawaii, some person in California, some person in Texas, some person in New York.

49:13And they aggregate all that information. So the places where prediction markets, I think, over time struggle a little bit more are places where that's not quite true. And so the first version of a prediction market, some of you may know this, is the Pope elections back in the 1400s in Rome. But that's interestingly, in my view, one of the bad versions of prediction markets because there's not really information outside of the, I don't know, 14, 15 cardinals that walk into the room and make the decision. And so that's been, you know, always a kind of an interesting concept for it. The other one is interesting because I think like, I think what's great about CalShoe right now is because we've onboarded so many customers from elections, from sports, from crypto,

49:47we can build much more liquidity and all the other questions are more and more interesting over time. So one of the things I want to release soon is markets on job displacement from AI. Imagine the types of questions we can start answering. So instead of listening to the rhetoric that's partisan and biased and, you know, agenda driven from both sides. Okay, AI is not going to do anything to jobs. AI is going to kill all jobs. How about we do a market with real skin in the game where millions of Americans are telling us what they actually think? And we can then use that to inform better and better policy. And I feel like Calci is finally at the point where we have enough customers, enough liquidity

50:16to basically get those questions answered. So the things that would historically have basically no volume or very little volume. My question is, most recently you raised the Series F funding. Is there anything, the IPO is coming up in the near future, or you're waiting for all the court cases to be, you win, then you go for the IPO? As much as I'd like to answer the question, my comms team would kill me if I commented on the IPO, so that's my answer. Right here. I would answer it if it was just up to me. A year ago, if you asked me, I would have answered it, but this is why people talk about Don Jr. all day. Is there a prediction market bet on when you IPO? Now I have a comms team that tells me no,

50:59and people might freak out about this one. So, thank you. I wanted to come back to this topic of how even or uneven the winners are in the competition on Kelshi. And Catherine, you brought up the Wall Street Journal article. And I think that talked about PolyMarket, but it said on PolyMarket at least they were able to evaluate or analyze that 67% of the profits were earned by one-tenth of 1% of the accounts. And I'm curious if that's, is that like another one of these things that like makes polymarket different from CalSheet? Or do you see something similar? And then just a related aspect to the question, you know, do kind of larger market makers, people put up a lot of markets, trade a lot of volume, do they get different terms from CalShare?

51:47Yeah, so that's a great question. So the numbers are not as cute. I don't know how that study was run, honestly. The numbers are not correct. It's not that tilted. But it's tilted. Again, if you really do an analysis on the distribution of profits in the options market, what percentage of profits is just Citadel alone? When Citadel is trading against Robinhood options traders, what percentage of profit is Citadel? It's massive. It's basically pretty much everything they pay to Robinhood every year for the PFOF. But the principle that you upheld, which is interesting, this is I think the market maker piece. The principles I've upheld at Cauchy in terms of the market structure is what the traditional commodities have.

52:26And I think over time, stock markets have less and less of, which is a completely free and fair and open market. Everyone has the same rights and same obligations. And there's some liquidity programs that we run, but they're publicly available for anyone. So anyone can access them and get the certain rights, but they have to abide by certain obligations. So that, for example, okay, you are going to get, let's say, a small rebate on your fees that you're paying, so you don't have to pay the full fee, but you're going to have to be available two-sided at all points in time, even when it's uncomfortable for you and you may lose money doing it. And that's how these market-making programs, so that's to boost up liquidity in certain places. The most interesting thing about

53:00cash, so the institutional market makers that people think about as like Wall Street, like the big names that you would know, are actually a much smaller percentage of profits and liquidity and volume than people think. The biggest people, the people that are really winning in prediction markets are basically the average people. And I go back to the mental model of the two dudes that were in their mom's garage in the Big Short. It's like the new Wall Street. That's what excites me so much because these people, when you ask them, do you trade in financial markets? They're like, no, because I don't have an edge. But they have an edge in politics. They have an edge on sports. They have an edge in weather.

53:36There was a recent piece of paper that said that weather markets are 10% more accurate than the national average of weather stations. And it's because you talk to these people, it's like this one guy, he's public about it, so I can talk about it. Scott Supak, he's one of the examples. He has now because, you know, you talk to these people, it's like, this one guy, he's public about it, so I can talk about it, Scott Supak. He's one of the examples. He has now a team of 10, 15 people. He got into prediction markets historically because he would get onto Twitter fights with climate deniers, climate change deniers, and get so pissed that he'd be like, put some money on it. And he found prediction markets, he's like, okay, you come to prediction markets, I'm

53:58going to put some money on it. You're not just going to sit on, and then if he was right, you know, he would punish them by making them lose money. And he's so into it. And this guy, like, scrapes satellite data, has all sorts of meteorology models. But that's not the traditional institutions. It's people that anyone can actually put the effort and get good at it. That's the whole point. Now, everybody does everything in life, right? But that's the key point, is that there's no structural advantage or anything like that for the financial guys, and that's why they're not the top performers. They just aren't. It's a great question. Or maybe there's one. Hi, thanks. So you guys are doing like north of

54:39three billion dollars of volume on certain days recently. I mean, obviously you mentioned already a lot of that's being driven by sports, a lot by combos. Crystal Ball, five years from now, what is the single largest type of contract that Kalshi's trading? And if it's perps, what kind of perps? I don't know for sure, but my feeling is Compute Futures right now. I think it's going to be very big. And we're announcing something big on that soon. But the, because, you know, the way to think about it is, like, derivatives markets get big. Whether it's true for, like, grain, oil, sports, politics, when the underlying gets pretty big. Like, when the underlying, there's enough moving in the underlying,

55:26so you get a derivative market that ends up basically, you know, laying on top of the underlying. And generally speaking, it varies. So the FX derivatives are 2X the FX market. That's at the very least. But usually there's some market structure reasons that make the derivatives smaller. On average, it's like 5 to 10X basically bigger than the spot. So if it's true that we're going to spend like a trillion dollars on computing in the next year or two, I mean, you're talking about a $5 to $1 trillion market for derivatives. So I think we want to win that. I'm pretty excited about that. And so, you know, I don't know if it's going to end up being, if they materialize. But if they materialize, I feel pretty good about our ability to win there.

56:03And I'm very, very, and it'll end up being the big, I think the biggest. I think we have time for one more question. Is the reason you didn't have a shirt today because you lost it in the prediction markets? I wish I could trade in the prediction markets. No, that wasn't my question. Could you talk a little bit about your fee structure of the sportsbooks versus Kalshi? So say you want to make a traditional sportsbook at minus 110, 4.5%. How would that same bet price out on Kalshi? So we take a fee. So it's different. So the sportsbook, basically, at the end of the day, they bet against you and they bet against you. And if you're winning, you get kicked out. And if you keep losing, they keep betting against you. And the way that they optimize their revenues over time is find the losers and the people that have the highest propensity to lose and keep bringing them back with promos.

56:52They figure out that you will lose $1,000 a week if they give you, the minimum they have to give you is $175.67 per week. They have a bunch of algorithms that are very smart to bring you back. So that's why you have so much promo and bonusing and all that stuff. For OptiMe, I think that's the stuff that really needs to be banned because that's, I think, the worst part of how to promote addiction because you find someone that has a propensity for addiction and you give them more and more candy. And that's how you make money long-term. And then there's a spread, yes, but the key thing you need to understand, people think of it as a spread, but the winners are getting rooted out of the system.

57:20That's the key thing. You figure out how to move the card counters out and get the best customers, and that's the customers that you try to extract as much as possible from. We don't have, like, we don't have that. They are trading against each other. And, you know, let's say they transact, you buy a hundred shares from him at 50 cents or $50. I take 0.7% on average. So I will take basically 35 cents on top of the $50. And that's a trade, no matter who wins or loses. And that's my fee. That's basically all the money I will make. We don't monetize the data. We don't monetize anything else. The data is all public for anyone to access. I don't know how to think in American odds. I don't even know why American odds

57:54exist. I think they exist to confuse people. I really do. I was a math guy and every time I had to think about them, I'd get confused again. I don't know. I can think in percentages, which I think how people should think. But I truly think that American odds were literally, which I think how people should think. But I truly think that American odds were literally invented to confuse the hell out of people. Because they make it very clear what the spread is, which is like insane, you know? But yeah. I don't know, but we're cheaper. I mean, yeah. Please join me in thanking both Tarek and Catherine for being here. Thanks a lot. That was good. Thank you. both Tarek and Catherine for being here. Thanks a lot.

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