The a16z Show · · Transcript & summary by WhipScribe
Two economists explain, with specific conditions and numbers, why better AI models have not yet produced an economic boom and what would have to change for one to arrive.
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“Benefits will exceed costs, but it will take some time” Tyler Cowen · at 0:01 — ▶ hear it from here
“what you actually need for real economic transformation is not just competence” Alex Imas · at 32:57 — ▶ hear it from here
Google DeepMind's Alex Imas and economist Tyler Cowen argue that fast progress in AI models will not automatically produce double-digit GDP growth. Imas explains that a singularity-style boom needs almost no bottlenecks and increasing returns to ideas, and that estimates from current data fall short of that. Cowen notes that very high growth in history usually came from a rebound after a recession, war or pandemic, or from a tiny economy with one export, and he says robotics and driverless cars are still slow to reach ordinary people.
Both guests locate the drag in institutions. They point to inertia in government, nonprofits, healthcare and higher education, and to the way regulated sectors absorb new tools slowly. Price competition among frontier labs is also keeping revenue below the hype, while agent costs rise because agentic systems use far more tokens. Imas argues that the larger shift will come only when AI agents coordinate well enough to outperform human organizations, since today's agent swarms mostly run tasks in parallel. He warns that a sudden coordination breakthrough could push employment through a rapid transition, while Cowen expects new jobs to appear and hiring to slow for a while.
The conversation also ranges across recent NVIDIA news, alignment through mechanism design, state-level political backlash against data centers and the limits of money in politics. Both guests favour checks and balances over any single fix. They close on higher education, where both want more experimentation, and Imas predicts that economics will become a toolkit AI helps apply across the social sciences.
Alex Imas is an economist who works on AI at Google DeepMind. He co-wrote a paper on organizations and AI agents with Andrew Koh and Shane Legg.
Tyler Cowen is an economist and the other guest, who joins Alex Imas to discuss how AI progress translates into economic growth.
Alex Imas says the idea of agentic swarms, where many AI agents work together, does not hold up when you look closely. He argues that these agents are still very bad at coordinating and are mostly doing parallel processing. In his view, better coordination is what would let AI agents outperform human organizations.
“But if you unpack it, these agents are still very bad at coordinating.”Alex Imas · 32:57
Tyler Cowen said that prediction markets for the Anthropic IPO bounce up and down, but the valuation is not flying above $2 trillion. He said Anthropic's projected revenue numbers are not what he would expect under a super fast AI takeoff. He said he became about 1% more bearish over the week before the recording, citing those signals.
“it's not flying above $2 trillion”Tyler Cowen · 5:57
Tyler Cowen said that if AI agents rose from basically zero to 6% of GDP, that could be called an explosion, but even that does not seem soon. He said 1.5% of GDP could plausibly arrive within five years. He stressed that GDP is huge, calling it one of the core insights of economics.
“GDP is huge. That's one of the core insights of economics.”Tyler Cowen · 38:05
Tyler Cowen said the Hugging Face incident did not update his views much. As an economist, he thinks in terms of principal-agent theory, where a principal cannot fully control an agent no matter the contract. He argued the answer was always going to be checks and balances, not perfect alignment.
“The answer was always going to be checks and balances”Tyler Cowen · 25:21
Alex Imas argues that AI models are improving fast, but real economic transformation needs AI agents that can coordinate with one another, not just better individual skills. He says that until coordination improves, growth is likely to stay closer to normal, though a coordination breakthrough could cause a sudden shift in wages and employment.
Alex Imas says real economic transformation needs AI agents that can coordinate with one another, not just stronger skills on single tasks. In a paper with Andrew Koh and Shane Legg, he argues that once coordination improves, the limit on firm size can break and wages and employment can shift. Today's agent swarms mostly run tasks in parallel, and on coordination benchmarks one agent beat two agents splitting the work.
Tyler Cowen says AI will change the whole world and that benefits will exceed costs, but the path will be more normal than many people expect. He says a burst of AI-driven growth might give the US 3% to 4%. He would bet heavily against 10% growth for a year, and says any such spike would be temporary and would mostly come from recovering after a recession, war or pandemic.
Alex Imas says the paper by Ben Jones and Chad Jones on singularity-type growth requires a set of knife-edge conditions, mainly no real bottlenecks and no decreasing returns to ideas. If each breakthrough makes the next one cheaper, the economy can get double-digit growth. He says the parameter estimated from current data is decidedly less than one, which means the standard single-digit, diminishing-returns world still holds for now.
Tyler Cowen says inertia is hard to overcome in government, nonprofits and heavily regulated parts of healthcare and higher education, which he estimates make up about 40% of the US economy. He cites the IRS still using fax machines and poor edtech software as examples. He says regulation is a problem, but inertia is the bigger barrier, so AI will not transform those sectors quickly.
Alex Imas says he is worried that if coordination breaks through quickly, wages and employment could shift in a phase transition. New sectors would still appear, but workers could not be rematched fast enough, leaving large pools of unemployment that scar people out of the labor market. He calls this a personal worry and says he thinks the likelihood is a different question, since he agrees things will probably move slowly for the real economy.
Tyler Cowen says robotics will likely arrive relatively slowly, and he points to how long it has taken Waymo to reach Washington, D.C., even though the robot is a simple one that goes forwards, backwards and turns. He says the contribution of driverless cars to human welfare is still tiny, mostly that it is fun. Market data suggests robotics will progress but will not produce 20% growth in three or four years.
Alex Imas explains the argument for runaway growth through non-homothetic preferences. Automated goods become cheaper, so they shrink as a share of GDP while bottleneck sectors grow and drive measured growth. He says a paper estimating these preferences from about 200 years of data supports the idea that growth shifts to whatever is least automated. He says this is the strongest version of the case made by people in the Bay Area.
Our own transcript of the public episode, with a timestamp about every 90 seconds. Tap a timestamp to play the episode from there in the show's own player; the link button on a paragraph copies a link that opens this page there.
0:01Institutions are not quite running as smoothly as either we might like or we might fear. We have these weird things happening with NVIDIA. If you look at prediction markets for what the anthropic IPO will go for, it's not flying above $2 trillion. Do you expect the growth to continue or do you think it'll level out? Benefits will exceed costs, but it will take some time, and the path will be quite a bit more normal than many people would have you believe. What you actually need for real economic transformation is not just competence, it's the ability of these agents to coordinate with one another. There's this idea of agentic swarms, but if you unpack it, these agents are still very bad at coordinating. They're mostly just doing parallel processing. Often the faster that some things move, that just means you hit the real bottlenecks more quickly.
0:49If you ask me the question, when will agents be 10% of GDP? I don't think it's soon. What do the two different worlds look like? One in which GDP growth is a bit more normal and another in which it actually becomes double digit. ANI models are getting better at an extraordinary rate. So why doesn't the economy look extraordinary yet? In this episode, I sit down with Google DeepMind's Alex Emos and economist Tyler Cowen to ask how rapidly advancing AI translates into economic growth. We unpack why better models don't automatically need double digit GDP growth, from institutional inertia and regulation to physical infrastructure and finding productive uses for AI. Alex also argues that the bigger breakthrough
1:31may come when AI agents learn to coordinate well enough to outperform human organizations. And that raises the larger question, what would actually have to happen for AI progress to produce an economic takeoff? Alex, Tyler, welcome to Face & Z podcast. Happy to be here. Thanks. Thanks for having us. So there's a lot to talk about. First, let's talk about some timely topics. The media report came out. There's been a lot of conversation. Paul Cristiano is talking in tweets. There's a lot of sort of unrest and anxiety around sort of the state of AI right now and RSI. And I'm curious, Alex, what is your reaction to what we are seeing and where do you stand on some of the proclamations being made right now?
2:16So, I mean, I read it closely. I think it's undeniable that we're having, you know, incredible progress and that the progress is accelerating. I think anybody who's looking at the model releases, they're becoming more frequent, they're becoming more powerful, the capabilities are going from last November to this November, it's just an unrecognizable world, especially the difference between agentic AI and the chatbot era. You're seeing like, you know, what's coming out of companies when you have data coming out and like the difference between, you know, the chatbot era versus the agentic era. You're seeing real productivity now. Like with the chatbot, you're kind of like using it almost like a fancy version of a, you know, Wikipedia or something like that. You're
3:05asking questions. It gives you answers with an agentic system. You're seeing actual work. And that level of work, the ability of these systems to actually do the work is just progressing so quickly. And, you know, you're seeing a lot of hockey sticks, basically. And that's what the meter report showed is that, look, here's another hockey stick. So to me, I didn't, to tell you the truth, I didn't update too much from the meter report because a lot of the data in the meter report has been around in other spaces. So the S1 statement, you know, we knew about some of the unreleased models. So I didn't update too much, but that's because I was kind of already there. Is your view that the hockey sticks
3:50that you're identifying, that they will just sort of continuously go up? At what point might they peter out? Or, you know, sort of how bullish are you from here on some of these hockey sticks maintaining? So, I mean, like, that's what you, the thing that you said, some of these hockey sticks is, I think, the main term. It's like, where are the hockey sticks going to be? How are they connected? So, in the meter report, to me, like, the very, the key phrase was unwell verified, you know, unwell specified tasks. What is, the big question is, like, what about less specified tasks? A lot of work is not well specified. I'm not one of those people who thinks this is like, all right, we're safe on the non-well specified side.
4:30I think the models are becoming increasingly better on not very well specified tasks as well. But I think, you know, it might be harder to do hockey sticks on those sort of tasks. There's also a lot of like the questions of like tacit knowledge, kind of Hayekian concerns about like the actual impact on the economy. I think, you know, Tyler and I are both economists. So all of this information, I have to kind of sift through about what these hockey sticks mean for economics and what does it mean for economically valuable tasks. And the big questions for me are like every model iteration, what are the economically valuable tasks that is this model is unlocking that the previous model wasn't unlocking? And this is kind of captured very
5:16imperfectly by get the hockey stick. So you can get a hockey stick that looks crazy on a benchmark and then you're not really seeing a lot of acceleration in the real world. We're not there yet. I think we're seeing a lot of acceleration in the real world, but these are just, you know, some of the questions that I have. Tyler, let's go to you. I feel like you've been a more sober voice in the conversation. Alex, I just mean, have you updated at all based on what's been happening here? What is your view? Well, often the faster that some things move, that just means you hit the real bottlenecks more quickly. So I don't update that frequently. But this is AI land, and in AI land, the exact dates really matter.
5:57So we're recording on November 11th, 2026, and that matters. I would say since August, I've changed my views a fair amount, most of all because of the math had. So I would date that to a few months ago. But if you mean over the last week, the meter report, the last two weeks, I'm actually slightly, very slightly more bearish. We have these weird things happening with NVIDIA. I have no prediction, but it will slow down the sector a bit. If you look at prediction markets for what the anthropic IPO will go for, they bounce up and down, but it's not flying above $2 trillion. You look at Anthropic's own projected revenue numbers, I forget the exact numbers. I wouldn't say I was underwhelmed, but they're not numbers that you would expect under the super fast takeoff scenarios, and that's for their IPO.
7:03So I'd say I'm like 1% more bearish over the course of the last week than I was a week ago for those reasons. Just the institutions are not quite running as smoothly as either we might like or we might fear, depending on your point of view. Are either the sort of growth rates of OpenAI and Anthropic, is your sort of base case that over the last, let's say, two or three years, that those growth rates continue? And put aside the specific companies, but I more mean just the leading AI companies, like the sort of economic impact that we've seen, whether those two companies maintain the lead. Of course, they're competing with the hyperscalers too. Do you expect the growth to continue or do you think a leveling out? Well, I was in the Bay Area a few weeks ago and many people were pushing
7:54very high revenue numbers on me. And I asked them all the following question. I said, what are the other sectors that are going to grow sufficiently rapidly to justify the extreme revenue numbers you're giving me for anthropic and open AI. And no one had an answer for that question. They didn't even try to give me answers. So I think that means the extreme revenue numbers are false. That doesn't make me bearish on the sector as a whole. I'm still bullish. I think it will be fine. Those are great companies. But at the end of the day, you look at market data, whether it's real interest rates, stock prices, anything, market data still look pretty normal. And the whole world investing community is talking about AI. It's not some kind of weird mystery like it was back in 2014,
8:41where you could say, I read a less wrong blog post, and now I'm really wealthy because I did. So I trust the judgment of the market more than the judgment of the Bay Area people who don't think that carefully about social interactions. So that's where I stand. It'll change the whole world. Benefits will exceed costs, but it will take some time, and the path will be quite a bit more normal than many people would have you believe. Yeah, and just to add to that, I think Tyler's exactly spot on in the fact that you need to start seeing the productivity numbers in the rest of the economy to justify the revenue increases. So at some point, the rest of the economy needs to be willing to pay for that product. And that increasing
9:26willingness to pay has to be from increasing productivity in the rest of the economy. And we haven't really seen too much evidence of that. Not to say that it won't happen, but it does need to happen at some point. The other part of that is competition. So I think what's starting to happen, particularly in the last few months, is extreme price competition from the Frontier Labs. As far as like before, they were just trying to compete on like who has the better model. And now that the models are being used by increasing number of enterprises and they're becoming quite expensive because Agentic AI, by the way, uses way more tokens. So now companies are, you know, open AI, anthropic, they're, you know, Muse is in the game, DeepMind is in the game, trying to
10:13actually say like, no, we're offering a cheaper model that as good or maybe even like a little bit better or maybe a little bit worse. And so you're seeing token prices come down a lot. And so, you know, Ramp has a really nice data set to track these things. And you saw exponential increases in token usage and flat revenue numbers, right? Where is that coming from? It's because of price competition. So at the frontier, you're seeing way more price competition than you used to like six months ago. And the very recent collections, I think those are being overplayed. I think a lot of data centers still will proceed, but I think it will slow things down a bit. There's greater likelihood of regulation
10:52or somewhat tougher regulation or regulation a bit sooner or Trump, you know, giving on the issue of guardrails. To me, it's not a major force, but again, it's going to make me a modest bit more bearish on the sector in terms of speed of takeoff, revenue numbers, anything else. By the way, while we're on the topic, did the midterms cause you to update anywhere else, Tyler? Or is it kind of, you know, thermostatic backlash is the thing and, you know, we should just expect these pendulum swings often? Well, most of it I expected and indeed predicted, but Texas truly surprised me. I didn't think Texas would flip the way it did. And maybe I just haven't been to the state enough lately, but that was a shock.
11:33Yeah, yeah. So AI and the economy, you both talked about how, you know, you push back strongly against the idea of, say, you know, doubleit GDP growth at some point, due to you're far more sober that, hey, it will be tremendously impactful for consumers. It will change a lot of things. But GDP growth, as you said a few minutes ago, it might be more normal than we might expect. But before getting why that is, can you explain what would need to be true for, for, or what are the two different worlds look like? One in which GDP growth is what we just said, a bit more normal, you know, and another in which it actually becomes double digit. And Alex, you were alluding to it a little bit, like paint that world to me of what it looks like if
12:19it's actually having, you know, massive impact on the economy. There's a beautiful paper out there that outlines exactly the conditions you need for this like singularity type growth by Ben Jones, Chad Jones, I believe Aguilón is on that paper as well. And essentially what you need is a bunch of pretty knife edge conditions to be met, particularly the main one is essentially no real bottlenecks. And the main bottleneck that can't exist is the idea production function. So you can't get decreasing returns to ideas. So basically, you go from like the old world where you have this technological breakthrough, and then you kind of have decreasing returns to that technological breakthrough. From that technological breakthrough to start creating more and more technological breakthroughs
13:11so you need less resources while getting more and more technology and more and more production out of that technology. And so you basically have increasing returns rather than decreasing returns. And this is the, you can actually estimate this parameter in the model. And if it's greater than one, you're in this like double digit growth world. If it's less than one, you're in the standard kind of like diminishing returns, single digit growth world. And if you look at the data so far, including kind of the meter report, the data that's out there, and you take that data and you estimate this parameter, it is decidedly less than one. So this could change. And some people say it will change. And when you get the full RSI loop,
13:59this is exactly what it's going to change. But right now, you need increasingly more resources in order to eke out increasingly more intelligence out of these models. I would add to that, you can look at cases where growth has been very high. So not long ago, Guyana grew 40% in a year. That's crazy. But it's a tiny place selling one thing oil. There's a brief period in the 80s where the U.S. is growing over 8%, but that's coming out of a deep recession. After pandemics, after major wars, you can have temporarily high rates of growth. So if the U.S. were to screw up in some way or we had another pandemic, some kind of terrible war, some other weird event, and that combined with a burst of AI-driven growth that might have given us 3% to 4%?
14:46Like, could we for a year get to 10%? I'll say yes. I'd bet heavily against it and the effect would be temporary and a lot of it would come from getting out of the recession, war, or pandemic. But that's another way to think about it, fully consistent with what Alex was saying. And if robotics emerge, would you have a similar view? Because that is impacting more of the real world, the real economy? Well, I think that would likely come relatively slowly. Look at how long it takes to get a Waymo in Washington, D.C. We're still not there. And that's a pretty simple kind of robot. There's like forwards, backwards, and turns. And if you look, well, what are the valuations of robotic companies at?
15:29Way higher than it had been. Hard to estimate. But you don't just see them popping into trillion-dollar companies. I mean, you could count Tesla as a kind of robotics company. But the market data suggests, you know, it will happen. It's making good progress. But not going to give us 20% growth like three or four years from now. No. runaway growth. You know, the Dorkesh, the Leopold, you know, are friends on who believe that. What do you think they think differently? Is it that they have a different belief on the speed of technology? Is it that they believe that it will sort of overcome some of these bottlenecks? Or can we steal man the other side? I think, and Tyler, please chime in. I think the argument, I'm going to get a bit technical here.
16:31It's about having something called homothetic or non-homothetic preferences. And basically, what that means is that if you look at kind of things that get automated in the past, what ends up happening is the thing that gets automated contributes less to growth. So let's say you have a million robots. Let's bring robotics. The thing that they're making, because the price becomes cheaper, the thing that they're making ironically becomes a smaller part of the economy. And so they contribute less to growth. And so if you have non-homothetic preferences, which is this, you know, there was a really nice paper estimating this, these preferences using, you know, 200 years of data. What ends up happening is that,
17:14let's say you have broad automation, people just, people, the value in the economy of what contributes to growth moves to the bottlenecks. That's just an inconvenient part of how growth is measured. And so the thing that's growing least will be contributing most to GDP. And that's why you get these sort of effects. I agree with all that, but I would add a more sociological element. In my case, and I suspect Alex's, what is emotionally vivid in our minds is the long slog of human history, previous growth episodes, centuries of GDP data, productivity data. What I think is emotionally most salient, probably for Dworkash, Leopold, and many others, is conversations they have in the Bay Area, which have real information.
18:00But when you ask the big question, you know, with which emotional salience will you make better predictions, I would opt for what Alex and I have stuffed our heads with or for what they imbibe all the time. to sort of, you know, the Internet to, you know, everything in between, they haven't led to runaway growth. Or if they did, it was because of sort of, you know, it was a small base or, you know, after a war or something like this. I do think this will likely be quicker than those. But still, you have a sense of the bottlenecks, whether it's the Industrial Revolution, history of the Scientific Revolution, implementation of electricity, the IRS still uses fax machines, and so on and so on.
18:58Try using edtech software, which I do all the time. It's a nightmare. They're not even up to, you know, how things should have been 10 years ago. Yeah. And that's not, that it's not, regulation is not the problem. It's a problem. But just inertia is difficult to overcome. And so much of our economy, it's government, it's nonprofits. It can be highly regulated parts of the healthcare sector, higher ed, general schooling. When you actually have experience with how those work, you could say like, I don't know, 40% of the U.S. economy is a kind of nightmare. In Europe, it could be higher, like in France. And those sectors might need to be that way for other reasons. But still, it's a big dose of realism
19:45that not everything is like startups. Yeah. Let's say you were both tasked by the president to come up with a set of metrics that determine whether AI is, you know, leading to our country's flourishing, you know, broadly defined. Obviously, that's a very big question. But what is GDP one of the main metrics you would think about? Like, should we be aspiring for it to have a big impact on GDP? Or what are some of the metrics you would you would consider? Yeah, I mean, so this this is a really important question. So I think the other thing that I would add before even starting is like, I don't think Tyler and I really disagree with like the San Francisco consensus on like the capabilities. Like I think, you know, I don't, a lot of people hear Tyler and I or people like us
20:37talk and they're like, oh, you're bearish on AGI or something like that. That's absolutely not it. It's more about how that affects the economy and the structure of the real economy. And so thinking through like what measures we can be using, I think GDP historically has been a really good tracker of, you know, how basically human welfare and flourishing, it tracks pretty well with the gross domestic product. But what Eric Bernionts and Avi Kolas and others have been kind of studying is the fact that technology has actually started to introduce this sort of wedge where a lot of the products that technology creates are basically free. And so they think about the sort of like digital entertainment and digital products.
21:25And then they have something called GDPB, which is or GDPD. I forgot the acronym. I'm sorry about that. But it's essentially a you take GDP and then you amend it with a kind of a survey based measure to actually see how much other products that are not necessarily priced or products that have become cheap or even free because of automation, how much the increased amount of those products is adding to human welfare. Because you could see a world where you're still kind of like in this forward of, you know, three to five percent GDP range, which is already on the high side of the growth. But you have a world that's actually truly flourishing. Like, how do you pick that up? And I think the way to pick it up is through
22:10these alternative measures. And longevity effects could well prove important. So, Eric, say you live to 120. I don't think I'm going to make it. That will, in complicated ways, boost GDP, and even more complicated ways possibly boost per capita GDP. But it is something distinct from GDP that you get all those extra years and economics can value those years and that's another way in which it may become more important to revise GDP. But as Alex said, GDP will become somewhat less accurate over time as AI progresses and we'll need to revise and improve it. But in the short run, it's just not that bad a measure. I like to say GDP, the most underrated statistic that there is. Yeah. In the 2010s, Peter Thiel famously
23:02decried sort of the lack of progress in atoms relative to bits. But here we are, you know, 10 years, 15 years later, we've got, you know, self-driving cars, you know, early flying cars. We've got, you know, major, you know, the biggest companies are now hardware companies, you know, NVIDIA, SpaceX, Tesla. Tyler, would you go so far as to say that, you know, that isn't a concern as much anymore? Or how would you reflect on that 10 years later? The atoms will break through, I would say, almost for sure. But we still don't have them. Like the contribution of driverless cars to actual human welfare is tiny. Like the biggest contribution is that it's fun. And you can tell your friends I was in a Waymo. It's not really better than an
23:52Uber. For me, it's a little worse because they go by the speed limit. It's fun in a science fiction kind of way. Most of America still doesn't have it. Europe, forget about it. So we're still not there. That's the amazing thing. And it gets back to robotics also will be slow. Yeah. I think I asked you 10 years ago, when would the great stagnation be over? And I think you said something along the lines of when we have self-driving cars. I can't remember if it was deployed or, you know, how sort of diffused it was, but you still believe that? More or less, but that's a matter of degree. And they clearly work. And the new Tesla is pretty phenomenal. I've been in Alex Tabarrok's lately a few times.
24:34But in terms of market penetration, I don't know the numbers, but again, it's tiny. Let's go back to a different topic. Alex recently wrote a related paper about it, but I'll start with you, Tyler. The agent swarm topic, sort of the hugging face incident, did that update your views in terms of what's possible or make you get concerned about something or any reactions to what happened there? It didn't update my views much at all. And I'm curious to see if Alex agrees with this perspective. But as an economist, you think first and foremost in terms of principal-agent theory. And unless the conditions are very restrictive, the principal just can't control the agent that well, no matter what contract they try to write. So when we replicate that result with AIs, well, it's interesting,
25:21but I'm not very shocked. The answer was always going to be checks and balances and what we might call separation of powers in the political realm, not you have perfect alignment. So again, if you come at this from the economist's point of view, all the hand-wringing about alignment, like, yes, people should work on that a lot. But at the end of the day, you're like, hey, I learned that when I was 17. Like, okay, it's a real about like how do you best get AI to be in the service of humanity, right? That's the question. That's the question of alignment. And one kind of way of thinking about it is to get the models themselves aligned with like something like a constitution, that the models at an individual level are aligned in this way
26:24because they have the same preferences as the human beings that are deploying that. But another perspective, which is what Tyler mentioned, is like you align things, you don't almost like don't even care what the preferences of these agents are. They could be extremely individually misaligned. But you can create a mechanism around them where the incentives are such that the agent behaves in an aligned way. And this is the mechanism design perspective in economics, where like as a principal, I don't need the agent to want to help me necessarily. The agent could really, really want to just help themselves and do whatever they want. And the whole study of mechanism design is how do you create the system of checks and balances
27:03in order for the agent to still be working in the principal's interest? And I think that is, from the research that I've been seeing coming out of the labs, both like internally, externally, like a lot of people are thinking this direction that we really need to take a mechanism design perspective. And as Tyler said, like, I wasn't, you know, shocked by what happened. I'm not aligned with the governor of Virginia, but it's a pretty well-run state, and I'm happy here. We have two-party competition, sort of, and it works. Tyler, do you think the way that Anthropic or OpenAI or some of these companies, or just the sort of AI safety community thinks about alignment, do you think that is sort of not the right way to think about it or confused in some sense?
27:51Well, there's how they think about it and how they talk about it. And how they talk about it is way too shaped by Twitter, which can be quite hysterical. How they actually think about it, I believe, is a lot more reasonable than how it ever looks from the outside. So I don't have some big speech about, oh, we've got to totally reform them. I think they're pretty practical. They're companies. They have IPOs coming up. They don't want to get sued too much. They don't want to be over-regulated. We already have checks and balances. Not all of them good, to be clear. But the reality is the actual problems we've seen you know the hacks they're mostly coming or maybe entirely coming from evil human individuals where the ais are doing what the humans told it to do
28:33and that is a huge problem but that is a kind of well we have the alignment the evil human says do this and the ai does this and that's where the costs are coming from. Yes. Some people make the comparison that alignment is in some ways it's for the employees or it's sort of like, or AI safety in general is like in 2020, 2021 and sort of around that time, there was, you know, sort of more awareness around social issues. And so CEOs had to sort of say these, say these things to please their employee base. And, you know, some of them were true believers and some of them weren't. And similarly, perhaps around AI safety, there's a lot of concern. And so some people are making that comparison that the CEOs aren't as true believers
29:18as they may be indicating. This checks and balances in these companies as well. It's partly why the companies work well, that you have to actually end up pushing through things that will work. And that's somewhat different than what everyone is saying. And there's a winnowing and selection set of mechanisms within the company. And people want promotions or bonuses, and they want to do things that can work. And again, it will end up going better than how it will sound on Twitter, I would say. Yeah. And I think like Hugging Face is like a perfect example of like, if you unpack like what actually happened, it's just a bunch of human error on top of human error. Right. And so like, it's great to have an incident. I mean, great in quotes,
29:59but it didn't like cause a massive disaster. Right? And it exposed a lot of, like, you know, broken incentives for the agents. So it was, you know, you see how, you know, the companies have reacted to the hugging phase by learning from it and creating better environments. And so this is, nothing is smooth. It'll be kind of a little bit down, a little bit up. But, you know, the slope is positive. I mean, some people, you know, Paul Cristiano, I think, said in his speech, he's like, the most likely cause of death, you know, a year from now or two years from now will be an AI-related death. And that to you sounds sort of, you know, hysterical? Strong disagree. Yeah, yeah. Alex, let's go deeper on your paper.
30:44Why don't you share some of the findings that you that you had and some of the questions that that's still right? Yeah, so like the paper, I believe you're talking about the organizing intelligence paper. Yeah, with Andrew Koh and my colleague Shane Legg. And basically, the idea of that paper is that it starts with this kind of puzzle that, you know, AI is becoming very capable on particular dimensions, but we don't see still see any like visible economic transformation. And the first kind of thing that we start with is that there's been this focus on individual agentic benchmarks without kind of thinking about what those agents are actually competing with in the economy where the thing that's the competitive, the relevant competitive unit is not
31:29the agent, it's the organization. And the organization in historically has been referred to as a form of super intelligence because of this concept called Ricardian comparative advantage. So basically, if you have a bunch of jobs, the person who does the job is not the average person, it's the person who's best suited for it. So like the envelope of the intelligence in an organization is way better than if you kind of average across the population. And so these, the AI agents are basically competing against forms of human organizations or teams of humans. And so you shouldn't compare a individual level benchmark to how well a human does something. It should be across the entire kind of what we call mosaic intelligence.
32:12So the thing that we, so then we kind of start layering on like what sort of, how do capability improvements will actually affect the economy in equilibrium? So this is a formal theoretical paper. And we look at different levels of intelligence. So we start with minimal AGI, where the AI models are as good as average human capability on every single dimension. So minimal AGI. And we show that even when you get to this point, you're not going to have a huge impact on the economy. Because again, because the organizations are not the average human ability, they're better than that. And so what you're going to start seeing is actually wages change. Because, you know, production becomes cheaper. And so that's going to affect human wages.
32:57And so what we show is that what you actually need for real economic transformation is not just competence, like ability on particular tasks to change. It's the ability of these agents to coordinate with one another. If you look at Hugging Face and even like how the solutions to the Millennium Problems, there's this idea of agentic swarms, right? But if you unpack it, these agents are still very bad at coordinating. They're not coordinating. They're mostly just doing parallel processing. And if you have benchmarks specifically on coordination, you could actually show that one agent does better than two agents splitting the work, even if they can communicate. Whereas if you give the same thing to people, they actually
33:42have division of labor, they communicate, and they do way better than one person with double the resources. So the agents are still pretty bad at coordinating. But if they get better at coordinating, you can basically break the co-seeing ceiling on firm size, and you can get very, very different firms to emerge. So that's the basic premise is that once coordination becomes better, the economic space of possibilities of what firms look like, what happens to wages, what happens to employment, that's when the real kind of visible changes that are going to happen. And what's the biggest bottleneck to figuring out coordination at the moment? To be honest, I don't know. I think it could be as simple as it's not being
34:28trained into the models. It's not part of post-training. I actually don't have any insight on that. Yeah. We've talked about some areas where you agree. I'm trying to find some areas where there's some difference of opinion. Maybe let's try employment. Alex, I think you're more worried about sort of the transition happening so fast that there might be something sudden happen on the employment side. Why don't you share your concerns or views? agree quite a bit with Tyler that things are potentially going to move pretty slowly as far as like the effect on the real economy. But if there is a fast transition, like let's say there's a breakthrough in coordination, what we show in that paper is that if there's a
35:14breakthrough in coordination, there is the potential for wages and employment to suddenly there's like a phase transition as far as what will happen to the economy. In that case, there still will be new sectors and new potential opportunities. But the sort of rematching that we have in the economy that, you know, because of transitions used to take quite a long time, the sort of rematching doesn't have an opportunity to happen. So you have these larger pools of unemployment, and that leads to kind of these recursive loops where people kind of get scarred out of the labor market. So that's my personal worry. But, you know, as far as that's a scenario that I'm worried about. Likelihood is kind of a different story.
35:59I have a related worry. It's close to the same thing, I think. But it's just hard to tell right now if you're hiring someone, will the person be good at AI? The skills they used to need, we had imperfect indicators. Oh, they went to Cornell or they got all A's or they had a good interview. And now the skill, will they be mentally flexible enough to pick up AI? You know, we don't know often. So that could increase the natural rate of unemployment. Good matches will be harder. Search will take longer. I don't think that problem will be with us forever. Eventually, the AIs themselves will figure it out. And there'll be certifications for how good a person is in AI. But in the transition, everyone's a novice.
36:43You might be, like, well-established, the way a lot of people in the tech world are. But otherwise, everyone's a novice. You might be like well-established the way a lot of people in the tech world are, but otherwise we're all novices at this very important new skill. And so I guess, what does that mean for, I guess I'm curious how you think about sort of employment, wages, sort of these questions. Well, some additional slowness in hiring people, but there'll be an incredible number of new projects, new jobs. So I'm pretty bullish actually. And labor markets have been fine. So, but of course there'll be disruptions and transition problems as there always are, as there were with the China shock,
37:23the industrial revolution. So I expect a new set of those, a bunch of them we haven't even figured out or seen yet, but they'll come. Absolutely. To what extent will there be just sort of an explosion of agents sort of buying, transacting with other agents in this kind of like almost parallel economy? And, you know, there's so many more of them. They're 24-7. They can, like, how do you sense that, you know, agents become the dominant sort of impact or sort of force on the internet? And like, what is the right mental model of thinking about what that will look like or what that won't look like? I don't know what you mean by the word explosion. If you ask me the question, when will agents be 10% of
38:05GDP? I don't think it's soon. Now, if they rose from basically zero to 6%, you could call that an explosion. 6% of GDP is enormous. Even that doesn't seem that soon. If it's like 1.5%, I could see that, I don't know, within five years. Just if you're going to force me to give guesses, you could call 1.5% an explosion. GDP is huge. That's one of the core insights of economics. GDP is huge. Yeah. And I mean, like, even with the agents that we have now, they're already incredibly capable, like the sort of consumer grade things that live on your phone. But, you know, that's the thing, like there's just completely unintuitive bottlenecks out there. Like websites are designed for human beings and they're all different. And so, you know, you're still
38:55getting into issues with where your super smart agent is like booking you a flight, booking you a seat right next to the toilet every single time, every single time. And then you're like, I don't want to use an agent next time. Or the fact that there's all of this regulation out there. I mean, that's the big one, right? So like agents, companies are spending billions of dollars trying to do basic choice architecture on their website in order to upsell humans on products, right? They don't want to, agents don't have the same psychology. And so they're not going to be prone to these sort of choice architecture. So these platforms have an incentive not to allow, you know, somebody else's agent to go in and shop for them. And you're
39:35already kind of seeing it. So like if you pull up Muse or something like that, it can't shop on Amazon for you. I don't use agents to manage my calendar although they could because I want to know mentally in my mind what's coming each day and the only way I can remember is if I have to write it down an extra time on my calendar and that's stupid that's my flaw but I don't think it's going away and the agents could be 10 times better whatever that means and I'm still going to want to write it on my calendar so I think oh December 18th I'm seeing a rena music concert. And I know that off the top of my head. So there are these funny indivisibilities in how we allocate our attention that are often some of the biggest bottlenecks. Going back to the regulation part,
40:22Tal, you seem more sober that this sort of the midterms, you know, might not lead to sort of, you know, data centers stalling indefinitely. I'm curious just for your broader thoughts on AI sentiment, how much of the negativity is real in the sense that it will lead to, you know, we saw like Bloomington, you know, trying to outlaw usage of it as well to some degree. Like, what are your thoughts here on sort of what's, how do you think about the political economy there? Well, we have 50 states. There's counties, there's cities, there's even other countries. It seems it will slow down a bit, but still basically go through. You know, the new Texas governor is already backtracking. They're like, well, we just want the labor unions involved.
41:06They need to pay good wages. You know, the projects we have now will go ahead. The others we're going to look at again. Josh Shapiro, the rhetoric was very strong. The reality is quite different. So it raises costs, but I don't think ultimately it will matter that much. But will there be a bunch of places that absolutely say no? Probably. But again, 50 states, I'm glad we have them. Maybe we'll end up with 52. Yeah. And I mean, just to piggyback on that, I think like it just completely depends on the path, right? So it's like things, everything's kind of endogenous, including political economy. So, you know, the reason that the governors are backtracking is because like unemployment look great, rate looks great. The economy is growing at a reasonable amount.
41:55Everything kind of looks fine economically. So like there's no like instrumental reason for there to be this sort of political economy reaction. But the thing that I think people who are projecting these very extreme scenarios don't realize is that with the beginning of an extreme scenario, there will be the beginning of an extreme political economy reaction. And that will kind of endogenously constrain things. So it's just going to be a back and forth. And what the data will end up looking like to our and to, you know, people living in the future is that things moved a lot slower than people would think because of this sort of interplay. It seems like, you know, the sort of amount of money one can put in politics, you know, everyone was worried about Citizens United a long time ago
42:41and, you know, corporations can control everything. But, you know, Elon put in 500 million or whatever it was and couldn't get the outcome he wanted. Is this a sort of exposed limitations of money in politics or is it just that, you know, tech people or not just tech people, but corporations may be very good at allocating for their business, but maybe not, you know, that great at allocating in sort of the DCM political realm? Dare I say that academia is slightly underrated by Bay Area people? People who study campaign finance have known this for a long time. There's a lot of evidence that spending doesn't matter that much. You can think that's good or bad, but none of this surprised me in the slightest.
43:27And I don't think it's that the people are fools. You might think they're fools in some broader sense of just having political aspirations at all. But there's just, apart from some number of local races, there's no simple way to spend a lot of money and get the politics you want. It's checks and balances. Even though no one in the system is like aligned with you. It's a beautiful system we have. I'm like just every day. I mean, I'm not joking. I'm like, it's, you know, the American system is incredible and competitive markets are incredible. It's just everything just, you know, it's not perfect, but exactly as Tyler said, like there's all this magic that comes out of the system. Yeah. I'm curious if you were both interviewing each other, what you would, what you would,
44:20what are you most curious about? Tyler, I'll start with you. Where are you most curious about Alex's perspective on something or, yeah. Well, your origin story of how you became an economist. Well, that's a very self-serving question, Tyler, because it has to do with you. Okay, well, say more. Yeah, so, I mean, so I was, I'm an immigrant from Moldova, so, you know, I very, you know, grew up on food stamps and things like that in America. And my parents didn't know anything about economics. I didn't know anything about economics. I went to college and I was pre-med because I knew what a doctor was. My parents knew what a doctor was. And in college, like you had to take like prerequisites. And I
45:02took an econ one class and I thought this was kind of fun, but I'm still pre-med. And I took it, I got good grades, made, made my GPA higher than my pre-med classes suggested. Um, and then, you know, I was going to go to medical school. I applied to medical school. I got into medical school and then, you know, I started reading Marginal Revolution and I started listening to, you know, I also heard like an NPR article program with Richard Thaler. And between the both of you guys, it was just, oh, I can do this with economics. This is incredible. I only knew one part of that story. So thank you. I knew the Marginal Revolution part. Yeah. but thank you. I knew the marginal revolution part. Yeah, no, I mean, it was, but it was like,
45:45because you were at that point, this was 2008 or nine. There weren't a lot of these economists, you know, actually showing you how much you can do with the topic. And so I actually, you know, I pulled out of medical school of the process. I went to the only school that accepted me, which was, you know, thank you, UC San Diego. And yeah, the rest is history. This is just like such an incredible field and knowledge base to kind of understand to the extent that we can, which is like not very high about what's going on in this, you know, complex system that we call the economy. Can I ask a follow up? Will and should Moldova become a part of Romania? I mean, yes, that's my view. And they will. I figure they should, but they will.
46:41Yeah, they were originally. I mean, the country was called Basarabia. My grandma, you know, she was from Basarabia she wasn't from moldova um and i think it this is probably a controversial opinion but i i i'm actually not from moldova i'm from transnistria ah okay now it's all clear so i yeah so like know, that we were refugees from Transnistria to America. So there was a civil war. We were like in basements hiding from bullets and all that type of stuff. And then we ended up coming to America as refugees. But I think it's like, you know, if you know Moldovan culture, it's very similar to Romanian culture. The language is almost the same. When the VCs say, always ask for the origin story, they're so correct.
47:28Yeah. Alex, what question would you ask Tyler? I want to know your, because you were so early on this, and I don't think I've ever heard this story of like, how were you kind of attracted to AI and thinking about AI so seriously? And you were very early about, like, the transformative potential of the technology. And I'm just curious, like, how did you realize that earlier than most? Well, all chess players have a story like this. I was in early years, like, a chess prodigy. So I was age 13 playing in New Jersey and they wheeled in a computer called Tinkerbell that played against the humans and it sucked. But I saw what the progress was like. But the point about chess players is this. They all know if they're any good.
48:18The chess is not like pocket calculator stuff. It's intuition. And if you see computers conquer an area that you already knew was mostly intuition, you will find it very easy to believe they can conquer a bunch of other areas. So Kasparov was early to this. Ken Rogoff didn't need much AI pilling. He was early to this. And the chess people were the first ones there. And that's a very simple direct story, and that's how it happened. And Demis too. Demis too. Absolutely. Common stories. You see it, you know, kick butt by the 1990s and it beats Kasparov, Deep Blue. And Deep Blue is not a great model, but it's like, okay, it can do this. So you're just waiting for it to spread to everything else. But it took a long time.
49:05Yeah. I think this is like a great example of like, you know, a lot of people would have looked at AI and said, hey, this it can't do this. It can't do that. But it's it that it's going to be able to do almost everything because, you know, like thinking about like RLVR or something like that, like the verifiable reward part of post-training, a lot of people like use that as like copium, like, oh, that's not verifiable, that's not verifiable. But like if you train the verifier, almost anything will become verifiable. The fact that you can criticize it means it's verifiable almost, right? Yeah, exactly, exactly. So it's like, then chess is like a really great example. Like you see, if you're a really good chess player, you know exactly how much that,
49:52that intuition is required and how far that's going to go in the future. Miracore is working on the poets. I'm not sure how far along they are, but it seems to me it should work. And create better poetry? Right, to write great poetry. I think in less than two years, it will be possible if people put their minds to it at all. I don't mean a big major effort with billions, but just some kind of effort at all. Bring in a dozen poets, pay them something, right? It doesn't have to be that much. Let them loose. Have some checks and balances on the process. It'll work. Some people at the firm think that the idea of taste being uniquely human is a coke that the systems are already good at. They already have great
50:37taste. You ask them about classical music, like what's the best recording of Sibelius's Fifth, whatever, they give great answers, better than the Penguin Guide right now. Yeah, fascinating. Okay, so there's a few grab bag questions I want to ask before we wrap. One is, did you guys see Dorkesh's sort of essay he collaborated with somebody on sort of basically saying that Piketty, you know, wasn't right about the last century, but his model of, you know, RRG, et cetera, might be right about the last century, but, but his model of, you know, RG, et cetera, is, is, might be right in the AI, uh, century. I'm curious if you, uh, had a take on that, Alex. Yeah. So this is what Phil Trammell, I think, um, capital in the 21st century. Um,
51:19I think that's a, that's, I think it's, uh, the's the idea that economic activity may be divorced from labor and be kind of focused on capital. That's kind of the broader idea of the piece. I think many people took kind of, had issues with the actual methodology of the piece, which, you know, I won't, I won't speak to, but the broad idea of the technology potentially increasing this concentrate, the reliance on capital, I think that is a, that is a scenario that could happen. But there's alternative scenarios, and this is things that I've written about, and I think Tyler also alluded to this, where depending on, there's an alternative scenario where like, you know, there's just more jobs created and these
52:10jobs are valuable because of the fact that they're scarce, right? So the idea is that, you know, value moves towards scarcity. This is kind of like the whole bottleneck logic. And then if those jobs are in a rich society, there will be a lot of value going to those jobs. And it's just a question of how many of those jobs exist and whether it can support the entire economy. And historically, that's been the case, but that's the real big question mark. But these are things that we just need to watch for with data. So like my paper with economic policy for AGI just basically makes that argument. We need to be tracking where the economy is going with AI in a much more comprehensive way. Very fundamental technologies tend to benefit the consumers.
52:58Fire, language, electricity, and so on and so on. That's no proof it will happen again. But we need to distinguish between capital can do a lot versus there are entry barriers that will accrue monopoly rents to particular capital owners. And I don't see that that piece really made a strong case for the latter proposition. It was mainly arguing capital can do a lot, but if the capital is commoditized, like I know people who say, all the rents will go to land, all the rents will go to energy. I'm not sure that's true, but those seem more likely than all the rents go to capital, if you had to say. Yeah. That's right. It goes to scarcity, and if scarcity is energy, that's where the rents will go. Now, maybe AI itself
53:46makes energy less scarce. So that's why I'm reluctant to predict. But I at least see the case to think, well, the Gulf countries will make out like bandits and so on, or the landowners. But AI will change enough things. Say we can terraform land quite cheaply and desalinate water very cheaply. It doesn't seem so implausible. Well, maybe it's location of land or the best retirement spots or like Tahoe is so special because you're near the Bay Area, but you don't pay the taxes or, but it's very hard to predict, but think through scarcity most of all. Mm-hmm. Yeah. And in our world on that note, we think that the big scarcity is on supply and in the short term, Mm-hmm. and the super users are really a small percentage of people at a small percentage of companies
54:47and AI is still not broadly diffused yet. And I think the counter to that claim would be, well, it's not having measurable impact on companies yet. So it is sort of speculative that the more that AI is used, it will eventually lead to impact on these companies in ways that justify the massive increase in spend. But, you know, we just started a new fund actually called Machine Age Fund, which is, you know, doing data centers and other elements of the sort of infrastructure stack to be able to mitigate some of these supply challenges. Leopold's paper, Situational Awareness, does that sort of stand to you as like one of the more important sort of, you know, public intellectual pieces in technology in the past few years?
55:34Or I'm curious what you think of the legacy of that. In anything, not just technology. But that said, I think he's too enamored of fast takeoff. As I told him at the time, he's assuming simulation can substitute for experiment. And thus you get this never-ending loop where science just keeps on accelerating. And I don't think simulation very much subs in for experiment. It will in some areas. Alex? We agree. I think, you know, I'm too Lucas critique-pilled for, sorry, another inside baseball. But it's like basically why you need to understand kind of like the deep structural parameters of the problem in order to actually be able to predict. And what simulations do and what AI is really good at is predicting, but it doesn't take the endogenous response of the system a lot of
56:26the time into account. And we'll see that kind of play out more and more, I think. The Robin Hanson's Age of M, how do you think that stands up or what would the legacy of those ideas be? Well, I think it's wrong. It's a brilliant book and I love Robin, but when it came out, which is now a while ago, I said, Robin, AI is going to get there first. And Robin says, no, AI might get there, but M has to come first. And I say, Robin, M probably will never happen. But if it does, first it needs AI. And I think my side of that debate is looking very good. But it's a great book to read for getting ideas and just shaking you out of, you know, the dogmatic slumbers. Do you have any, we're right now talking, speaking of timely issues, sort of
57:08NVIDIA is sort of, is in a big crosshairs at the moment with sort of the Jensen situation. As you sort of view the public discourse, what do you think is misunderstood or how are you sort of interpreting, you know, what this potentially means or what lessons, if any, to take? Or what do you think, Tyler? You know, we've already said alignment is impossible. The stakes were so high. His behavior, the company, something seems out of alignment. In fact, it will be fine because of checks and balances. I don't know how they're going to operate. I think it's a great lesson in all the different things we've been saying. Alex, anything you do to do that? Yeah, I think, you know, I'm, I think this is not really going to change the trajectory much. I think like checks and balances work. We have diversity in
57:58the supply chain to a large extent. Everything is oversubscribed. Demand creates supply, supply creates demand. So I think things are going to, you know, the system is robust. The biggest change might be if something goes wrong at the macro level and NVIDIA had to step in as a buyer or lender of last resort with a weakened or gone CEO founder type, they're a lot less able to do that than they would have been had all this never happened. Like, yeah, that matters. But in the medium term, it's going to wash out and it could slow things down a bit. But again, the structural forces will take over sooner or later. If you had to expect what is the next genre of sort of situational awareness like document
58:48that is going to be remarkably prescient and greatly impact our society, where would you expect that to be? Would it be in something in biotech? Would it still be in something in AI? Like, how are you thinking about sort of what are some underrated ideas right now that might be massive in the years to come? Well, they're underrated to me too. I mean, everyone talks about biotech and I'm fully on board, but I think that will be especially slow because of regulation and the inability to use simulation to address the main issues. But again, Eric, I think you'll live to 120 and I think I will not. That's the simple way to put it. I think we're going to get better models of, to the extent that AI will create
59:32better models of micro and macro phenomenon, like better structural models. So something like the model of the cell or like using digital twins to do macroeconomics or something like that, to the extent that you are going to be able to put structure on things that we need to be able to use to predict, that's going to be the real big blow up, I think. And because that kind of gets to that idea in economics, like the reduced form versus structural debate, where you understand the structure, you can really create brand new things. And I think AI, the potential for AI to do that, to help you understand and recreate that structure, I think that's really underrated. It'll be great. Raj Chetty has a new
1:00:17paper out on digital twins. Exactly. Digital twins. That's exactly what I'm referencing. But he needed, you know, five co-authors and a lot of money and a research center, which is fine. It's wonderful that he's done it, but that also goes to show you something. Let's close on the university question, actually, because we said earlier, you know, the academy is underrated in some ways, certainly by Silicon Valley. And now that we've, you know, given the props, I do want to ask you guys, where are you most excited in terms of innovation in higher education? And where is the most sort of urgent need? We, of course, are interested in the question having incubated Horowitz and Dreesen Academy. Maybe, Tyler, we'll start with you.
1:00:59I hope you all do something and spend more money on it than what you've announced and put some of your best people on it. I don't really know what your plans are, but I'd love to be involved in some way. And as with you, Austin and Minerva and other innovations, we need much more experimentation, innovation and measurement in higher ed. And if you're a part of that, I'm thrilled. Amazing. I would love to have you. Alex, where are you most excited or what advice might you have to anybody trying to innovate in higher education? I think more innovation, the better. I think higher ed is going to change drastically in the next. I don't know. I don't have a great timeline for it just because there's such slow moving institutions. And but I, uh, but I think that it's going to, we're, we're the forces
1:01:47of, of the market forces are going to lead to a shrinking of the kind of our standard idea of higher ed of what that sector looks like the traditional version. Uh, but I think we're going to have a ton of new innovation and, um, we're going to have, I I'm very bullish in higher ed in the longterm. That's. That's what I'll say. And are you both bullish on the field of economics at the moment? Are you encouraged by what's happening right now? Where do you stand there? I mean, I think the economic toolkit and the economic way of thinking is extremely underrated. So I'm extremely biased too. But I think like the way that I see things play out, like, you know, we had the earlier question about, you know, alignment and the economic toolkit is like,
1:02:31is perfect for thinking about that through this mechanism design perspective. And you have this type of thing going on all the time about like endogeneity in the political economy question and thinking through these sorts of consequences, thinking through the Lucas critique about like, you know, you estimate a parameter, but that's actually not a structural parameter. So it's not going to be valid to actually use that parameter in order to actually make the decisions. So all of these sorts of things are super important and they're going to be more important in the coming days, I think. So I'm bullish. And it may just become social science. So the things economists don't know, the AI fills in for, the basic mental toolkit becomes more science. So the things economists don't know, the AI fills in for, the basic metal
1:03:06toolkit becomes more valuable. This is originally a Chicago idea from Gary Becker and others. And you just want really smart people who have some skills, a bit like those that we now call software engineers, but it will have its own name. And they have their fingers on the dials, and they manage a bunch of AI agents, and theyarios and they know economics and do all of social science. That's what I expect. So a true realization of the earlier Chicago vision. I'm from the University of Chicago, so I buy that vision. I'm happy with that vision. Maybe we'll do it at the University of Chicago. Amazing. Full circle moment to end the conversation. Tyler, Alex, thank you so much for coming on the podcast.
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