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📅 2026-11-13 ⏱ 55 min episode · ~2 min read 📝 Transcript · 9,810 words 👁 1 views

Nvidia and Economic Espionage

Ones and Tooze · · Transcript & summary by WhipScribe

Two economists trace economic espionage from 18th-century textile spies to the Nvidia affair, separating what is known from what is hype.

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In this episodeNvidiaJensen HuangMegaspeedAdam ToozeKlaus FuchsSamuel SlaterFrancis Cabot LowellVladimir VetrovStasiThe EconomistNew York TimesHuawei

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▸Notable quotes

“It's the most sincere form of flattery after all” Adam Tooze · at 17:30 — ▶ hear it from here
“The whole thing has about it the chronicle of a death foretold or the chronicle of a disaster foretold.” Adam Tooze · at 49:53 — ▶ hear it from here

▸What this episode covers

The episode opens with Nvidia losing roughly $200 billion in market value in a single day after chief executive Jensen Huang disclosed a romantic relationship with a Megaspeed executive. The hosts separate industrial espionage, which targets particular businesses, from economic espionage, which usually involves governments chasing technology of national strategic interest. They note that the affair sits on the boundary between the two, and that the spy allegations rest on reported intelligence assessments that remain unconfirmed.

Looking back, the discussion traces three long eras, from 18th-century mercantilist theft of British textile secrets by French and American agents, to Cold War cases such as Klaus Fuchs and Soviet attempts to absorb Western technology. Stolen knowledge only helps if the thief can use it, and the United States also profited from copying foreign ideas. Estimates of current Chinese IP theft range from hundreds of billions of dollars a year down to about $40 billion, and both hosts treat the problem as real even though the figure is contested.

On methods, the conversation argues that hiring people and joint ventures move expertise more reliably than hacking or honey traps, because a person carries tacit knowledge a blueprint lacks. Non-compete rules shape how easily talent moves between firms. The hosts then discuss Stasi romance operations against West German officials, and conclude that the Huang affair looks overdetermined, with plenty of alarm and little proof so far.

▸Nvidia and Economic Espionage on Ones and Tooze: the answers

What did Adam Tooze say about Jensen Huang?

Adam Tooze said the Jensen Huang story is still mostly allegation. Huang has admitted the affair, but the spy claim rests on reported intelligence assessments, and China's foreign ministry has called them unsubstantiated. He described the episode as smoke with so far no fire, and noted that Nvidia lost about $200 billion in market value after the disclosure.

“The whole thing has about it the chronicle of a death foretold or the chronicle of a disaster foretold.”Adam Tooze · 49:53

What did Adam Tooze say about Industrial Espionage?

Adam Tooze said industrial espionage is usually aimed at particular businesses, often by other businesses, to access commercial secrets and strategies. Economic espionage overlaps with it but more commonly involves governments targeting technologies of broad strategic interest. He added that economic intelligence, such as British wartime bombing analysis, often relies on open-source information with no subterfuge at all.

“industrial espionage, I think, and the definitions here are a little fluid.”Adam Tooze · 5:42

What did Adam Tooze say about Intellectual Property Theft?

Adam Tooze said hawkish American think tanks estimate the transfer of US intellectual property to China at hundreds of billions of dollars per year, figures he called highly contentious and political. Firm-level studies suggest closer to $40 billion a year, plus about $5 billion in prevention costs. He said the losses are real even though their true scale is uncertain, and that the flow cuts both ways, citing American cyber operations against Huawei.

“They're highly contentious. They're clearly political.”Adam Tooze · 14:18

What did Adam Tooze say about Klaus Fuchs?

Adam Tooze said German atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, who worked on the transatlantic Manhattan Project, is probably the most successful Cold War example of state-backed espionage, transferring key expertise. He also said his own grandfather spied for the Soviet Union and passed radar information from a private contractor in the British war effort.

“perhaps the most successful is the German atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, who worked in the collective transatlantic Manhattan Project and transferred key expertise.”Adam Tooze · 12:49

What did Adam Tooze say about Stasi?

Adam Tooze said some of the most successful honey trap projects were run by the East German Stasi, which targeted West German civil servants and female researchers interested in East Germany. Its agents, known as Romeos, appealed through a mix of erotic and intellectual interest, and placed people in the BND and senior ranks of the German civil service.

“some of the most successful honey trap projects were run by the Stasi in West Germany.”Adam Tooze · 37:27

What is Adam Tooze's main argument on Ones and Tooze?

Adam Tooze argues that economic espionage is an old, ongoing feature of economic development, from 18th-century textile theft to Cold War and modern China cases. He says stolen knowledge only matters if the thief can absorb it, and that the Nvidia affair is so far mostly speculation, with alarm running well ahead of evidence.

Mentioned in this episode

Episode facts

Released
November 13, 2026
Length
55 minutes

▸Key takeaways

01Nvidia lost about $200 billion in market value in a single day after CEO Jensen Huang disclosed a romantic relationship with a Megaspeed executive.
02Adam Tooze separates industrial espionage, aimed at businesses, from economic espionage, where governments target technology of strategic interest.
03Hawkish US think tanks estimate China's IP transfer at hundreds of billions a year, while firm-level studies put losses nearer $40 billion annually.
04Tooze says American publishers pirated Charles Dickens for decades, since US copyright did not protect foreign works until the 1890s.
05Tooze argues the Huang affair is mostly smoke so far, with the New York Times spy claims unconfirmed and China's foreign ministry calling them unsubstantiated.

▸Questions this episode answers

Q1What did Adam Tooze say about the Jensen Huang affair and Nvidia?

Adam Tooze said the Jensen Huang story is still mostly allegation. Huang has admitted the affair, but the spy claim rests on reported intelligence assessments, and China's foreign ministry has called them unsubstantiated. He described the episode as smoke with so far no fire, and noted that Nvidia lost about $200 billion in market value after the disclosure.

Q2What is the difference between industrial espionage and economic espionage according to Adam Tooze?

Adam Tooze said industrial espionage is usually aimed at particular businesses, often by other businesses, to access commercial secrets and strategies. Economic espionage overlaps with it but more commonly involves governments targeting technologies of broad strategic interest. He added that economic intelligence, such as the British wartime bombing analysis, often relies on open-source information with no subterfuge at all.

Q3How much does China's intellectual property theft cost the United States, according to Adam Tooze?

Adam Tooze said hawkish American think tanks estimate the transfer of US intellectual property to China at hundreds of billions of dollars per year, figures that are highly contentious and political. Firm-level studies suggest closer to $40 billion a year, plus about $5 billion in prevention costs. He said there is no doubt the losses are real, though the true scale is uncertain, and noted that the flow cuts both ways, citing American cyber operations against Huawei.

Q4How did the French and Americans steal British textile secrets in the 18th century?

Adam Tooze described how, from about 1700 to the mid-19th century, French and American entrepreneurs targeted British textile manufacturing. They hired British workers, and some visitors toured factories, apprenticed themselves, and then memorized machines to write down later. He named Samuel Slater and Francis Cabot Lowell as men who trained themselves to observe closely, then smuggled the knowledge out of Britain past baggage searches.

Q5Why does Adam Tooze say hiring people is an effective way to acquire technology?

Adam Tooze said the methods that reliably work are acquisitions and joint ventures, and that hiring people is a tried and tested way to get trade secrets. A blueprint can be stolen, but a person carries tacit knowledge, so putting them in your lab shows what they actually do. He contrasted Massachusetts non-compete rules with California's more permissive approach, which he linked to Silicon Valley's enduring advantage.

Q6Did the Stasi use honey traps against West German civil servants, according to Adam Tooze?

Adam Tooze said some of the most successful honey trap projects were run by the East German Stasi, which targeted West German civil servants and female researchers interested in East Germany. Its agents, known as Romeos, appealed through a mix of erotic and intellectual interest. Tooze said the Stasi managed to place people in the BND and senior ranks of the German civil service.

▸Transcript

Our own transcript of the public episode, with a timestamp about every 90 seconds. Tap a timestamp to play the episode from there in the show's own player; the link button on a paragraph copies a link that opens this page there.

0:00This episode is brought to you by Indeed. You're ready to level up your business, but the pressure to find the right person to make that happen is intense. Indeed Sponsored Jobs can help carry the load. It boosts your job post to help it reach quality talent fast. Cut through the chaos with Indeed Sponsored Jobs. Get a $75 sponsored job credit at indeed.com slash podcast. Terms and conditions apply. Hiring now? Then this is a job for Indeed Sponsored Jobs. Hi, and welcome to 1's and 2's FP's Economics Podcast. Every week, we take a couple data points, use them to try to explain the world. I'm Cameron Apati, FP's Deputy Editor with you in Berlin, Germany. Joining us as always is Adam Tooze, FP's Economics Columnist and

0:49Columbia University Professor. Before we get to Adam, one small point. We recorded the bulk of this conversation on Wednesday. We had one data point. It is tied to the news and the news has moved on a bit since we recorded on Wednesday. Namely, the data point is related to NVIDIA. So we just wanted to give a quick update here at the top of the show before we get to the bulk of the conversation. And before we even get to the data point, one quick note. Discerning listeners might remember that we had teased a live show that was supposed to be happening this week and was supposed to be ostensibly on the feed this Friday. Of course, this is not a live show. And the reason for that is that we had to postpone it. Unforeseen circumstances intervened.

1:35But some good news is that the show has been postponed to a specific date. That is March 15th. That's more time for those of you out there who perhaps couldn't make it to this past week's show. Potentially a good Christmas present for those of you looking for one. So yeah, you can mark that date down March 15th. Apologies to those who had tickets for this week's show. We hope to see you all there. It's going to be a lot of fun. We hope to see a lot more people there as well. It's Festsaal Kreuzberg in Berlin, March 15th. The link in the show notes is live. If you want to book tickets, you can do so now. So back to that data point, it is 200 billion. That is approximately how much market value NVIDIA, that is the semiconductor company manufacturer at the heart of the AI economy around the world.

2:30That's how much money that company's stock lost just on Monday this week. That's about 4.3% of its total value. It was, I think, at one point the biggest company in the world. Now it's approximately the third as I record this. That was after its chief executive, Jensen Huang, disclosed a romantic relationship in a memo to employees. And the problem is that the woman with whom he was having that affair, Elise Huang, is a former executive at another company, Megaspeed, which is ostensibly based in Singapore, but some are suggesting is a cut executive at another company, Megaspeed, which is ostensibly based in Singapore, but some are suggesting is a cutout for Chinese technology companies. What's clear is that

3:12Megaspeed was an NVIDIA customer and that Jensen Huang seems to have been lobbying on Megaspeed's behalf with the Trump administration, which ostensibly had rules in place to prevent Nvidia's chips from reaching China, but may have found a route through Megaspeed ultimately. A probe has been opened by the chip giant investigating whether Mr. Huang has been the target of a foreign intelligence effort. This comes as concerns grow over Huang's interactions with Megaspeed AI executive Alice Huang, an alleged Chinese intelligence asset. And so the New York Times reported that Alice Huang may have in fact been a spy for the Chinese Ministry of State Security. We can't confirm that's the case, but what's clear

3:58is that this story is not only about the AI economy or the Trump administration's susceptibility to lobbying and corruption, but moreover, a story potentially about economic espionage and the way it's intersecting with the AI economy right now and more generally how it functions in the global economy. And so we thought we'd take a step back to consider the issue from that perspective. And especially now it's even more urgent with Jensen Huang having announced on Thursday that he's resigned, which is leading to an even greater slide in the market value of Nvidia. So a kind of vent here in the form of this affair. And so we thought we'd dig into economic espionage and how it works. And so with that,

4:47we're going to turn to the conversation that Adam and I had on Wednesday and look forward to seeing you again next week. And of course, at that live show in March. Adam, to start off with, I thought it could be useful to kind of establish some definitions about what we're talking about here. Because in reading about this subject, you come across terms like industrial espionage, economic intelligence. And those are sort of contrasted with or compared to economic espionage per se. So what are the differences between those things, industrial espionage, economic espionage, and economic intelligence, so to speak? Yeah, I think one can distinguish usefully between the targets of data gathering, intelligence gathering, the purposes of it, the beneficiaries, and the modes of intelligence gathering being used.

5:42And industrial espionage, I think, and the definitions here are a little fluid. I mean, there's not like a canonical definition here. But I think in general understanding, industrial espionage is above all targeted at particular businesses by more often than not other businesses, but sometimes by governments. And it's about accessing commercial secrets, business secrets, business strategies, business technologies, and it involves various types of subterfuge or illegal action. Economic espionage is sort of blurred into that zone because it also involves various types of subterfuge. But the agents more commonly involved when we say economic espionage, one immediately thinks of governments. Why is that? I think because when we think of businesses, we think of private economic activity and profit.

6:41But when we use the word economy, we immediately start thinking about GDP and national interest. And so the sorts of information that are being targeted there might be more to do with technologies of general strategic interest. So that will be different from industrial espionage or purely commercial espionage. And then economic intelligence ranges the whole gamut from, say, wartime efforts on the part of, I don't know, the British who are aiming a strategic bombing program against Germany and therefore need to understand how the German economy functions and built an economics intelligence wing of the British military war effort so as to organize that. And that ranged from famously people who were architectural historians

7:28who knew which cities would be inflammable if you dropped incendiary bombs on them, all the way through to an understanding of the input-output diagram, the supply chains. And it involves more often than not open source information. It doesn't involve any subterfuge at all. And so economic intelligence kind of blurs into the world that we're in of economic reporting, of newsletters, of regular updates. The Economist magazine has what it used to call the place of the United States, might very well find themselves being arrested on charges of economic espionage. They would have thought that was an inherent risk. Very little risk there. I would have thought of them being accused of industrial espionage and otherwise stealing secrets for whom they wouldn't

8:19be stealing those on behalf of The Economist magazine. So maybe that illustrates, that spectrum kind of illustrates the distinctions here. And I think the allegation in this case, since we're hooking onto the NVIDIA story, is that it sits more squarely in the domain of economic espionage. But on the other hand, it targets a particular business and a very, you know, the top man in that particular business, the charismatic figurehead, indeed, of the entire hardware side of AI. Indeed, the profit of AI in general, because NVIDIA's business is tied up. So it would seem that it sits somewhere on that boundary. I don't think the allegation, however, is that Jensen Huang's lover was doing this with a view to commercially profiting herself. I don't think

9:06that's the suggestion. All of these are allegations at this point. But I think the suggestion is, is MSS, the Ministry of State Security, which is doing this on behalf of the Chinese state. So it would sit more in that second category. Yeah, I do think it's important to emphasize that we don't exactly know the facts of what happened here. You know, Huang has admitted the affair. The spy claim rests on reported intelligence assessments, and China's foreign ministry has said it's all unsubstantiated. So who knows when we will exactly know what happened here. But yeah, clearly, espionage of various kinds seems like unavoidable in the general economy, given that every company is looking to get an edge. But it is this kind of

9:51economic espionage per se, where governments are involved in breaking rules to get access to secrets. That seems what may be most interesting. And I'm curious, what are then some major examples of economic espionage then from history? I mean, in the modern era, broadly understood, I think you could quite helpfully distinguish three huge long epochs. So one would be the history of mercantilism. So between say 1700 and the mid 19th century, where you have state-backed projects of industrial development, which are both defensive, protecting industrial development against outsiders and proactively trying to acquire secrets so as to drive development. The era where industry per se was new and textiles became the

10:38key center for this. And in that instance, probably the most successful and dramatic are efforts by the French and the Americans to steal secrets of modern textile manufacture from the British, who at that point were the leading industrial power. British, we could say a bit about this in a minute, themselves acquired these in part through encouraging migration of Huguenots, persecuted Protestant minority from France. But in any case, by the 18th century, it's the British who are the target. And both the French and the Americans, both at the level of individual entrepreneurs, but in the French case, apparently coordinated by the state, make systematic efforts to attract British expertise by hiring people, which is a tried and tested means of doing this

11:23sort of information acquisition, not as spies, but literally just hiring them away. So they bring their trade secrets with them. But in some cases, also something that's much closer to spying, where folks would visit British factories, be taken around, apprenticed themselves, and then take those secrets home with them. And in fact, would they dedicate themselves in the case of Samuel Slater, and indeed, Lowell, Francis Cabot Lowell in the American case, these men would actually train themselves so as to be able to go into a factory, see a machine, leave innocently with no pen and paper or anything like that, but go home to their, you know, whatever inn they were staying at and quickly scribble down what they just seen, and then take this information out of

12:04Britain, making sure that their baggage wasn't searched. So this was quite serious stuff. And amazingly, economic historians have actually begun to investigate what economic impact this had because these stories are fun and glamorous, but do they actually matter? And a recent economic paper with perhaps my favorite economic history article title ever, which is You Only Weave Twice, Espionage and Industrialization in 18th Century France. Obviously, a play on the famous James Bond film by an academic called Bruno Capritini, University of St. Gallen, actually traces the impact, because this is the sort of thing that economic historians and economists love to do. What is the shock effect of the treatment of a

12:49French textiles community by the arrival of news? And apparently it shows measurable, in fact, sort of, you know, 2x type effects on the concentration of textile jobs in those communities persisting into the 19th century. So it seems to have worked. It wasn't, it isn't just sort of the fabled beginning. The second phase would be the phase of the Cold War, state-backed, or the early Cold War, World War II, Total War, state-backed projects of industrial and economic espionage. And they blur then just into the realms of full-on espionage. So perhaps the most successful is the German atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, who worked in the collective transatlantic Manhattan Project and transferred key expertise. Now, some people may know, actually, this is not a secret, but my grandfather

13:37spied for the Soviet Union on this basis and is reputed to have transferred radar information from a private contractor in the British war effort. It wasn't the well-known aerial radar, it was a gunnery radar. So that sort of thing was going on during the Cold War. Sorry, that personal connection just struck me as I was speaking, but that's literally what he did. That's quite hard to measure. We'll say a bit more about this, I think, later on, because the Soviet Union was not in economic terms, terribly successful at incorporating this kind of expertise. When we start moving into the modern period of globalization, shall we say, or the new Cold War with China, the numbers get really big really quickly. And you started off

14:18by quoting a number of 200 billion, I think, that was the loss in the capital value of NVIDIA. That's the kind of ballpark that the more hawkish American think tanks estimate the transfer of resource of IP to be from the United States to China, its antagonist. Hundreds of billions of dollars per year, they estimate. And the key element of that is not copyright or fake handbags. It's the acquisition of various types of IP. Now, those numbers form the basis for one of the more aggressive turns in American policy towards China in the 2010s. They're highly contentious. They're clearly political. More detailed studies looking at specific firms which have reported theft, rather than just kind of gross estimates, suggest numbers which are not orders of magnitude, but a quarter as high as that,

15:11more like $40 billion a year, plus maybe $5 billion or so in the prevention costs, which are also the sort of numbers you get out of Australian estimates. Australia is also a target, perhaps unsurprisingly, for Chinese efforts in this direction. So I don't think there's any doubt that it's going on. There's no doubt at all that it causes losses. There is, I think, a question mark over whether they're in the tens of billions or hundreds of billions. And of course, there's also questions about maybe what goes the other way increasingly. We certainly know that American intelligence intelligence was penetrating, Huawei, for instance, was massively penetrated by American aggressive cyber warfare in the 2000s

15:52and 2010s. So, you know, unsurprisingly, it cuts both ways. Yeah, it's interesting. I mean, it does seem like one of the contentions is that there are countries, China among them, who are accused of having this economic espionage as a state policy and really pursuing it concretely. Even, you know, among other countries mentioned in that context, I recall from, you know, work at FP was France. France is also often cited as a country that has pursued economic espionage as a state policy. But the United States claims not to be doing that very vehemently. And yet the history that you were just discussing, as I was reading about it as well, it seemed to suggest to me a kind of, you know, inherent irony to some extent in the history of economic espionage in the sense that

16:42the purpose of stealing these secrets seems to be to try to gain a technological advantage ultimately by incorporating them into one's own economy. But if one is as successful at that, ultimately one becomes a target oneself, right? I mean, you know, we were talking about Britain and its textile technologies, but, you know, it acquired them from Italy originally before it became the target of theft of those secrets. And yeah, America, despite claiming not to pursue economic espionage, despite criminalizing it in the 1990s, you know, its own history with economic espionage is pretty prolific if one digs into it, you know, in terms of pursuing British technologies in the early part of its own history and generally refusing to recognize foreign IP rights, etc. So curious

17:30what you make of whether economic espionage is sort of inherently ironic in that sense. Yes, I mean, deep down, after all, if one starts from anything like a kind of liberal view of economic activity, not in the normative way of this is how it should be in free markets best and even patents and infringement of that. But just if we think of economic activity is driven by like a hive mind, the competitive hive mind of interests all over the world, then the most obvious thing in the world to see is imitation, spying, you know, intelligence gathering. It's the most sincere form of flattery after all it's like what you're doing is fantastic i want to do that too and i want a slice of the action that you're

18:09generating and then maybe it inspires some ideas in me as well which then ultimately it's quite difficult to just simply reproduce somebody else's technology this is a point we'll come back to like successful spying always means essentially that the successful spy already has got some game going on, right? If you and I stumbled into Jensen Huang's bedroom in a hotel and bumped into an incredible suitcase of the latest NVIDIA chip design, I'm sure he doesn't carry them around, but just imagine it. You and I would be useless, like it would help us in no way whatsoever. Like we have none of the requisite skills to make anything of this knowledge, right? So successful spying always implies some capacity on the part

18:54of the spy to actually do something with it, which means you're not starting from scratch. And certainly there is this sort of back and forth, as you were saying. I believe the first, I did a thing on the newsletter about it. I think the first fully powered factory in the world was actually a British ripoff of Italian, North Italian silk textiles production, which a Brit basically more or less covertly observed, took the vision back to Britain and built a factory, which was the first fully, largely mechanized textiles factory. Yes, the US case is egregious because they were, you know, one of the world's big. And of course, in the American case in the 18th century, and in the popular presentation, it's dressed up as

19:35patriots liberating secrets from the beastly, mercantilist British monarchy and its associated economic interests, which now in America will enable the unfolding of the freedom of America and the American Republic with much higher levels of productivity because, you know, manifest destiny. It's only in the 1890s that the American copyright actually protects not even secrets, but like, say, the works of Charles Dickens, which were systematically ripped off and produced in just, you know, what the Germans called Raubtrucks, so like robbed print in the 19th century. So it's definitely a back and forth. And in the case of China as well, you know, whilst there was still scope for a liberal narrative about China, and that, of course, now is very restricted. But not so long

20:26ago, as recently, or five or six years ago, in the pages of The Economist, you could read The Economist describing the way that perhaps the convergence story with China, at least in this limited sense, was in fact playing out. Because whereas China in the 90s, 2000s, early 2010s, might have been an uninhibited acquirer, shall we say, of Western expertise and used every conceivable route to do so. In the late 2010s, Chinese courts were actually beginning to take cases of IP theft, which included Western firms suing Chinese people, but also Chinese firms suing each other over IP. And the general prognosis was that Chinese courts, as you'd expect, would get more and more sophisticated in their arbitration. They

21:09would in various ways acquire a tacit, if not explicit commitment to protecting private property rights. And the story of convergence that liberals hinged their optimism with regard to China on would play out in the Chinese case. In the new era, I've heard and I've been in rooms where, and sometimes me being me, I like sort of cynically and somewhat flippantly introduce this idea, but I don't ever get any dissent, which is, isn't the idea now with regard, say, to Chinese EV factories, electric vehicle factories, that we get them to build them in Europe? And then the phrase that people use is, this time we'll do to them what they did to us. In other words, we will acquire technology from them quite rapidly, whether

21:50it's batteries or chips, but it's almost always about electric vehicles. Because it's quite clear that without that, even the most sophisticated European producers at this point are in trouble. I mean, they actually need to organize a reverse transfer. And the Chinese anticipating this have actually also moved very aggressively towards criminalizing the transfer, which of course puts any Chinese, given the sanctions the Chinese state can impose on people, that puts Chinese engineers in an incredibly dangerous position if they're in joint ventures. So Beijing can see Europe coming in manipulating this gradient. But given history, you wouldn't bet against a future in which in 10 years from now,

22:34there are firms in Central Europe and Europe which are basing their business model on technology that flowed the other way. Yeah, this raises for me the question of methods when it comes to economic espionage. I mean, you know, in one sense, if you had the acquisition of these secrets or maybe knowledge more generally is whether espionage is just one variety of acquiring such knowledge. You know, when we talk about espionage, some methods that come to mind are, you know, human intelligence of the kinds that involve using spies to acquire secrets. And that seems to be what is at stake in the NVIDIA story right now. There is cyber intelligence to acquire secrets using digital methods, signals intelligence. But all of that seems to me

23:26contrasted with some kind of like commercial and legal methods of pursuing espionage, so to speak. I mean, like hiring of engineers from companies, say, or acquiring companies that are at the leading edge of certain technologies. I mean, when it comes to these methods, which are sort of most effective or how do they sort of contrast with one another? Well, the ones that we know systematically work are clearly acquisition, joint venture. That's been a channel for the transfer of technology for as long as there have been those kind of projects. And many of them actually have it as part of their terms. It's part of the deal that X amount of expertise will be transferred. So and so, during the post-colonial

24:11period, there was an effort to so-called, quote unquote, nativize the workforce, which is train up people who are not expat Western Europeans or whatever, so that they can take over the running of the firm in due course. Saudi Aramco would probably be the most dramatic instance of this worldwide, but then Chinese industrialization is heavily driven by this kind of process. So I think that's the one about which we can say without any kind of ambiguity that it clearly is a powerhouse of economic development. And the liberal in me says, bring it on and let's please, please, please not this this is absurd right this is this is actually just development down the other end of the spectrum you know there is everything

24:50from signals intelligence you know large-scale monitoring and cracking of commercial secret information and then you know people and pressure on people communication between people you know everything from you know people being paid to transfer blueprints of things to casual pillow talk to presumably the risk with jensen huang is not that he shows up somewhere in a hotel room with blueprints but that i don't know that his personal communication is so completely compromised that hackers can get in so presumably in the modern age like the way this works is that they that somebody gets entangled in a relationship like this it turns out that it's a honey trap of some kind and then either blackmail is applied or or it's just a doorway into their electronic world. And then you can start transferring the terabytes of data, which is presumably, you know, you can't.

25:48I was thinking to myself, I don't think, Adam, you can actually put this in a suitcase anymore. Hey, you know, it's not that kind of intelligence. We're not in the 1980s anymore. So I would have thought in the modern age, all of these things go very much together. But you know, to go back to the sort of normal end of this, right? It's all about things like non-compete clauses, like how long is it that you have to wait before you move from one tech business to another? This applies to the financial sector as well, right? People have to do, they go on gardening leave for a period of time, so-called, before they're able to able to switch say from one trading team at a big investment bank to a hedge fund or

26:30whatever and there's actually quite a lot of interesting studies about the very different cultures that are created depending on what type of non-complete non-disclosure rules actually stand up in different jurisdictions. So there's differences, for instance, between East Coast Massachusetts law on this and Californian law. And there is apparently a body of thought that says that one of the reasons for California's and Silicon Valley's enduring competitive advantage is that Californian law is actually restrictive with regard to non-compete clauses. So it's relatively easy for human intelligence to move, as opposed to Massachusetts, apparently, where it's more vertical. In other words, it's harder for bodies and minds to move. And the crucial thing about that, to just come back to

27:14absolute basics, is what is it that you acquire? If you get a blueprint, you've got a blueprint. If you've got a flow of communication, you know, I don't know, some huge cyber operation, then you have to crack that and make sense of it and run algos on it to figure out what it is. But if you've got an actual person, they embody all sorts of tacit knowledge. So it's really a question then of putting them in your lab and seeing what they do, because they may not even actually be able to spell out to you all of the different requirements that are necessary to make a particular experiment work or replicate a particular result in a blueprint form. And so I think that's the kind of spectrum of different various options here. Yeah. I mean, it's interesting to reflect

28:02on this conversation as we're having it and how easily we're treating the kind of like legal methods and the, you know, ostensibly illegal methods that's existing on a spectrum is surprising on some level, even if functionally, yeah, they are obviously the same, but... Am I being, not being judgmental enough? Sorry. No, I'm sorry. I, I, I, it's interesting from, you know, you're, you're citing your own, you know, liberal bona fides and, and it's interesting, you know, it always seems to me, you know, another liberal perspective would be to emphasize the importance and the virtues of consistent rules. But of course, as we, we know, there's also a lot of hypocrisy always whenever rules are in play and who sets them and breaks them, et cetera. And particularly

28:43with regard to knowledge, right? Because knowledge is a non-exclusively type of good, right? Me having it doesn't mean you don't have it. And there's a fundamental tension in liberal thinking about patents that on the face of it, they're an abomination. They're basically a licensed monopoly. And the strongest argument for them is that otherwise, you know, people don't have the incentive to do the hard work of innovating. And they don't have the incentive to make the investments which are necessary in modern types of scientific endeavor and engineering endeavor, but that's also the case after all the argument for the relatively lenient treatment of spies, certainly during World War II itself, because

29:28the information was being passed to allies. You know, why is it that it makes sense to monopolize the scientific knowledge of Western allies when the vast majority of the fighting is being done by the Soviets? And that's obviously a rationalization. And it was clearly, it was, I think, one of the key reasons why people who were exposed during the war itself were treated under a very different regime than folks during the Cold War. So these logics are complex, I think. And ironically, one of the weirdest things is that if you don't want to disclose anything, you don't ever file a patent. So it never actually gets fully classified as intellectual property. So then it falls under a different type of law, which is much harder to actually classify,

30:07which is business secrets, which are by definition not formalized, right? So the more you formalize it, the more you actually expose it. And so then ultimately, the least disclosed form of knowledge is in the body of people. And non-compete clauses are pretty serious infringements of people's civil liberties and can be pushed in a very aggressive way in modern American law, corporate law, right? Non-disclosure, non-compete clauses can materially inhibit people's freedom of movement between jobs. We're going to take a quick break right here, but we'll be back in a second to continue talking about economic espionage. Hey, Once and Two's listeners, it's Rob here from the pod team. Now, a few years back,

31:02my buddies and I trekked out to Jackson Hole, Wyoming to conquer the Grand Teton Mountain. the pod team. Now, a few years back, my buddies and I trekked out to Jackson Hole, Wyoming to conquer the Grand Teton Mountain, all 13,775 feet of it. Now, in addition to making sure we had the right ropes, helmets, and footwear, we also had to ensure we had the right outerwear. So that's when I turned to Stio. Locals in Jackson know Stio's the brand climbers, skiers, and trekkers wear because Stio is local too. Their gear is designed and tested right there in Jackson Hole, right at the base of the Tetons. The hometown down jacket is 800 filled down, but feels more like your favorite hoodie than a puffy.

31:37And the enviroment jacket, pants, and bib are your all-mountain workhorse. Now, I know when I hit the summit, it felt amazing to be there, bundled up warm and feeling gratitude toward my friends and guides. And now, for being loyal listeners, you too can feel the difference this winter and gear up the way locals do. Go to Stio.com slash ones for 20% off your order. That's S-T-I-O dot com slash ones. Stio.com slash ones, STIO.com slash ones, STIO, designed and tested in Jackson Hole. Hi, I'm Laura Ross Brautellam. I'm a producer here at Foreign Policy. And I'm here to tell you that this episode is sponsored by BetterHelp. If you could permanently delete just one thing from your brain, what would it be? I know

32:27for me personally, my house and its mess just occupies way too much space in my mind. Just my inability to keep things organized. It takes up a lot of my time and I feel like I'd be much happier if I had the time and the strategies to deal with it. And honestly, that's something that if it's bothering you too, or you have something else that just takes up a lot of space and you can't get off your back, therapy could be really helpful. Better help therapists are licensed, experienced professionals, and better help does the initial matching work for you so you can focus on your therapy goals, whatever they might be. BetterHelp is now in network with more than 125 health plans with many co-pays as low as $15 for eligible members. And if you don't

33:21have eligible insurance or you live outside the United States, you can still get 20% off your first month. Sign up and get 20% off at BetterHelp.com slash ones twos. That's BetterHelp.com slash ones twos. To return to this conversation of methods, you know, you mentioned honey trap or honeypot espionage as a method. And I guess more generally that that involves creating a sexual relationship in order to exploit that relationship in various ways, whether to gain access or create blackmail, et cetera. And, you know, without wanting to indulge in stereotypes, but it does seem like it's fair to raise the question of whether the relevant economic actors in our, you know, tech economy now are particularly vulnerable to that method.

34:15I mean, we're talking about a kind of tech world where, you know, people have risen to the top by being kinds of really obsessive, focused, nerdy kinds of people, maybe? Is it fair to wonder whether honeypot operations of the kind that have now been exposed perhaps at NVIDIA are a particular problem now? Yeah, I was thinking about this as well. I mean, it's almost impossible that I'm not entirely going to resist the temptation to speculate about the ego makeup of Silicon Valley engineers. It wouldn't, after all, be surprising if there was a desire for compensation and for overcoming a whole variety of inhibitions, which no doubt are channeled at various stages in many people's careers into extraordinarily efforts in very, very dry, very recondite zones of technical expertise. So, you know, the nerd gone wild at the head of a company,

35:11the loneliness of people in that kind of position, all of this, I think, no doubt feeds in. But then I was thinking actually sociologically, and I came to this, you know, strange realization, because I spend quite a lot of time in hotels because of this weird existence that I have. And I was thinking to myself, if a senior soldier goes to a hotel, on the face of it, you're kind of wondering what the senior soldier is doing in a hotel, right? If a senior civil servant, pretty much whichever government they work for, goes to a really glamorous hotel, again, you'd be asking yourself, how can they afford that? That's not really where they belong, right? So suddenly you realize that the whole zone of high-end, expensive, relatively exclusive hospitality that presumably provides the

35:59most attractive zone for this kind of entrapment, the actors for whom where it arouses zero legitimacy issues, zero need for explanation at all, in fact, it's completely normal and taken for granted, are high-level business figures. You know, the entire conference circuit where people stay, the blending in those spaces of leisure and a business activity, including pools and gyms and eating and drinking as a matter of course, in fact, a kind of mandate for many businesses. I go to a lot of these investor conferences, and it's quite clear that networking is an absolutely required option, right? There's no excuse for just withdrawing to your room and getting on with your life, which I'd want to do

36:42most of the time. And so presumably, this is precisely the world in which this works. I mean, business people systematically expect to be wined and dined. They expect to be courted. They expect in various, let me put this, they constantly struggle to draw the line between reasonable inducements and bribery. That is an essential part of their business. And many of them, of course, have very strict codes of ethics. But it's a matter of record that those shift all the time. And they're much more like, in that sense, the Chinese Communist Party than they are like, you know, conventional civil service jobs in the West, where it's just quite clear that accepting any kind of gift in any form is just ultra-virus. No one in the civil service is regularly invited to glamorous parties

37:27where there's a mixture of more or less formally clad, in some cases scantily clad, different types of interaction. And so it's a kind of recipe for stress on this fault line, I would have thought. And it's purely sociological. It's not a matter of psychology at all, though the psychology that then is acted out in those spaces is, of course, quite interesting. And the games that are played around dress code and stuff like that are really quite a high level. So that, I think, might be one way of rationalizing this, that if you were going to target those kind of actors, this would be an obvious way to go. Though it's worth saying that I think some of the most successful honey trap projects were run by the Stasi in West Germany.

38:10And they were actually quite often targeted at civil servants. And it was quite often women. So some of the most significant cases of the Stasi would call them Romeos. And their job was to target West German women researchers, female researchers who were interested in East Germany. And the allure was in part erotic and part just intellectual. You know, people wanted to talk. And then they were highly successful, in fact, at placing people who were subordinate in this way into the BND and into the German intelligence and senior ranks of the German civil service. So it's quite, you know, it takes a different type of structure. The more common thing that we seem to be dealing with here, I think,

38:52does fit into this sociology of business sociability that just creates many more risks and hazards of this type than is commonplace for, especially for civil servants in general, I think. And military in particular, because like, it really would attract attention if, I think it would be an obvious red flag if you saw a senior military figure enjoying hospitality in a, you know, high-end restaurants or hotels anywhere in Asia. Yeah, I think the sociological element of this is necessary if we're thinking about the kinds of inducements that are being offered. And yeah, the assumption in describing something as a honey trap is the suggestion that the sex is the main inducement and that's really what is being offered. But

39:40obviously these things are always more complicated. And yeah, in the East German case, you know, where the genders are switched, I think it's usually described, it wasn't the sexuality so much as like, yeah, the kind of sort of like companionship or loneliness being addressed by a romantic figure. I mean, who knows? I'm not steeped in the details of that history. Yeah, one only has to read, like, one only has to read, you know serious by-fiction like John Le Carre or people like that to realize that clearly intimacy is the biggest. This is a matter of seduction fundamentally. So what is it? And in each particular case, it'll depend on what it is that people need to be, you know, what is the trigger?

40:20And presumably skillful spymasters or whatever just are very good at finding the lever through which to pressure people and through which to seduce them and it could presumably be sex but it much more likely i would have thought in general is something more about recognition and attention and and then ultimately some kind of uh that would seem to be a much more plausible story because these spaces that we're talking about sociologically are also the spaces of high-end escorts so if what you want is sex there are many many ways of obtaining this especially for somebody with enormous wealth that do not require i mean all of them involve certain amounts of risk but certainly don't don't require you know this kind of complexity i mean somebody like

41:03jensen huang if they're interested in text, presumably can get it in a much less complicated way than this. So I do want to return to a distinction you were mentioning, drawing earlier in this discussion, and that's between pursuing the acquisition of technologies through espionage of this kind that we're talking about versus productively absorbing that technology upon having acquired it? And how relevant is that distinction? How does it work? And how does it apply right now, say to China? I mean, would or would not China be effective right now at implementing the secrets it's being said to be trying to steal? I think that's the whole game, actually. The real reason to be worried is that China has a demonstrated and extraordinary capacity to incorporate.

41:54In other words, it's a near peer. And that's precisely what makes it so alarming to Western security officials is that, you know, there's absolutely every reason to think they can yeah um and furthermore leapfrog even like give them give them you know half a chance and there's every single reason to think that they can generalize it make it cheaper speed it up there are differences obviously because what nvidia does or what tsmc does what you know the lithograph makers do is literally special source like no one has ever done that anywhere ever in the entire world in the history of humanity ever. So whether you can replicate that is an open question. But that's presumably what the Chinese aren't going to do anyway.

42:35They're going to make their own version that's more suitable to their circumstances. And it's critical to know. And we don't know what's actually happened in this case. But there are certain critical problems that it's interesting to know how other people solve them, because it helps you to think about how you should solve them in your own terms. And that is why I think the Chinese case is so significant, because they have a demonstrative capacity to do that. And it really varies, like in regard to transport engineering, cars, railways, solar, batteries, hugely successful leapfrogging, game is over. With regard to chips, slightly different story. And I think that speaks to the fact that the technological demands are just so mind-blowingly high. And I think something

43:17similar is also true for jet engines for the very latest generation of aircraft. The Chinese have been acquiring that technology from the Russians who were basing their technological development on the Soviet era. But there are some structural issues with their ability. The last time I looked, anyway, that was regarded as a key issue and acquiring and sourcing information from the weak spots in the former Warsaw Pact, which were Russia and Ukraine, was seen as a way in which the Chinese might be able to leapfrog. And now, of course, perhaps with a new era of drones, none of it matters very much anyway, and they're very apparently quite advanced in rocketry. So maybe that's an old story. But that does contrast very significantly with the Soviet Union, which at different periods in

44:03its history, demonstrated greater and lesser degree capacity to incorporate. So around the atomic bomb program, quite a high capacity to incorporate. Then of course, in rocketry, they become world leading, and they do that like the Americans by capturing German rocket scientists and then incorporating their knowledge into what was already a high-functioning military industrial system in the Soviet Union that was wasteful to people's lives, but was generative of a whole series of incredibly innovative, very, very powerful and effective weapons. So it's not as though the Soviets need this to suddenly be a world-beating power, for heaven's sake. They beat the Wehrmacht in a knock-down, drag-out fight.

44:43But yes, when they then capture German rocket scientists from the V1 and the V2 program, they know what to do with them. But more generally, it's a remarkable instance of just how little can get transferred because after all, the Soviet Union was the beneficiary after 1945 of a huge wave. This is the untold story of German reparations after World War II. Absolutely gigantic. And they take the form principle of dismantling. So vast amounts of German equipment is shipped to the Soviet Union, where I don't think it's merely apocryphal to say an awful lot of it just rusted and was not fully incorporated into the Soviet system. Now, in earlier stages, they had done much better. So in the 30s, the Stalinist industrialization program is heavily dependent on American expertise and

45:24on German expertise and on German expertise funded in part by export guarantees from the Weimar Republic that helped to fund this flow. So it wasn't consistently rubbish incorporating, but it certainly wasn't the powerhouse of creative imitation, adaptation, modification, improvement that China is to an extent that nowhere else in the world can match, right? That's the extraordinary thing. They can iterate, they can modify, they can incorporate at a pace that no one else in the world, in almost all areas of production, no one else can match. And so then if you feed that with privileged insider information, then you'd expect really large scale effects. But of course, that implies a huge capacity on the Chinese side to start with. In other words, this is not a story in which,

46:10you know, it's only by way of the acquisition of the foreign expertise that things happen. I do want to briefly emphasize that image of, yeah, the Soviet Union literally dismantling factories in Germany, moving them all the way to Russia, and then just having them sit there. It's quite a wild image. Because the Chinese have dismantled factories in Germany as well. But we know for damn sure that those are operating and those were used as the template for the build out of some of their heavy industrial capacity. But to take a closer look at this case, I mean, how significant is this alleged espionage with NVIDIA or more broadly with these, you know, US AI and tech companies? I mean, is this is the, you know, allegation that China is acquiring

46:56chips that it can then use to leapfrog the US or even reverse engineer these chips and things that it may be acquiring from these companies? I mean, how significant is what's going on and what would that be exactly? I mean, we just literally don't know. All we know, as you were saying at the beginning, what we know is that NVIDIA is the most valuable company in the world ever. It's the hub of the AI boom for loads of reasons we've talked about on the show before before and keep thinking back to the fact that you had the sense to say, Adam, we should do a segment about Nvidia years ago now. And that was the first time I'd ever thought about it. And since then it's become literally the most, the most valuable company in the world in

47:37history and what 7% or 8% of the S and P 500 on a good day. And the anchor of the entire internally self-financed AI system. So it's hugely important business. But of course, it's full of brilliant engineers like Jensen Huang, maybe like the driving inspiration of this, but he's not the man that actually does everything. So who knows how important it is that he's having this affair. We know that there've been allegations that Alice Huang is a MSS asset, but they flat out denied it. The firm that she's involved with, Megaspeed, which is one of these crossover companies, right? It comes out of gaming and has moved into data centers. It's a little bit like the crypto miners that have moved into data centers. And NVIDvidia itself comes out of that gaming zone it's not even on the

48:26entity list right so i mean there's been a push apparently within washington for it to be put on that list but like many part the universities of the community university on the entity list it's not even on that list so and it doesn't seem to have been a very substantial business so who knows what this actually adds up to i mean i have to say that it's hard not to see this to go back to the sex theme as part of the kind of liberal American nightmare, right, of inappropriate sex, outside marriage in a corporate setting, conflicts of interest, and then also Chinese and AI. And then, of course, all of the alarm bells are going off everywhere and nothing actually needs to be proven. I mean, what's so remarkable is this whole thing explodes

49:11with all smoke and so far zero fire. But the sense that this is the nightmare is so palpable that the very least sign that it's arrived is immediately, quite obviously, whatever it is. And the rumor mill in D.C. gets going. And presumably, the New York Times is not just, you know, has some substance to the story. There must be some people making some claims which are halfway credible. But how much one can trust any of those, to be honest, who are we to say at this point? Is it plausible that the Chinese should want to do this? If I was the Chinese spymaster, would I be want to do this if i was the chinese spy master would i be trying to do this of course hey so like if he is jensen wang is out in the open socializing the

49:53way he does like you try and suborn the guy obviously right but um who knows i mean what's remarkable about him is how freely he's traveled around the world how accessible he appears to be how much he likes socializing. What a rock star he is. The guy's a rock star. And he acts the rock star. And he looks great. It's not like this is some sort of hardship mission seducing him. I don't know. The whole thing has about it the chronicle of a death foretold or the chronicle of a disaster foretold. It's like, what, he doesn't have a Chinese spy girlfriend yet? There's something slightly wrong here if that isn't the case and so now it's arrived and we all go oh my god and yet we don't actually have any as far as i know the ft's summary of it anyway basically just says we

50:35know nvidia is important and he's agreed he's he's accepted that there was an affair or he's a he's acknowledged that there's an affair but what else and she doesn't seem to have made any secret of it. That's the incredible puzzle. Like if she was actually a spy, why does she have it all over her social media? Because I've seen pictures of them together for months, like way before this blew up. I'm sure loads of every, millions of other people have also seen these pictures of him consistently with the same person over and over again. And she doesn't make any secret of it. So maybe this is double think that if she did keep it clandestine, that would look more suspicious. But the whole thing about it's so obvious, if you like, that it's difficult to know how you negotiate

51:16the clandestine and the surprising in a world in which this just seems as predictable as, well, as anything could possibly be. Yeah, I see what you mean about it being overdetermined. Somehow it begins with his leather jacket. Yeah, exactly. And his haircut. He looks fantastic. And he like jumps on stage in these crazy things. And there's all these cheering fans, including many, many extremely eligible women. They're all going, oh my God, oh my God, you're so amazing. And like, so it looks more like a Beatles concert or something like, you know, Jensen mania. I mean, I say in jest, but one can wonder whether it's actually U.S. intelligence operation, maybe. There have been people saying that, like, you know, this is all associated with the midterms and the AI bubble that was bound to bust.

51:57And apparently they've known about it for months and months. Apparently Trump had reports on his desk in May. And Lutnick maybe at Commerce is blocking putting this company on the list. That's what the FT reported or Lutnick's in charge of Commerce and no one understands why Commerce hasn't taken the action. So it all just seems both totally obvious out in the open and yet actually kind of vaguely obscure. Well, I guess this relates to the last question I wanted to ask, which is how economic espionage potentially relates to counter espionage. I mean, does espionage of this kind expose vulnerabilities ultimately to forms of response like sabotage? And I'm thinking of certain parts of Cold War

52:47history where there were countermeasures by the West against the Soviet Union. And yeah, how does that history unfold exactly? Yeah, this has been a fun episode to research, because apparently there was an amazing, I imagine you're talking about this episode, the farewell, Operation Farewell, where there was a defector vladimir vetrov a kgb officer who you know had the good taste to defect to the french so you know he's having a good time in paris he takes a dossier of material to the mitterrand government in 81 and he's from the t office within the kgb um so this is the technological spy network and they were running assets all over the west thousands and thousands of people apparently they were known as x officers and so so he brings in

53:30this network and says look this is what we're doing and rather than panicking the western side apparently decides to just play this back on the soviets so because there's so much information flowing presumably it's quite difficult for them to decide what's plausible and what not. But they start feeding the Soviet broken things, basically, or things which were themselves then weaknesses and variety of bad chips and software that doesn't really work properly or industrial machinity, defective plans. And there's even a rumor that there was a really nasty explosion on a siberian gas pipeline years later that may have had to do with the fact that this operation planted defective buggy software in the soviet then the russian energy system that's highly

54:19disputed and debated amongst you know people who are into intelligence history as to whether or not that actually happened. But it's undisputed, I think, that seeing this interest from the Soviet side, the West were able to exploit that against the Soviet side by planting misinformation. So yeah, there's all that kind of options for these sorts of cat and mouse games. And this just brings me back to this basic question of getting, what does getting Jensen Huang into bed actually do for you in terms of winning the chip race? I'm not entirely certain. You know, when people ask me whether I think I'm under surveillance from MSS or whatever, I always say, well, they're really wasting their time.

55:02In that case, I'm part of the counterintelligence operation. What is it that you think you could possibly gain that would be of any use for my brain? How would that help your situation? So I just think there's a tendency to kind of dramatically rationalize this as targeted, highly strategic, massively successful, influential. And he may, as we've said, like there are clearly instances in history where it really did matter, but on the face of it, it's a, yeah, we would need a very complex understanding of what's actually been transacted here before jumping to conclusions, I think. Well, I'd like to think that spy services would like to know how we're preparing for this podcast. Well, this is the thing. It's so narcissistic. Like there were

55:49these headlines, these headlines in the British press that I was mocking on Twitter, which was like, who's next? It's like, you know, who gets to be seduced by MSS next? It's literally sort of because I'm so precious and so important. And so surely they're going to want to send some glamorous spy after me. It's, it's at some level, it's such a, it's such an x-ray through the mind of, of the West. Well, if any spies out there want to know, just write us an email. We'll include you on our emails. But otherwise, come to the live show. It's a classic rendezvous for this kind of thing. Yeah, exactly. But for now, we should say goodbye. And of course, we'll be back next week with new Data Points.

56:37Ones and Twos is written and edited by Adam and me and produced by Claudia Tatey. The show is made possible through the support of foreign policy readers and ones and twos listeners. As always, we love getting listener feedback. You can leave voice messages on the ones and twos homepage on foreignpolicy.com or email us that's podcasts at foreignpolicy.com or you can tweet us that's at ones and twos pod. I'm Cameron Abadie. Thank you very much for listening, and we'll be back in your feed next week. Hi, I'm Katie, your friend and jeweler at Shane Company. As a Shane Company jewelry consultant and gift insider, here are my top three engagement ring trends for a magical holiday proposal. Vintage inspired styles with intricate details,

57:35bold rings with thicker gold bands, and unique diamond shapes like antique cushion. We have so many beautiful ring styles and diamonds in stock to compare side by side. Plus, we'll protect your ring with our all-inclusive free lifetime warranty. Visit us in-store or at shaneco.com. Shane Company, your friend in jeweler.

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